

Lecture 5

Where Is International Relations?

In this lecture and the next I continue to problematise the quasi-discipline of International Relations further by drawing attention to some idiosyncracies of its empirical base. The primary argument of the last two lectures has been that the debate between liberal and realist views of international relations has been a modern one. Yet simply to characterise realism as a 1930s riposte to the superficial idealism of 1920s is inaccurate. In one way, the architects of International Relations reach back too far, to Thucydides and Machiavelli; in another way they do not go back far enough, seeming blind to the direct nineteenth-century antecedents and political engagements of the earliest debates within the inchoate would-be discipline.

In order to clarify the position I tried to place the two traditions of liberalism and realism, such as they are, within a wider context of European thought. My provisional conclusion was that, far from being the dominant tradition of analysis, as the IR text books so often insist, political realism has been the late-comer, struggling to be born out of German idealism in order to challenge hegemonic

liberalism. Often sailing close to the whirlpool of liberalism, it has suffered frequent defections to idealistic schemes for world government, even in its era of triumph, because of the grave threat posed by nuclear weapons.¹

I now want to extend the argument to consider some ways in which contemporary concerns of the English-speaking nations during the second half of the twentieth century limited the scope of International Relations, dealing by and large with spatial limits in this lecture and historical ones in the next. This will also allow me, this week, to stir into the mix two missing elements: nationalism and Marxism, which add piquancy to the rich stew that is International Studies, and may even prove so acidic that they etch a hole in the pot.

There are two distinct aspects to spatial restriction, which I will take in turn following a lengthy methodological preface. I call them 'agenda setting' and 'case selection'. First of all, things look very different depending on whether you stand in Britain, the USA, France or Argentina. Each viewpoint suggests a different agenda. To those states that had so recently fought at such great cost it

¹ Campbell Craig, *passim*.

seemed obvious, whether in 1918 or 1945, that war must be the central problem for International Relations because it was the central problem of contemporary international relations. This was far less evident to states that were *not* belligerents in the two world wars, or were only marginally engaged, and this has nowhere been more true than in Latin America, a region where there have been relatively few wars between states. There, the primary drama of international politics has seemed to be about setting the rules governing movements of goods, capital and labour.

Each viewpoint not only selects a different range of subjects as worthy of study, but also directs attention to a distinct universe of events and distinct parts of the world. From each, the extent and shape of the world looks different. A positive science of International Relations ought surely to be universal in application; testable against the history of any and every group of interacting polities. But this kind of testing is seldom attempted because, for most scholars, the grand narrative has been to do with war between the European Great Powers and the decisive involvement, from the twentieth century, of independent East Asian (Japan, China, Australia) and North American (USA, Canada) powers.

The would-be science rests on close examination of a single case. Yet the ways in which pre-conquest polities in Meso-America or pre-colonial polities in sub-Saharan Africa interacted were quite different to the ways European states of the same period related to one another. One reason why the Spanish were able to conquer Mexico and Peru was that they did not understand or obey the local rules governing armed combat. On the other hand they rapidly mastered the essence of local alliance systems and diplomacy, which more closely resembled their own. Also quite different to Europe were the processes governing interaction between polities in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. More subtle than this have been the differences that developed among the successor states of the Spanish empire in the Western hemisphere under conditions of relative autonomy from the European state-system. So do not be surprised when transgression of both varieties of spatial restriction – agenda setting and case selection – leads to South America.

I have already suggested ways in which the international society tradition is associated with Britain through the Cambridge-based British Committee and the so-called English School, and since

both James Mayall and I are (literally in my own case) paid-up members, most of what I say will be permeated with Englishness. So I will say little more about it and leave you to draw your own conclusions.² All I would add is that members of the English School and some of its US allies have moved on from Bull and Watson's Eurocentric and modernist narrative of the expansion of a supposedly post-Westphalian states-system to a less present-centered and neo-colonialist comparative approach to world history that accepts the thesis that modernity emerged independently in many places, and did not simply spread from one.³ There is a small literature on the International Relations as a United States pursuit.⁴ You may consider this at your leisure.

