

died in the Holocaust, as other relations did. Having arrived in Moscow in 1934, aged ten, and taking on citizenship five years later, Wolf became one of the few bilingual functionaries of German extraction. In 1943, Wolf was chosen to attend the Comintern's training school, which was engaged in the formation of a small group of top KPD functionaries to run Germany after the defeat of the Third Reich. Wolf's adoption of the Stalinist tenets of unquestioning discipline, undeterred by the purges of the mid-1930s or the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, and his identity as a socialist 'true believer' made him precisely the type of loyal *apparatchik* Moscow required after 1945 to serve in the Eastern European satellite states. Appointed to the nascent East German foreign intelligence service in 1951, Wolf headed HV A from 1956 until his departure in 1986; thereafter, his links with leading KGB figures remained close. If Wolf's reform-communist face of the later 1980s is widely regarded as a mask, then his success as its head goes largely unquestioned. There can, however, be little doubt that Wolf knew precisely what his functions in the communist system required: to act in any manner along with the MfS to preserve SED rule. While the highly urbane and intellectual Wolf stresses the high degree of personal antipathy between himself and Mielke, there is absolutely no reason to believe that their working relationship suffered from this. Wolf's successor, Großmann, a long-serving officer in HV A, was less creative and a more compliant partner for Mielke.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Richter P. and Rösler K. 1992: 133–4.

IN THE OPERATION AREA

PARALLELS BETWEEN THE BND AND HV A

During the early 1990s, Wolf and his former officers claimed that HV A had acted no differently from the West German foreign intelligence service, the BND. Historians of the Stasi have tended to stress the differences while opting to omit the parallels between the actions of the BND and HV A. In contrast to HV A, the BND is presented as a foreign intelligence service protecting a democratic republic using secret service methods within the framework of legality and parliamentary accountability.¹ However, studies of the BND have drawn quite different conclusions, pointing to structural similarities with HV A. Particularly during the early years of the Bonn Republic, the BND's relationship with parliamentary democracy was at best ambivalent. The BND was the only West German authority to have an unbroken line of continuity with the Nazi era. Continuity was particularly pronounced during the Gehlen era (1942–68). Gehlen, the first head of the BND, had headed the Nazis' intelligence apparatus in the East and many of his personnel shared a similar past. The organisation's objectives also remained rooted in the Third Reich's pronounced anti-communism, substituting the organisation's constitutional duty to serve democracy with its own hostility to the West German mainstream left, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and trade unions. Particularly before the reforms initiated in 1967, hundreds of files were built up on SPD and trade union leaders. Throughout the life of the old Federal Republic, West German citizens' postal correspondence and telephone conversations to and from the GDR, and more generally the Eastern bloc, were randomly monitored. During the 1970s, it is estimated that some 10,000 letters were sent each day for intelligence evaluation by the BND.² In theory, the BND had no West German 'unofficial collaborators' on their books; however, in practice, information flowed to the BND from as many as 5,000

¹ See, for example, Schell M. and Kalinka W. 1991: 220–22.

² Schmidt-Fenboom E. 1993: 59–60; *Der Stern*, no. 47, 1978.

sources, who functioned as *de facto* agents.³ The extent of the BND's operations against West German citizens led one commentator on the West German foreign intelligence during the 1970s and 1980s to conclude that:

Exerting influence on the trade-unions, directing the press, infiltrating research institutions, or secret co-operation with the church, was part of the BND's every day activities. In some important areas of society there are more agents employed than salaried staff. In this respect the BND's success is less that it proved itself an efficient foreign intelligence service, than it succeeded in establishing itself, largely undetected, as the fifth power in the state along with the three official state authorities and a genuinely free media.⁴

While there are evident and significant differences between the BND and HV A, especially in terms of the scale of surveillance of their own citizens, the attempt to make a distinction between 'good' spies, who defended democracy, and 'bad' spies, who served communist dictatorships, should not be allowed to go unchallenged.

ESPIONAGE AGAINST WEST GERMANY: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DÉTENTE

The early years of East German espionage against the FRG were conditioned by the Cold War era of open antagonism between the power blocs. In inter-German relations, this was symbolised by the building of the Berlin Wall and the adoption of the Hallstein Doctrine, according to which Bonn would break off diplomatic relations and financial aid with any country recognising the GDR as an independent state. The GDR's isolation from the West accorded well with the worldview of Mielke, who believed that contact with West Germany risked undermining the always fragile legitimacy accorded to SED rule. However, as discussed in earlier chapters, caught between Brezhnev's new direction in foreign policy and the West's desire to reduce international tensions, Ulbricht was ejected as SED leader. His replacement, Erich Honecker, was given the task of addressing détente in its specifically German incarnation: the *Ostpolitik* adopted by the SPD-FDP coalition under Chancellor Willy Brandt. The central tenet of foreign policy in the Honecker era was the achievement and consolidation of international recognition of the GDR, while maintaining sufficient distance from the Federal Republic to prevent a challenge to SED rule from within its own borders. The improvement in inter-German relations had its drawbacks for the SED as the rapid increase in personal contacts across the border was thought to entail the expansion of 'subversive' political contacts and the rise of anti-socialist social forces. In accordance with this East German interpretation of events, not only was HV A called upon to take advantage of official representation in West Germany

³ Schmidt-Eenboom E. 1993: 345-6.