In the advertisement for this lecture I also offered to sketch a French tradition, but – frankly – this is far too difficult to do in ten or fifteen minutes. It would include Jean Bodin (1530-1596), Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (1609-1755), Charles-Irénée Castel, Abbé de Saint Pierre, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It would run on through those mid-twentieth-century giants, Raymond Aron (1905-1983) and Jean-Paul Sartre

² . Dunne, Linklater, Buzan, Anarch soc thirty years after.

³ . Buzan and Little; Wohlforth & Kaufmann; the EJIR article. Also Chris Bayly.

⁴ . Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science' *Daedalus* 106:3 (1977); Krippendorf 'American Approaches to IR' *Millennium* (1987).

(1905-1980) – coeval friends and opponents –to Albert Camus
(1913-1960), Franz Fanon (1925-1961), Paul Virilio (b. 1932) and
Jean Baudrillard (b. 1929).

Aside from time restrictions and the fact that I will be dealing a little with Virilio and Baudrillard in lecture 8, the substantive reason for not attempting to trace this story today is that my own less than fully developed fascination with the French tradition arises from the unique interaction between events and ideas in that country during the modern period, and I lack the time and knowledge to tell that story well enough to provide an intelligible context for the evolution of French thought. Lord of Europe in 1807, humiliated in 1815; a great power throughout the middle decades of the nineteenth century, but trounced by Prussia in 1870; victorious at enormous cost in 1918; occupied in 1940 (its fleet Copenhagened by the British, yet still an imperial power⁵); a victor once again in 1945, but on the verge of collapse in 1968. It is from this extraordinary experience that the extraordinary character of French thought

⁵ . The English verb, ‘to Copenhagen’ had fallen out of normal usage by the early twentieth century, but had been current during the previous century. To Copenhagen was to attack a neutral without warning, as the British had done in 1807, seizing the entire Danish fleet and a great quantity of naval stores. (http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume7_number2_aug08/PDFs/Bjerg.pdf). The only difference at Oran on 3rd July 1940 was that France had been an ally rather than an uncooperative neutral until less than a fortnight before. The British attack at Oran, which cost more than 1,000 French lives, is an excellent example of a wartime action which, though plainly unjustifiable and illegal might be considered essential.

derives. For those who do not read French, the best access points are probably the works of Stanley Hoffmann (b. 1928) and James Der Derian (born c.1960). The former, brought up in France and a French citizen since 1947, taught at Harvard from 1968 and wrote extensively on French politics and thought as well as international relations. The latter, operating on a narrower front first at Amherst and latterly at Brown, has been instrumental in introducing the ideas of Paul Virilio to an Anglophone audience.

Instead, I intend to spend the next half-hour thinking first about how the world looks from the southern republics of Argentina, Chile and Brazil and, secondly, what relations among these countries, and between each of them and the remaining South American republics, might look like to anyone from elsewhere who took the trouble to examine them. The path to South America, however, passes first through the United States and Russia, two countries that contributed substantially to the development of nationalist international thought in the nineteenth century.

The story begins with Alexander Hamilton (1755 or 1757-1804) a prominent economic nationalist in the young North American confederation, and the first man to hold the office of Secretary of

the Treasury, from 1789-1795. Hamilton favoured state intervention to promote business, including the use of high tariffs to protect infant manufacturing industries, and though his influence waned following the 1800 presidential election and his death four years later, Hamilton's ideas, notably in the 1791 'Report on Manufactures,' were to continue to influence US thought during economic downturns, while the baton that fell when he died by the hand of Aaron Burr was taken up and ably carried by Henry Clay. Clay was the Kentucky lawyer who anticipated Mahatma Gandhi by more than a century when, in 1809, he proposed that members of the state legislature should wear homespun instead of imported British broadcloth. He went on, as a leading whig, to advocate protectionist tariffs, state provision of physical infrastructure and a national bank.