⁴ Ibid., 363.

and closer inter-state contacts as a springboard to the further penetration of political and economic life there but its role in the struggle against critics of the SED in the two Germanies received a further boost.⁵ The consequence was a stepping up of HV A operations against the FRG and the comprehensive infiltration of West German political and economic life, universities and research institutes, the peace movement and the churches, the military and GDR critics in West Berlin, thus making it one of the strongest foreign intelligence agencies in the world. MfS agents were placed in research units and university departments concerned with GDR research, such as Walter Völkel (IM 'Rosenow') of the GDR Archive of the Free University in West Berlin and Professor Dietrich Staritz (IM 'Erich') of the GDR research centre at the University of Mannheim, as well as in the broader context of East-West relations Peter Heilmann of the Evangelical Academy in West Berlin and Professor Hans-Dieter Jacobsen (IM 'Hoffmann') of the Otto Suhr Institute.⁶ Although in the 1970s and 1980s the MfS pursued critics such as Wolf Biermann and Jürgen Fuchs who had found residence in the West, at least it did not carry out the kind of ruthless kidnappings which occurred in the 1950s of critics in West Berlin such as the lawyer Walter Linse and the author Karl Wilhelm Fricke.⁷ However, as space does not permit an examination of all these areas, the focus will be on the penetration of nerve centres in the political, economic and security spheres.

PENETRATION OF WEST GERMAN POLITICS: THE GUILLAUME AFFAIR

In 1974, shortly after the Brandt administration's success in implementing its flagship *Ostpolitik*, the Chancellor's personal aid, Günter Guillaume, was exposed as an HV A agent.⁸ Guillaume was the classic example of the Stasi-schooled agent, who had been floated into West Germany on the mid-1950s tide of refugees; he worked as part of a husband-and-wife team, which rose through the SPD's ranks from the local Frankfurt-am-Main branch to the Chancellor's inner circle. By 1972, Guillaume relayed detailed information from the Chancellor's Office to East Berlin on *Ostpolitik* and the foreign policy position of West Germany's allies. During Günter Guillaume's four years as a personal assistant to Brandt, his access to top secret domestic and foreign policy materials ensured that he was run directly by Wolf.⁹ This was not the

⁵ Siebenmorgen P. 1993: 125-6.

⁶ Knabe H. 1999: 287-94, 344-8, 375-6, 399, 408-9.

⁷ Ibid., 305-26.

⁸ On the affair, see, among many other accounts, Childs D. and Popplewell R. 1999: 142-3 and Koehler J. O. 1999: 151-63.

⁹ On the other hand, a recent examination of SIRA records indicates that the information provided by Guillaume and his wife may not have been as significant as hitherto assumed; see Frank R. 2002: 123.

first time that Brandt had come into the Stasi's gun sights. In the late 1950s, when Brandt was mayor of West Berlin, HV A had tried to bring about his 'political death' in a disinformation campaign labelling today's anti-communist cold warrior as yesterday's fellow travelling Nazi, who had cooperated in the occupation of Norway, where he had lived as an émigré since 1933. Unlike the events of 1974, the earlier attack failed to take out its political target, not least because Brandt's role as an anti-fascist was beyond question.¹⁰

There is much irony in the situation as MfS machinations in 1972 had helped thwart a CDU/CSU attempt to depose Brandt as chancellor by the constitutional device of a constructive vote of no confidence. A successful vote in the Bundestag would have enabled the CDU candidate, Rainer Barzel, to replace Brandt, and to overturn the social-liberal coalition's *Ostpolitik* and the Eastern Treaties which it was negotiating with the Soviet Union and its allies. At this juncture as Brandt was regarded as the lesser of two evils, the MfS intervened: the CDU deputy Julius Steiner received an advance payment of 50,000 DM via HV A Department II for his vote in favour of Brandt. His vote proved to be crucial as the chancellor only survived by a majority of two.¹¹ On balance, GDR interests dictated that Brandt was the lesser evil and that his *Ostpolitik* would help deliver international recognition of the GDR.

The fall of Brandt, who resigned after the spy scandal broke, did as much to make the reputation of East German espionage as it did to tarnish the name of West German counterespionage. However, Wolf has presented the uncovering of Guillaume as a significant setback for those 'moderates' in the SED who wanted to reduce East-West tension. According to this argument, top-level insider information on the position of a leadership divided over *Ostpolitik* helped persuade the SED's sceptics that Bonn was serious about the sea change in inter-German relations.¹² As ever, much remains unclear regarding elite attitudes towards *Ostpolitik*; however, if hardliners in East Berlin welcomed the impact of the spy-scandal, then Moscow, which was a primary beneficiary in the transfer of intelligence, was clearly worried by the anti-spy mania unleashed by the Guillaume affair.¹³ Perhaps of greater significance is that Guillaume merely sat on the tip of an espionage network which extended across Bonn and the West German party system.

WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES

East Berlin attached a high priority to infiltrating the West German federal and regional governments and the state machinery that drove them, as well as

¹⁰ 'Suche nach Blut an den Händen', *Der Spiegel*, no. 2, 1997, pp. 32-5.

¹¹ Knabe H. 1999: 15-16; Richter P. and Rösler K. 1992: 68; Wolf M. 1997: 156.

¹² Wolf M. 1997: 155-6.

¹³ Andrew C. and Gordievsky O. 1992: 38.

the parliamentarians, their research and support staff and the wider political parties themselves. HV A showed remarkable aptitude in maintaining a flow of information running eastwards. Although the SPD proved to be more porous than the other major political parties, HV A was able to infiltrate the entire spectrum of West German political life from high politics into the fringe groups. By the late 1990s, over 120 IMs had been identified who worked on behalf of the MfS in the political parties.¹⁴

A plethora of revelations of political espionage have hit the headlines since the fall of the Berlin Wall. A great blow to the SPD was the discovery that Karl Wienand, a former manager of the party's parliamentary group in Bonn, had spied for the Stasi for 13 years as IM 'Streit'. A long-serving senior party figure, he had been close to both Chancellors Brandt and Schmidt. Another revelation from the ranks of the SPD concerned Kurt Gröndahl, who had been recruited by the MfS as a radical left-wing law student in the mid-1960s, and went on to supply East Germany with a range of sensitive material from the Ministry of Inter-German Affairs. Between 1986 and 1988, his position as a political adviser to the West German permanent representation in East Berlin facilitated the supply of classified materials on Chancellor Kohl's policy towards the GDR.¹⁵ Since 1975, the SPD's Bonn headquarters had also been infiltrated by the secretary Doris Biesenbaum, who, for four years, was privy to all of the party's parliamentary business because of her work in the chief whip's office. Along with her husband, who had recruited her in the early 1970s, she earned some 20,000 DM annually. If ideological inclination reinforced with cash payments helps to explain the motivation of these moles, then the case of Armin Hindrichs (IM 'Taler') is more complex. In 1960, after a long period of imprisonment in East Berlin, Hindrichs agreed to take up residence in West Germany and to infiltrate the SPD. By 1972, Hindrichs was an SPD speaker on foreign policy in the Bundestag, and in 1983 became head of the party's documentation centre. Hindrichs, who was close to Herbert Wehner, had worked for the deputy parliamentary group leaders Horst Ehmke and Norbert Gensel. In 1996, he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Both Biesenbaum and Hindrichs were in key positions, able to influence opinion formation and decision making in the party.

Access to the Stasi's files indicates that Hindrichs was not the only former dissident imprisoned in the GDR to collaborate with the Stasi. Wilhelm Borm, a high-profile FDP parliamentarian, similarly converted to communism during a nine-year stretch in Bautzen. After his release in 1960, Borm rapidly rose through the Free Democrats' hierarchy. From the 1960s until his death in 1987, he represented the party on committees dealing with domestic and foreign affairs as well as sitting on a highly selective committee comprising eight deputies who were kept informed of Bonn's treaty negotiations with

¹⁴ Knabe H. 1999: 47.

¹⁵ Koehler J. O. 1999: 188-9.

Moscow, Warsaw and East Berlin. Borm was a high profile 'influence agent' who openly advocated reconciliation with the GDR, making many parliamentary speeches and publishing newspaper articles, which had been written by HV A's Department X.¹⁶ Another unlikely recruit by East German espionage was the 'millionaire Marxist' Hannsheinz Porst, who had made his money as an entrepreneur in the mass photography market. Until his unearthing in 1967, Porst used his position in the FDP to establish high-level political and business contacts. The Stasi also succeeded in penetrating the FDP's administrative headquarters in Bonn, the agent's identity, however, remains unknown.¹⁷

By the late 1980s, infiltration of the CDU/CSU had become a top priority in East Berlin. Although no new names among the Conservatives' senior figures have come to light, the Stasi had amassed materials such as defence committee reports, internal party papers and advance copies of parliamentary reports. Furthermore, a 'second Guillaume' was passing information out of the Federal Chancellery, including preparations for Honecker's visit to the FRG.¹⁸ One interesting revelation is the role of IM 'Zady', who worked for the MfS in West Berlin between 1958 and 1989. 'Zady' had been recruited by the MfS Regional Administration in Dresden in 1954 before taking up his mission to infiltrate the CDU and a wide range of organisations which stood politically close to the party. 'Zady' did this with verve, joining some 25 organisations in addition to the West Berlin CDU; his reports filled 16 files and over 3,962 pages; the final file, from 1988 to 1989, was shredded. In addition to supplying membership lists, documents and situation reports, in 1975 'Zady' successfully penetrated a West Berlin group which planned to assist an engineer from Leipzig to defect; his efforts led to the East German's imprisonment for three years and nine months.¹⁹ An example of 'long-range' agents used against the CDU is that of the Otto brothers. In the early 1970s, Rainer Otto had been recruited by the Stasi and charged with infiltrating the Ministry of Inter-German Affairs. However, failing to make the grade, Rainer recruited his brother, Reinhard, who was a CDU member and adviser on economic affairs to the party's parliamentary group in the North-Rhine Westphalian *Landtag*. In this instance, the Stasi gained access to classified information in addition to that originally intended.²⁰ The long-serving agent Hans-Adolf Kanter ('Fichtel') was personally acquainted with Kohl from their early days in regional politics and he later served on the political staff of the management of and, as a lobbyist in Bonn, for the vast Flick business conglomerate. The latter positions enabled him to penetrate the secrets of the Flick Affair which broke out in the 1982 over the group's laundering of

¹⁶ Knabe H. 1999: 67–70.

¹⁷ Schlomann F. W. 1993: 107, 130; Wolf M. 1997: 114–18; Koehler J. O. 1999: 189–90.

¹⁸ Schlomann F. W. 1993: 108, 112–13, 128.

¹⁹ Informations- und Dokumentationszentrum Berlin 1998: 4.

²⁰ Koehler J. O. 1999: 190.

contributions since the mid-1970s to the three major political parties in return for tax concessions and other favours.²¹

The rise of the Greens during the 1980s brought with it an increase in HV A's efforts to penetrate the anti-Communist radical left. Dirk Schneider, a member of the party's executive committee and media spokesperson for its Bundestag group in the mid-1980s, had been recruited by HV A in 1975. Schneider's efforts to suppress the Greens' efforts to highlight human rights abuses in the GDR pushed many West Berlin activists out of the party. More seriously still, his information about his party's links to the East German opposition assisted in the arrest of several individuals, including the leading peace movement activist, Bärbel Bohley.²² Leaving no political stone unturned, HV A also penetrated right-wing extremist groups in West Germany.