Those of you who take an interest in the world of contemporary multinational firms and their supposed iniquities may have read of ways in which these firms sometimes minimize the effects of tariffs or of taxation by manipulating the prices at which their local subsidiaries buy inputs from sister companies. Since what matters to shareholders and hence to managers is less the performance of each operating company than that of the whole enterprise, transfer

prices may be adjusted to maximize profits. Less well known is that what may be the first recorded instance of state action being taken against allegedly fraudulent use of transfer pricing occurred in the United States during the recession of the late 1820s. In those days the USA was the great example of a protectionist or mercantilist state, resisting the deprivations of British liberalism. Henry Brougham (1778-1868), a leading English whig, later to serve as Lord Chancellor (1830-34), but whose chief claim to fame is the establishment of Cannes as a leading Mediterranean resort, had suggested, back in 1816, that British merchants should flood the United States with goods in order to 'stifle, in the cradle, those rising manufactures ... which the war [with Napoleon's France] had forced into existence contrary to the natural course of things'.⁶ The Yankees were listening.

All of this is intended to drive home the point that the undoubted liberalism of the United States was conjoined for much of its first century-and-a-half, with mercantilist economic policies, so that the South American theories of international relations that I am about to describe, and even the strand of neo-Marxist thought that feeds into them through the work of Lenin, are to be seen as exhibiting

⁶ . Quoted by Edward P. Crapol in his *America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Westport CO: 1973) 8.

the influence of United States practice and ideas, and as being consistent with views that the United States would only renege upon when it ceased to be a revisionist power and became – in Carr’s terms – a *status quo* power.⁷ How the noses of John Coatsworth and Jeffrey Williamson’s must grow when they castigate Latin American nineteenth-century revenue tariffs as protectionist, knowing full-well from Williamson’s own extensive empirical research that the United States was every bit as protectionist at the time, if not more so.⁸ Only after 1942 did the United States start to wave a liberal flag and wag its finger at the rest of the world, kicking away the ladder it had so recently climbed.⁹ And, as will become clear in due course, a similar story can be told about the role of international law in the USA.

Returning to the nineteenth century, the influence of Hamilton spread first to Central Europe through Friedrich List (1789-1846), where it helped fuel the German Historical School that was to exert a reciprocal influence upon economists in the United States later in the century, before subsequently merged with other more or less

⁷ . For US influence on Lenin see Etherington.

⁸ . John H. Coatsworth and Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘Always Protectionist? Latin American Tariffs from Independence to Great Depression,’ *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 36:2 (May 2004). See my discussion of this point in Charles A. Jones, *American Civilization* (London: ISA, 2007), 58-9.

⁹ . All of this is nicely summed up in the works of Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang, notably *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem Press, 2002) and, in brief, at <http://www.paecon.net/PAEtexts/Chang1.htm>.

autonomous strands of economic nationalism that became prominent in India and Latin America in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and to provide the basis for a Third-World ideology during the mid-twentieth-century.¹⁰

Some of you may by now be beginning to chaff a little. Several pages further on we seem no nearer to the promised South America. But we have established the outline of a flotilla of economic nationalisms, opposed to British or Manchester School forms of liberalism, sailing toward British waters in line abreast, and in mutual communication, toward the close of the nineteenth century. You may also object that we seem to have deviated from International Relations Theory into International Political Economy or the History of Economic Thought, each generally offered at universities in the English-speaking world as a separate course of study.