THE SECRET SERVICES AND THE STATE BUREAUCRACY

Throughout the history of divided Germany, East Berlin succeeded in deeply penetrating the West German security services. The susceptibility of Stasi recruits to the overtures of a foreign secret service had its roots in a range of motives and pressures: vulnerability to blackmail and avarice, ideological idealism and 'operational' romances. The earliest infiltration of the West German intelligence service was the Soviets' recruitment of Heinz Felfe, who worked for the BND between 1951 and 1961, becoming head of the anti-Soviet section in 1958. For ten years, Moscow had top-level information from the nerve centre of West German intelligence. Although Felfe has stressed his motivation was anti-Americanism, it appears more likely that his past as an officer in the ranks of the Third Reich's intelligence service left him open to blackmail.²³ In keeping with the times, the recruitment of the BND officer Alfred Spuhler in 1968 derived from anti-militarism and socialist idealism. In the belief that West German rearmament was threatening to destabilise the power balance in Europe, Spuhler agreed to pass on material to East Berlin, including documentation on active agents working in the GDR. Alfred and his brother Ludwig, who had acted as a courier, were only finally found out following the defection of the same source who facilitated the exposure of the more famous Gabriele Gast.

The recruitment of Gast represented a major espionage success for HV A. She was recruited in 1970 by Department XV of the Karl-Marx-Stadt Regional Administration while researching for her doctoral thesis on the political role of women in the GDR. Her recruitment began after she fell in love with a

²¹ Gieseke J. 2001: 207; Knabe H. 1999: 55–6.

²² Sclitrenny R. and Weichert T. 1991: 46; Schlomann F. W. 1993: 109–10, 131–2; Knabe H. 2000: 73–9.

²³ Andrew C. and Gordievsky O. 1991: 452–3; Wolf M. 1997: 51.

Stasi agent called 'Karliszek'; however, something of a political transformation sealed this upper-middle-class student's support for communism. Gast became a model 'long-range' agent, who, after graduating from the University of Aachen in 1972, rose rapidly in the BND. Having served at the Soviet desk and acting as a West German intelligence service representative at meetings throughout the world from Washington to the Far East, in 1987 she was promoted to deputy head of BND's research into the Eastern bloc. Gast went on to write Chancellor Kohl's daily intelligence briefing, meaning nothing less than that the Stasi was sharing this information. The importance of the information Gast supplied is indicated by Markus Wolf's hands-on approach to running her: they met personally on seven occasions.²⁴ She would serve six years and nine months in prison.

The motivating power of avarice is exemplified in classic fashion by the 1980s penetration of the West German security service, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* – BfV). One of Wolf's most important informants in the BfV was Klaus Kuron. Having joined the BfV in 1962, Kuron became head of Department 4, which 'ran' former HV A agents who had been 'turned', the so-called 'countermen'. However, the lack of a degree-level education blocked his career path and limited his salary scale. Kuron became increasingly resentful of younger, to his mind less able, colleagues who passed him on the professional ladder. It was this desire for greater financial reward and professional recognition that precipitated his initial 'walk in' offer to East Berlin in September 1981. After a series of mandatory security checks, Wolf, along with other senior HV A staff, met Kuron in Austria in 1982 and accepted his financial demands, which effectively doubled his remuneration by the BfV. HV A received a high return on its investment, discovering which of their agents had been 'turned' as well as gaining information on the personal problems of BfV's officers, such as debt, extra-marital affairs or alcoholism, greatly assisting the Stasi's own counterespionage operations.²⁵ During Kuron's nine years in the service of the Stasi, he 'betrayed' at least 18 GDR agents who had become 'doubles'. In order to ensure that HV A's detection of 'turned' agents did not lead to Kuron coming under suspicion, Wolf agreed only to relocate these 'doubles' from sensitive positions to unimportant backwaters.²⁶ In 1990, when Kuron gave himself up to the authorities, his role as an HV A agent took his superiors completely by surprise. He was later sentenced to 12 years in prison.

A further serious setback for West German counterespionage was the defection of Hannsjoachim Tiedge in August 1985. Tiedge had worked for the BfV since 1966, reaching the position of head of the counterintelligence department. Tiedge's defection was motivated by a desire to wipe clean his

²⁴ Reichenbach A. 1992: 71–82; Gast G. 1999: 177–213, 273–5, 281–2.

²⁵ Reichenbach A. 1992: 82–5; Koehler J. O. 1999: 164.

²⁶ Schmeidel J. 1995: 141; Schlomann F. W. 1993: 142–5.

gambling debts and the offer of treatment for his escalating alcoholism. His recruitment handed East Germany highly sensitive intelligence information, including the nature of all ongoing West German operations inside the GDR, and the identity of East Germans working for the West. Tiedge also wrote an exposé of the BfV's counterespionage methods in the form of a 'doctoral thesis' for the Humboldt University. The very fact that an individual with alcohol and debt problems had undergone no security clearance update in 16 years points to serious lapses on the part of the BfV itself.²⁷ The *Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (LfV), the regional security service, which complemented the BfV's counterespionage activities and monitored domestic political extremism, was also infiltrated in each of its 11 branches. In addition to its officers' early inexperience, financial reasons and career frustrations provided the primary motivation for the 'walk in' offers of cooperation with East German intelligence. In this manner, HV A gained access to valuable information on which of their agents had been 'turned', West German counterespionage methods and ongoing operations; several double agents were imprisoned in East Germany as a direct result.²⁸

Military counterintelligence also proved susceptible to East German penetration. After the fall of the GDR, the one-time deputy head of West German military intelligence (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst*), Joachim Kruse, was unearched as a mole; between 1973 and his death in 1988, Kruse had passed top-secret intelligence information to the Stasi. Once again the motivation was thwarted career ambitions: Kruse resented younger staff, with the formal educational requirements, stepping into the positions he felt should rightly be his own. As deputy head of counterespionage, Kruse had coordinated all intelligence operations and knew the active personnel. Not only did Kruse pass this information to East Berlin, but, more gravely still, Moscow received the coordinates pinpointing the secret location of the USA's Poseidon tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany.²⁹ This case also illustrates the interconnection of the 'domestic' arm of MfS with HV A in operations in the Federal Republic. Kruse was not run by Wolf's organisation, but by the deputy head of Main Department II (counterespionage). This was no exception as it reflected Kruse's importance to the Stasi; for example, the payroll of Main Department VIII included policemen and local government employees with access to computer data covering West German citizens' occupational and residential location.³⁰

The West German state apparatus was also peppered with spies, who were often placed in strategically significant posts dealing with Bonn's foreign policy and NATO's defence strategies. East Berlin was able to gain valuable information on foreign relations through the work of moles in Bonn's diplomatic corps. Between 1961 and the fall of the Eastern bloc, Hagen Blau

²⁷ Childs D. and Popplewell R. 1999: 166–7.