To scotch that last objection I must hold back the convoy just a moment longer while the SS 'Lenin' clears the Channel and sails

¹⁰ . Examples include the Chilean, Francisco A. Encina, *Nuestra inferioridad económica* (Santiago 1912) and – far more important – the work of Romesh Chunder Dutt, generally known as R. C. Dutt (1848-1909), the long-serving and socially conservative Bengali civil servant, novelist and historian, who did most to popularise the commonplace interpretation of Indian history that blames the British for de-industrialization and famine.

out into the Atlantic to join the rest of the fleet. For one of the foundations of British nineteenth-century liberalism was the abstraction of the political and the economic as two clearly distinguishable ways of viewing society, and I want to spike that particular cannon before my little fleet comes within range.

The methodological challenge of the Latin American *dependentistas* of the 1960s lay in their rejection of the existing boundaries of states, the abstractions on which conventional disciplines had been based, and the disciplines themselves. For the *dependentistas* international political economy – or simply IPE, as it soon became generally known – was the signal for transgression of boundaries between states and between politics and economics. For scholars in the United States it was the birth of a sub-discipline of International Relations that examined the mutual influence of the economic and the political upon one another within a world of states. Hence the very titles of early US treatments like the 1970 *Power and Money: the Economics of International Politics and the Politics of International Economics* by Charles Kindleberger (1910-2003), the 1973 *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power* by Klaus Knorr (1911-1990) or the 1978 *Politics of International Economic*

Relations by Joan Edelman Spero. Each in its different way bore witness to the struggle to affirm disciplinary boundaries and state-sovereignty, even while transgressing both. International Political Economy – and this very phrase wobbles uneasily between its three component terms! – was from the very beginning and in its mere naming a methodological and ideological battlefield.

The incomprehension with which Kenneth Waltz and others in the USA and Britain read Vladimir Lenin's (1870-1924) little pamphlet on imperialism during the first phase of the Cold War was grounded in this attachment to the state and to the liberal separation of the economic from the political. Waltz, David Fieldhouse and others assumed that when Marxists wrote of base and superstructure they must be referring to economic forces and political institutions respectively. So in grounding the course of contemporary imperialism in pathologies of the capitalist mode of production, Lenin was taken, by Waltz, to be offering an explanation that was reductionist in the sense that it attributed political outcomes to economic causes. Since it was assumed by Lenin's critics that capitalism was a condition of national economies, Lenin could also be accused of a second form of reductionism, namely the attribution of a systemic outcome – the

outbreak of war between the European great powers in 1914 – to a unit-level cause, namely the workings of their several national economies.

I read Lenin differently. He was concerned with the effects of a transnational capitalist system – the material base – on superstructural institutions of several kinds, all moving in parallel and each regarded as one facet of a single phenomenon, which he chose to call imperialism. (Bear in mind that another use of the word ‘facet,’ perhaps its root usage, is to refer to one surface of a crystal or precious stone.) These facets included the process of division of territory among the great powers and a parallel, more than causal, division of world markets among oligopolistic firms. Once base is read as materiality and superstructure as institutions, it becomes clear that Lenin’s theory, inadequate though it was in its gross understatement of the productive potential of capitalism, was nothing if not a systemic theory in Waltz’s sense.

In Cold War readings of Lenin by Anglophone historians, international relations (lower case) and International Relations (upper case) bleed into one another. The first governs reading by scholars within the second, and the second seeks to contribute to

struggle in the first by attacking Leftist theories of imperialism. But it is to another of Lenin's works that I want now to refer briefly before finally turning to South America, and that is his economic history of Russia.¹¹

True to his belief that capitalism was a global system, Lenin argued that Russian economic development had been hindered by obstacles that had arisen because of the ways in which pioneering national economies in Western Europe had developed.¹² Rather than being untouched by capitalism, virginally awaiting development, peripheral economies had already been shaped by capitalist development in important ways, not least through the process referred to by classical economists as primitive accumulation: the forcible seizure of resources for use in core economies.

This insight was by no means unique to Lenin. We have already observed how economic nationalist thought was, by the time he wrote, well established in the Americas, Germany, and India. It is a strand of thought conventionally referred to in IPE text-books as

¹¹ . V. I. Lenin, *The Economic Development of Russia* (vol. 3 of *Collected Works*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1957??)

¹² . Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?' *World Development* 6:7-8 (1978) 881-924.

mercantilist, in which state direction of the economy is calculated to maximise national security or growth of the national economy as a whole relative to that of rival states.

Now the odd thing about mercantilism is that it is illiberal in its policy prescription precisely because it is *not* nationalist in its analysis of capitalism. It is because of their appreciation of the global character of markets and the penetrability of local economies that nationalists choose to devote resources to setting up defences. Liberals, by contrast, either follow Ricardo by regarding international trade as necessarily beneficial to both parties or else take the view – popular among United States modernization theorists of the 1950s and '60s such as Kennedy and Johnson's Assistant National Security Adviser, the virulently anti-Communist Walt Whitman Rostow (1916-2003) – that economic development is largely a national process, following a similar but more or less independent trajectory in one country after another.¹³ The reason why so many liberals should have come to this oddly nation-bound conclusion is, as we have already seen,

¹³ . Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960); bizarrely, the Swedish economist and historian, Mancur Olson, whose *Logic of Collective Action* was been one of the most influential texts in recent political economy, went for the same unit-level, unsystemic style of analysis in *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982).

that among the tacit abstractions of nineteenth-century liberalism, alongside the distinction between economy and polity, was the assumption that the nation state was a natural unit of analysis for the social and historical sciences.

All this has been by way of preface to the inclusion of twentieth-century Latin American thought about trade and investment in my *tour d'horizon* of international thought, and to its inclusion on all fours with the war-fixated Anglo-American tradition rather than as a footnote, to be dismissed as economic (and therefore secondary) or else heterodox, and as such consigned, in puzzlement, to a supplementary category of 'Marxist international thought' or the sub-discipline of IPE.

Combat or commerce: which is the more fundamental; which the more conflictual? This seems to me still an open question, and to those who think of commerce as an obviously pacific force – *doux* or sweet, as the French were apt to say¹⁴ – one may quote William

¹⁴ . Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). Hirschman, born in Berlin in 1915 and educated at the Sorbonne, the LSE and Trieste, is a fine example of the dying tradition of what another, Charles Kindleberger, called 'literary economists'.

Roscoe, an eighteenth-century Liverpool poet, writing about capitalism in 1787.¹⁵

But why with foolish fondness would you strive
To dress a devil in an angel's garb,
And bid mankind adore him? – Can it be,
That he, the foulest fiend that ever stalk'd
Across the confines of the suffering world;
He, the dread spirit of commercial gain,
Whose heart is marble, and whose harpy hands
Are stain'd with blood of millions; can it be
That he should personate the form divine
Of soft compassion, and perform the task
To her mild cares and lenient hand assign'd?

And so at last to Argentina! – Imagine yourself in the recently founded Central Bank in the later 1930s. Between 1880 and 1905 the country had experienced an average annual growth rate of 8 per cent; per capita income had risen from about one-third the US level to four-fifths, comparable to that of Canada or France. There had been massive immigration, and new technologies of transport and refrigeration had made possible considerable export diversification. The process continued, but wartime disruption and a populist turn in national politics after 1916 left the country poorly placed to cope with the collapse in commodity prices that followed

¹⁵ . William Roscoe, 'The Wrongs of Africa' (Part 1, 1787), reprinted in George Chandler, *William Roscoe of Liverpool, 1753-1831* (London: Batsford, 1953) 356.

the brief post-war boom. Finally forced off gold in 1930, the government fell victim later that same year to a military coup.

The leading question occupying officials at the Central Bank and the Economics Ministry by the later 1930s was whether it was prudent to trust to a revival in demand for traditional Argentine exports, bearing in mind the high tariff and non-tariff barriers that had been erected around most developed-country economies since 1914 and the fact that cereals and meat were products in which Argentina competed directly with United States producers.