²⁸ Koehler J. O. 1999: 192–3; Richter P. and Röslér K. 1992: 58–9.

²⁹ Koehler J. O. 1999: 171.

³⁰ Reichenbach A. 1992: 151.

rose through the ranks of the Foreign Ministry, passing on information which provided a valuable overview of foreign policy from his postings across the three continents of Europe, Asia and Latin America. Blau had been recruited on the basis of his support for socialism. However, Ludwig Pauli, another senior diplomat in the Foreign Ministry, is the only known agent who fell into a Stasi 'honey trap', being unable to resist the charms of a Yugoslavian during a posting to Belgrade. Until 1989, Pauli also supplied details of West German foreign policy from its embassies and consulates, including Edinburgh and Liverpool, as well as Bonn itself.

The Ministry of Defence was also penetrated by HV A. The most serious case was that of the agent couples Lutze and Weigel. The *spiritus rector*, Lothar Lutze, had spent his childhood years in the Young Pioneers in Thuringia before his parents moved to West Germany; an enduring ideological tie to East German communism had been forged. Lutze recruited his wife, Renate, who was employed as secretary to the director of social affairs, and Jürgen Weigel, another secretary.³¹ Even more significant was the information travelling eastwards from NATO headquarters on the Western Allies' military strategy and planning. Not only did HV A manage to recruit multilingual secretaries who were relocated from Bonn, but a number of earlier recruits also found their way to Brussels. While working at the West German trade mission in 1968, Herbert Kemp was recruited by two HV A men who posed as representatives of the firm ITT. After this 'false flag' recruitment, Kemp supplied the Stasi with material from Bonn's permanent diplomatic representation in Brussels. Similarly, the 'walk-in' offer of cooperation from the navy cryptographer Heinz-Helmut Werner in 1974 took the Stasi from the Bundeswehr's command and control centre in Nuremberg to NATO headquarters. Werner supplied some 1,200 NATO documents, including materials on the debate among member states on the deployment of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the West's policy intentions concerning Germany, and its negotiating position in the arms race; he also provided Soviet military intelligence with technical and operational material on code breaking.

The most serious case of cold-war espionage against NATO came to light only in 1993, following the supply of information by the former HV A officer Heinz Busch. Rainer Rupp ('Topaz') had been recruited by HV A as a 'long-range IM' while he was involved in the 1960s student movement, and, on his handler's advice, sought to obtain a position in NATO. In 1972, Rupp recruited his British wife, Anne-Christine ('Türkis'), who then co-operated in supplying documents from her various desks in Brussels until the birth of their first child. From 1977, however, Rupp was himself employed by NATO, beginning 12 years of top-level espionage activity. Rupp not only supplied a vast quantity of high quality material, concerning the Western Allies' military planning and nuclear first strike policy, but put inaccessible

³¹ Reichenbach A. 1992: 126; Richter P. and Rösler K. 1992: 58.

jargon into easily digestible reports; this material, which was passed to Moscow, had obvious implications in the event of an international crisis.

ROMEOS AND SECRETARIES

HV A's Romeo agents did not restrict their activities to Bonn's secretarial pool. However, according to Markus Wolf, it was his agents' success in this area that will probably secure his place in espionage history. Although the exact number of secretaries seduced into cooperating with the Stasi may never be accurately established, one informed estimate places the figure at some 60 'Juliets'.³² Romeo agents were used throughout the history of the GDR, with their collection of intelligence peaking during the 1970s. At some point during the late 1950s the recruitment of Romeo agents was stepped up. The selection procedure, according to Wolf, was extremely rigorous: scouts working in the SED, its youth organisations and the universities identified possible agents, who were eliminated by background checks and interviews until some 1 per cent of the initial number remained. Those selected then underwent a training programme at the HV A training school, which included a dry-run mission in the West. The new 'graduates' were then sent to either Bonn, under an assumed identity, or to one of the holiday resorts in southern and eastern Europe, such as the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, which were known to attract single secretaries who were 'looking for love'. Both the initial pick-up and the escape route in the event of difficulties were planned in detail. Once the secretary had taken the bait and fallen for the agent, a back-up network of couriers and controllers was put in place to deliver the fruits of espionage to East Berlin. Wolf's denial that blackmail was used has a hollow ring.

The targeted secretaries corresponded to a given profile: they were entering middle age (the secretaries' average age was 38) and lacked strong links to their parents and wider families.³³ The significance attached to the recruitment and running of these women is exemplified by instructions from Wolf in 1970 that 'scientific' investigations be carried out into the process. The resulting dissertation compiled by two HV A colonels received the commendation '*magna cum laude*'.³⁴ If it was necessary to retain a secretary who began to doubt either her romance or role in espionage, then all means were sanctioned by HV A from 'operational (that is, invalid) marriages' to a bogus priest taking confession. HV A showed great patience, slowly manoeuvring their recruits into positions with access to sensitive materials, waiting while they moved from the private to the public sector or underwent professional

³² Reichenbach A. 1992: 103. Between 1965 and 1980, 15 secretaries were caught; their sentences were relatively light, amounting to up to five years' imprisonment: see Koehler J. O. 1999: 183.

³³ Reichenbach A. 1992: 103-4.

³⁴ Knabe H. 1999: 58.

retraining. Interestingly, however, the West German authorities' contemporary reports as well as the secretaries' later statements point to their voluntary co-operation motivated predominantly by love of a man over that of a country.³⁵

The aim of this type of intelligence operation was to gain access to the state secrets of the West German government, the bureaucracies of the governing parties and the state apparatus. HV A had found a rich seam of information, with early successes including material fuelling the East German campaign against the chief of Chancellor Adenauer's office, Hans Globke, who resigned in 1963 amid a barrage of propaganda concerning his Nazi past. However, if the 1960s proved to be the period of successful recruitment, then the 1970s increasingly became the age of these agents' exposure. The arrest of agents was not new, the first 'Juliet' had been caught in 1958, but the scale of the West German campaigns against this form of espionage expanded rapidly in the late 1970s. The first case to hit the headlines was that of Dagmar Kahlig-Scheffer, recruited by HV A in 1973 while working as a journalist's researcher before starting work in Chancellor Schmidt's office. Her arrest followed the BfV's introduction of a system of computer-based name traces, which identified her controller in Düsseldorf as a Stasi officer. She subsequently discovered that her marriage to her Romeo was an 'operational marriage' as he was already married.³⁶ In the course of 1979, one disclosure of East German espionage followed another. The first arrest was that of Ingrid Garbe, a secretary in the West German mission to NATO, followed by the defection of Ursel Lorenz, another secretary based at NATO's headquarters in Brussels. Before the storm subsided, Ursula Hoefs, a secretary in the CDU's Bonn headquarters, was arrested. This triggered East Germany's withdrawal of Inge Goliath, an employee of a CDU-funded research institute, and Christel Broszcy, who had worked for four CDU party chairmen, fled to East Berlin. Helga Roediger, who had been an assistant to a senior civil servant in the foreign ministry, followed in their immediate train. According to Wolf himself, this represented only the tip of the iceberg: between 1972 and 1982, 30 agents were arrested and some 100 withdrawn as the BfV came close to identifying them.³⁷ It was a change in the BfV's tactics that had led to the spate of exposures, which, with such scope for public interest, ensured that the Western media had a field day retelling the spying-for-sex story with a modern twist.

COLD WAR PARTISANS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The role of IMs in the West extended beyond the gathering of political and economic information to the assignment of a military function to suitable

³⁵ Wolf M. 1997: 124; Schmeidel J. 1995: 145-6.

³⁶ Koehler J. O. 1999: 183.

³⁷ Wolf M. 1997: 133.

members of their ranks. When an IM signed the official statement obliging him/her to work with the Stasi, notions of antimilitarism, patriotism and helping to preserve world peace were often prominent. However, even during the 1980s, when the Politbüro endlessly discussed the matter, the SED's so-called 'peace policy' was essentially a concomitant of its general search for international and domestic legitimacy. At home, the 'peace policy' was turned into campaigns in the factories for higher production, using slogans such as 'my workplace - the place from which I struggle for peace'.³⁸ In fact, throughout its existence HV A was involved in the Stasi's military preparations for the anticipated final conflict with the West. Despite his claims to the contrary, documentary evidence now identifies Markus Wolf as a leading figure in training these forces.³⁹

The East German intelligence and security services were not only concerned with fighting battles on the 'invisible front' but along with the Central Committee and the NVA they also played a key role in organising a communist fighting force which was to function behind enemy lines. The number of Stasi officers involved in coordinating these activities was extensive. Since the 1950s but more systematically from 1964 onwards, the Stasi had trained special taskforces to function as partisan fighters, whose tasks included sabotaging the supply of essential services, such as gas and water, disrupting the public transport system and in particular playing a key role at the beginning of a war against the FRG.⁴⁰ Between 1964 and 1984, about 3,500 staff took part in such courses and the coordinating unit was eventually called the Working Group of the Minister/Special Questions (*Arbeitsgruppe des Ministers/Sonderfragen*). A secret military organisation in the West German Communist Party was set up in 1968-69; 20 years later, it had 200 members. From the mid-1970s, members were trained in camps in the GDR by MfS and NVA staff with the aim of creating a fifth column in the FRG. Under the leadership of the veteran Communist Harry Schmidt, the West Germans learned how to take up arms, conduct strategically planned acts of sabotage and liberate captured comrades.⁴¹ It was also envisaged that certain carefully selected IMs in the West would take part in a future invasion force, particularly in West Berlin, which had been planned in detail by the SED leadership. For these purposes, arms dumps had been carefully hidden in strategic locations throughout Europe.⁴²

The Stasi's campaign to assist the West German peace movement's protests against stationing NATO nuclear missile on German territory must be seen in

³⁸ This features strongly in the meetings of the Politbüro; see, for example, SAPMO DY 30/2218.

³⁹ Knabe H. 1997: 14.

⁴⁰ Fingerle S. and Gieseke J. 1996; Gieseke J. 2001: 216-17; Auerbach T. 1999: 10-11, 15-17, 22, 49.

⁴¹ Gieseke J. 2001: 217; *Der Spiegel*, no. 1, 1990, pp. 65ff and no. 2, 1990, pp. 61ff.

⁴² Knabe H. 1997: 17.

the light of these Eastern bloc military concerns. In order to influence Bonn's defence policy during the Second Cold War of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Stasi set up a regional headquarters to direct a network of agents.⁴³ Its role included influencing grassroots members of the SPD, the Greens and the FDP against the West German government's decision to station nuclear weapons in the hope of affecting party policy. An attempt to influence the SPD's 1981 congress 'from below', however, had absolutely no impact.⁴⁴ The Stasi also funded organisations sympathetic to its objectives, such as 'Generals for Peace', which alone received some 100,000 DM.⁴⁵

The Stasi's connections to the Red Army Faction (RAF), under Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, are also to be understood in terms of East German preparations for the final conflict with the West.⁴⁶ Declassified documentation confirms that the Stasi's support for the RAF and other 'international terrorists', which was coordinated by the Main Department XXII, was considerably greater than contemporary observers had ever suspected. However, their relationship was characterised by the maxim 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'. The RAF did not regard East Germany as a model society, but accepted military training and, after 1977, asylum in the GDR. The *quid pro quo* was that when the moment finally came to destabilise West Germany the RAF too would join the fifth column of the Cold War's communist partisans.