Raúl Prebisch, working at the Central Bank, had noticed that, over time, prices of manufactured goods seemed to have held up better than those of primary products. It therefore seemed to make good sense to diversify, expanding the quite substantial manufacturing base that Argentina had already begun to establish behind a protectionist tariff. To the extent that this raised the prices of inputs to the agricultural and pastoral sectors, it made them less competitive than they would otherwise have been in world markets, thereby reducing incomes in the export sector. This in turn placed strain on the exchange rate and the domestic political balance between the traditional landowning oligarchy and the

growing urban working class. No matter. The autarkic strategy seemed vindicated when the USA turned savagely against Argentina in the late 1940s on the pretext of the country's very late and evidently reluctant abandonment of neutrality during the war.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Prebisch had in 1948 been appointed Director of a new United Nations institution, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or, in Spanish, CEPAL) and had set about theorizing his insight about the relative prices of primary and manufactured goods. The Singer-Prebisch theory is really little more than an elaboration of Engels' Law, which states that as household income rises, the proportion of each successive increment spent on food decreases. Extrapolating from this one would expect to see demand for industrial goods outpacing that for foodstuffs. The observation made independently by Prebisch and Singer was that the terms of trade between primary products and manufactured goods deteriorate in the long run. The sleight of hand here is that by no means all primary products are foodstuffs. Many are inputs to industrial processes or sources of energy, and nowadays this is becoming more and more true of crops formerly

¹⁶ . Callum MacDonald., 'The United States, Great Britain and Argentina in the Years Immediately after the Second World War,' in Guido Di Tella and D.C.M. Platt (eds.) *The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946* (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1986) 183-200.

used entirely for food or forage. In addition, the substantial literature on the terms of trade has challenged the accuracy of the Prebisch-Singer observation, which depends critically on the choice of base year. However the empirical observation was largely unquestioned when Prebisch first published it in 1950, and more important than the law-like secular deterioration was the theory that Prebisch advanced to account for it and the policies adopted in dozens of countries around the world on the strength of that theory.

For Prebisch, the really interesting question was how the countries that exported manufactured goods were able to retain their gains. His sociological argument was that there are systematic differences between primary production and industrial production that make the organization of labour and the development of oligopoly easier in the latter. His answer was a bundle of policies calculated to maximize gains from primary production while diversifying away from it. These included state or collective action to maximize and stabilize commodity prices through international agreements or export cartels, regional economic cooperation or integration, careful state management of multiple exchange rates, tight regulation of foreign-owned firms and the strategic

channelling of new direct foreign investment away from land and public utilities and into manufacturing and mineral extraction.

Together these policies flanked tariff protection of manufacturing industry in his ideal strategy, and for a time – throughout the 1960s, into the '70s and up to the crash of 1983 – all seemed to be going well in Mexico, Brazil, and even Argentina, though by this time the southern republic was in such political disarray that it was rapidly falling behind other newly industrializing countries.¹⁷

The appointment of Prebisch to head the newly formed United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, at a time when many newly independent states in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean were attempting to manage their economies under rules and institutions created in the 1940s to suit the existing industrialized economies, resulted in widespread adoption of simplified versions of Prebisch's prescription, known generically as Import Substituting Industrialization or ISI for short.

Prebisch's approach to international relations is generally referred to as Latin American structuralism, an over-used word which has a confusing multiplicity of meanings in the social sciences. But some

¹⁷ . On the international rivalries of this period and for more detail on Prebisch and ISI strategies see Charles A. Jones, *The North-South Dialogue: A Brief History* (Pinter, 1983).

name is needed to distinguish the family of thought and policy led by Prebisch and adopted by governments, many of which were authoritarian and mostly pro-capitalist, from a second Latin American approach to international relations with which structuralism is often confused. I refer to the dependency school or the *dependentistas*.

Based primarily in 1960s Chile, the dependency approach arose within the Marxist Left in opposition to the official Communist Party view, which favoured cooperation with other Leftists through Popular Front governments and affirmed the possibility of a non-violent road to socialism. The *dependentistas* denied this possibility and called for complete disengagement from the world economy. In crudest terms, the reasoning behind this was that long-run asymmetries and injustices in the operation of the world economy, including but by no means limited to the secular decline in the terms of trade, had distorted the class structures of peripheral economies to the extent that national bourgeoisies had simply never formed. Beyond the North Atlantic world, bourgeoisies of the sort that Tom Paine and Immanuel Kant had hoped would extirpate war, that Karl Marx had believed would expand the frontiers of production to the point where communism

became a practical possibility, and that Cobden, Hobson and Schumpeter had shaken their heads over in puzzled disappointment were nowhere to be found. Instead, earlier class structures had persisted, with excessive power in the hands of landowners; local bourgeoisies were in the pockets of foreign capitalists; proletariats remained small and weak. Industrialization was impossible under these conditions. This meant that the dialectical historical process that Communists hoped would lead to revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat was not to be looked for and the only option left was to seize power and adopt an autarkic path to industrial development.

In considerable political and personal disarray by the late 1970s, after vicious coups and repression in Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), Argentina (1976), and elsewhere, their ranks now swollen by European and United States fellow-travellers, the *dependentistas* were also on the back foot intellectually. Brazil and Mexico were doing far too well under ISI policies. Manufacturing industry was growing apace. But the beauty of ideology is that it can take anything the world throws at it. Where theory is falsified, ideology takes the punch and bounces back, more speedball than punch-bag. Peter Evans, a Californian *dependentista*, sprang to the

rescue with a study of Brazil which drew to some extent on Milovan Djilas's (1911-1995) analysis of Yugoslavia and the so-called 'New Class' of state functionaries to argue that dependency could be overcome because the very disarray of the class system to which it had given rise created the space in which a relatively autonomous state and its technocratic servants could manoeuvre and achieve industrialization.¹⁸

Flanking this American preoccupation with commercial asymmetry and mercantilist solutions has been a second preoccupation, with international law and organization. As with mercantilism, so with legalism, the United States only jumped ship when forced into a new posture by its overwhelming economic and military power and its close engagement in Europe and East Asia. It makes sense for revisionist states to emphasise international law and, in particular the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. Appealing to powerful states to act consistently with their declared values and accusing them of hypocrisy when they fail to do so are cheap defensive instruments: a lot cheaper than deep-water fleets or large armies, neither of which the United States possessed for

¹⁸ . Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational State and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1957).

more than a very short space of time until the mid-twentieth century. So while it is easy to be cynical about the late-nineteenth-century enthusiasm for international law chronicled by Francis Boyle in *Foundations of World Order*, especially when it is set against the rising tide of United States interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, the dismemberment of the remnants of Spanish empire and the assumption of a leadership role in Pan-American conferences, it is nevertheless hard to resist Boyle's account of the positive international law movement in the USA as the realist tool of a rising power not yet ready to lead.¹⁹

Further south, the case is easier to make since opportunities for inconsistency were less plentiful. Latin Americans made substantial contributions to the development of international law during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially in the fields of non-intervention, the legal equality of states and peaceful settlement of disputes. During the same period, Latin American states were also active in wider international diplomacy, organization and law-making. Ruy Barbosa, the eminent Brazilian delegate, was prominent in discussions at the first Hague Conference in 1899. Ten Latin American states signed the

¹⁹ . Francis A. Boyle, *Foundations of World Order: the legalist approach to international relations, 1898-1922* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1999).