The Cold War's division of the Third World into zones of influence also characterised the Stasi's wider relationship with the 'international terrorism' of the 1970s and 1980s – a period in which the Soviets optimistically believed they were gaining the upper hand in a politically polarised international climate. Throughout these two decades, the Stasi had close relations with a number of Third World states, some of which, such as Iraq and Syria, sponsored terrorist groups. Despite the evident risks exposure would cause to East German foreign policy, a common hostility to the former Western colonial powers was reinforced by the involvement of the Stasi and the KGB in the formation of secret services in Cuba, Zanzibar, Tanzania, Ghana, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan and South Yemen. Although the Soviet Union was the major player in the Third World, East Berlin also trained guerrilla fighters from South Africa (ANC), Namibia (SWAPO) and Rhodesia (ZAPU).⁴⁷ It should be remembered, however, that if conditions in the Third World seemed to favour the expansion of Eastern bloc influence, then relations within the Soviet world were at times severely strained. In the Honecker era, this was above all the case during the events in Poland during 1980–81, with the formation of the independent trade union Solidarity.

⁴³ Sélitrenny R. and Weichert T. 1991: 196–200.

⁴⁴ Knabe H. 1997: 12–13.

⁴⁵ Wolf M. 1998: 343.

⁴⁶ See Childs D. and Popplewell R. 1999: 138, 140–41; Koehler J. O. 1999: 387–401.

⁴⁷ Childs D. and Popplewell R. 1999: 140–41; Schleicher H-G. and Engel U. 1996.

Fearing that Poland was about to fall into the 'enemy camp', operative groups were active in Poland's main cities, while HV A's Department X (disinformation) was behind the propaganda and operational preparations which aimed to prevent strikes spreading to East Germany.⁴⁸

HV A AND 'EXTERNAL DEFENCE'

The HV A's role in guaranteeing the security of the GDR against internal 'political-ideological subversion' and the activities of the 'political underground' amounted to a cross-border operation in close cooperation with Main Department XX, which had the specific task of rooting out individuals and groups critical of SED rule. Since the formation of the GDR, the organisations on the receiving end of HV A's measures of 'external defence' ranged from groups promoting political and human rights, such as the Alternative List for Democracy and Amnesty International, to environmental groups like Green Peace. By 1985, some 150 West German organisations stood on the Stasi's list of external enemies.⁴⁹ In 1987, as the church-based, inter-bloc peace movement of the 1980s grew in strength, HV A set up counterintelligence units to 'neutralise' activists in the GDR and reconnoitred their contacts with churches in West Germany.⁵⁰ East Berlin's ideologically driven interpretation of the influence of external forces in producing domestic opposition was highlighted in a Politbüro report from 1986 on the opinions and attitudes of youth in East Germany. The report stressed that the West was attempting to form a 'political opposition' in the GDR by exploiting these environmental and civil rights organisations.⁵¹ With a worldview that attributed opposition to SED rule to subversive influences emanating from the West, it was axiomatic, at least in the SED's terms, that HV A should be involved against peace and civil rights activists in the GDR too. HV A's struggle in the Operation Area involved infiltrating IMs into these organisations in order to gather material for disinformation campaigns, including smear campaigns against individuals, and fomenting distrust and discontent within the organisations themselves. A case study of HV A's campaign against the International Society for Human Rights details the role of IMs in 61 'operational cases'.⁵²

A typical example of the Stasi's methods of conducting an 'operational campaign' against an organisation involved in publicising its criticisms of the GDR is provided by the Society for Former Political Prisoners, which had several thousand members in the FRG. In the early 1980s, the election of a

⁴⁸ Tantzsch M. 1995: 2610–13, 2642, 2662–3, 2750–55.

⁴⁹ Wüst J. 1996: 37–53.

⁵⁰ Fricke K. W. 1997: 25; Sélitrenny R. and Weichert T. 1991: 214.

⁵¹ SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039.

⁵² Wüst J. 1996: 37–53.

new branch chairman in West Berlin was contested by a woman member, who claimed that the new chairman had 'touched her up' and repeatedly made obscene phone calls to her. Although the branch membership continued to support the new chairman until these allegations could be substantiated, he resigned in order to enable the organisation to resume its human rights activities. After 1989, it was discovered that the woman and her husband were IMs who had acted in accordance with instructions from their Stasi handlers.⁵³

The full extent of West German citizens who were the target of Stasi's actions remains unknown. However, an indication of the numbers involved – about 1,400 persons – can be derived from an incomplete listing compiled by the Stasi's East Berlin organisation. The GDR security services were particularly involved against former East German citizens who had been expelled to West Germany in order to eliminate them from 'troublemaking' at home. One example is the harassment of the author Jürgen Fuchs, a prominent GDR dissident who had been deported to West Germany. In September 1982 alone, he received intimidating anonymous phone calls, goods of a compromising nature were delivered to his home, home improvement companies frequently arrived expecting to carry out work, and taxis and the emergency services were called out in his name.⁵⁴ One of the leading authorities on the Stasi, Karl Wilhelm Fricke, uncovered an official communication from 1982 bearing Wolf's signature, which had been sent to the head of Main Department XX, Major General Paul Kienberg, providing information obtained by his intelligence service considered of value in the operational case against the prominent dissident Rainer Epplermann.⁵⁵ Critics of communist rule living in West Berlin and active in groups hostile to the SED regime, especially former East German citizens, were also subjected to harassment campaigns such as 'telephone terror', whereby an anonymous voice, normally in the early hours of the morning, would announce: 'We will get you'.⁵⁶ The Stasi was also involved in actions against at least one Marxist group, which tried to set up organisational bases in East Germany. During the 1970s, one such 'enemy' organisation was the Maoist (later pro-Albanian) Marxist-Leninist German Communist Party (KPD/ML).⁵⁷

CONCLUSION: SUCCESS IN ULTIMATE FAILURE

During the Honecker era, HV A was a highly effective intelligence service, running an extensive array of agents and informers in West Germany and not

⁵³ Interview with Jörg Drieselmann in Berlin on 26 August 1999.