Versailles Treaty as belligerents. These and others joined the League of Nations where, by regional caucusing, they ensured the election of American representatives to key positions. For these men the League represented both an insurance against United States regional hegemony and an opportunity to hone diplomatic and legal skills in a global arena. Since then, the armed forces of Latin American states have been prominent in many UN peace-keeping missions while diplomats and lawyers from these republics have been prominent in areas of legal and organizational innovation such as non-proliferation, human rights, law of the sea, and management of the Antarctic.²⁰

My object today has not been to teach economic or legal history but to establish that, from the perspective of South America, just two of Hedley Bull's five institutions of international society – international law and organization – seem much more important than the remaining three. Put it another way; of Carr's three kinds of power – political power, economic power, and power over opinion – it has been the second that has been of most concern to South Americans. The fact that the quasi-theories and doctrines of Prebisch, the *dependentistas* or the jurists have not been

²⁰ . For more details and references see Charles A. Jones, *American Civilization* (London: ISA, 2007) chapter 4.

organized into a discipline called *relaciones internacionales* reflects the extent to which the United States and Britain won the twentieth-century struggle for the third kind of power – power over opinion – settling frontiers between disciplines just as much as between states, and always with an eye to their own advantage. In short, the agenda of International Relations reflects the circumstances in which it emerged rather more than any holistic view of international relations. What you see depends on where you stand. Ghandi, asked what he thought of Western Civilization, famously quipped that he thought it would be a very good idea. A study of international relations written by an elderly Argentine military officer, pensioned off following the return to democracy, inventing IR in blissful ignorance of the mass of literature in English, would read very differently from the standard text-books.

At the start of this lecture I distinguished two aspects of spatiality that bore on the genesis of international theory. I want now to turn from the first of these, agenda setting, to the second, case selection. To examine the first I encouraged you to engage in the thought experiment of thinking about international relations from an American, and most of all a South American perspective. To examine the second is to return to the anglosphere and pose the

question of what might be the consequences, for a purportedly universal science of International Relations, of expanding the universe of study to include states-systems other than the one that started in Europe at the dawn of the modern period and has come, over the past four or five centuries, to provide norms and legal structures for the whole world, though hardly to govern practice.²¹

It was in this spirit that Barry Buzan and Richard Little embarked on a sequel to *The Logic of Anarchy*.²² Others, too have taken a historical turn, writing about balancing, or the lack of it, in the Western hemisphere during the century or so either side of the European invasions and about war between settlers and First Nations.²³ Yet perhaps the benefits of this quasi-anthropological exercise are greater the closer to home it is conducted. And what could be closer to the European system, the post-Westphalian system as some still insist on calling it, than the Western hemisphere, viewed not as an expansion but as an alternative, even a negation, of the corrupt and bellicose states-system the

²¹ . Guillermo O'Donnell's attack on the norm of the western state; Richard Devetak?

²² . Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

²³ . William H. Wohlforth et al. 'Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History' *European Journal of International Relations* 13:2 (June 2007) and objections from Mette Eilstrup Sangiovanni and our reply in the same journal (forthcoming). See also William C. Wohlforth, Stuart Kaufman and Richard Little (eds.) *The Balance of Power in World History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) for the full text of my essay and the others summarised in the *European Journal* article.

emigrants left behind. This is the enterprise Charles Jones broached, rather flippantly, in *American Civilization* and that was addressed, more seriously, in a collaborative study of balancing led by William Wohlforth and the examination of the development of distinctive norms, rules and institutions in South America after independence recently commenced by Arie Kakowicz, though with a regrettable neglect of the long century between the Bourbon reforms and national consolidation following independence.²⁴

I posed the question ‘Where is IR?’ – My answer is that it doesn’t get out enough and could do with an Atlantic cruise, making short stops in Boston, New York and Baltimore and rather longer stays in Rio and Buenos Aires.²⁵ In the next lecture I ask ‘When was international relations?’ and ‘When was International Relations?’ – first time round lower case; second time, upper case. I can tell you now that one answer to the first question is ‘Not 1648’ while a fair answer to the second is ‘Not 1918’.

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²⁴ . Arie M. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998); Arie M. Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881-2001* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).

²⁵ . Reminder to myself to include Roberto Unger next year as a continuation of the Latin American tradition of IR.

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