⁵⁴ Knabe H. 1997: 13–14.

⁵⁵ Fricke K. W. 1997: 24.

⁵⁶ Interview with Jörg Drieselmann in Berlin on 26 August 1999.

⁵⁷ Wunschik T. 1997.

bound by the restraints on operations in democratic societies. Using a highly trained staff of professional officers and their IMs as well as the advantage of a common language, HV A was able to penetrate West German politics and society from its upper levels to areas of everyday life. In politics, East Berlin gained an important insight into Bonn's decision-making process, conflicts among the political elites, the function of the state apparatus which drove government in the Federal Republic, and its policy towards the GDR. In economic life too, the GDR economy benefited both financially and technically from the fruits of espionage. In military espionage, access to the secrets of the Western Allies' planning and intentions would certainly have meant a severe setback for any NATO-based military strategy. However, if HV A had been able to obtain information a mile wide, then the SED's evaluation of this intelligence data was often an inch deep. The SED's strict adherence to an ideologically-based interpretation of how the capitalist West would act meant that intelligence information which ran against the political grain was often ignored.⁵⁸ Ironically, the ideology, which helped integrate and motivate HV A's officers, ultimately clouded the party's assessment of the true significance of the intelligence material obtained. In distorting perceptions of the West, the Marxism-Leninism which underpinned the MfS led to an overestimate of the steering influence of Western 'imperialists' as well as a failure to appreciate the GDR's lack of appeal for most West Germans.

Furthermore, care must be taken not to exaggerate the value of the information supplied by IMs. Wolf, for instance, has opined that much of Guillaume's data has been overrated and as has been observed by Leslie Colitt in his study of Wolf: 'As with so much espionage material, Guillaume's information had served largely to boost the ego and the budget of the HV A'.⁵⁹ The former HV A officers Richter and Rösler have argued that in later decades the decline in morale and the greater administrative load of HV A not only reduced efficiency but also resulted in data which, as elsewhere in the MfS, was world class only in its mediocrity.⁶⁰ And as discussed in Chapter 8, while the transfer of scientific and technological data was of significant value in the short term, one effect was to block much-needed economic reform while simultaneously reinforcing the GDR's dependence on Western know-how and failing to narrow the technological gap. Some of the data procured by HV A, GDR visitors to the West and the residents attached to GDR embassies in the West were of limited value. This was also often true of the information obtained by those cadres who visited the West from East Berlin's Institute for Politics and Economics, which cooperated closely with HV A. The academics' contacts with research institutes in the FRG elicited data which tended to be academic in nature rather than having a secret

⁵⁸ Fricke K. W. 1997: 22.

⁵⁹ Colitt L. 1995: 109.

⁶⁰ Richter P. and Rösler K. 1992: 108.

service content and of little more value than information gleaned from articles in a good weekly West German magazine like *Der Spiegel*.⁶¹ Moreover, the HV A Regional Departments, as in Gera and Magdeburg, seriously questioned whether the heavy investment of resources in the recruitment and running of agents produced its equivalent in worthwhile information.⁶²

It was the SED's ideology of the 'unity of reconnaissance and defence' which tied HV A to the Stasi's apparatus of domestic repression and to the belief that internal opposition was the work of foreign 'political-ideological subversion' of East German citizens. In the 1970s, HV A's role was primarily to supply the MfS's domestic units with relevant information concerning opposition to SED rule. However, with the rise of cross-border opposition movements in the aftermath of the events in Poland in the early 1980s and the inter-bloc peace and ecology movements, HV A's role became increasingly hands-on. Not only did HV A act against the 'external enemy' in the Operation Area, its regional branches also acted against the church-based opposition in East Germany. HV A's greater involvement in the work of the domestic apparatus is symbolised by its officers' participation in the efforts to suppress the demonstrators in East Berlin in October 1989 during the regime's 40th anniversary celebrations.⁶³ The fact that there has been a debate about the extent to which HV A played a part in the Stasi's domestic repression is a final testament to Wolf's, and his officers', adept use of their tradecraft. It represents no less than their final campaign of disinformation by one of the Cold War's most efficient intelligence services. In this respect we should not be overly surprised that Wolf has no wish to tell us the whole story of his role in sustaining the communist system; it was, after all, his job to prevaricate for a political purpose. However, as the researchers of the Gauck Authority uncovered the traces of HV A's actions, Wolf became the spy who had said too much, and one day's denial became the next day's reluctant admission.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Richter P. and Rösler K. 1992: 99–100.

⁶² Müller-Enbergs H. 1998: 259, 281.

⁶³ Richter P. and Rösler K. 1992: 143–4.

⁶⁴ For example, compare Wolf's denial of any role in the imprisonment of Georg Angerer in an effort to extract information in the late 1950s to discredit Willy Brandt as a fellow-travelling Nazi with a subsequent admission to having played a central role; see *Der Spiegel*, no. 18, 1993 and no. 2, 1997.

Part VII

THE OCTOPUS LOSES ITS TENTACLES