Lecture 8

The Ethics and Nature of War

To move from accounts of why wars happen to thought about the ethics and nature of war is to move from the world of efficient causation to one of motives, intentions, reasons and justifications. I explained in earlier lectures the manner in which IR at its inception, following the Second World War, was anxious to gain its social scientific credentials by presenting itself as a reaction against the theological and *a priori* reasoning of classical realists and the wishful thinking of interwar idealists alike.

In earlier lectures I also provided some very basic grounding in the contrasting political theologies of St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. Christian thought about war was never extinguished in the mid-twentieth century. But it was pretty much confined to the Churches and their training colleges between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. At that point a curious confluence occurred. A reintegration of IR theory with political theory and a reinstatement of a broadly Thomist version of just war doctrine coincided with a dissemination of English School thought about the norm-governed and institutionalised character of international society. The point of

origin of this return from what has since been termed, with some exaggeration, the 'forty-years' detour', can be dated quite precisely to the 1977 publications of Hedley Bull in Britain and Michael Walzer in the USA. *The Anarchical Society* and *Just and Unjust Wars* are two very different books, but they shared an emphasis on justice and constituted a powerful attack on one flank of the behavioralist movement at a time when its scientific pretentions were under pressure from neorealism.

I use the resurgence of just war discourse to illustrate the recovery of a concern with what is often called normative theory (an oxymoron if ever there was one). I have chosen to do this because I am using thought about war to illustrate the breadth of method and concerns in contemporary International Relations; so I must make clear that the just war here represents a wider movement in International Relations, as much concerned with distributive and intergenerational justice and global democracy as with war, much of which is not subject to the reservations offeredc here about the just war revival.

Chris Brown, Mervyn Frost and Terry Nardin are among the large number of scholars who have taken the normative path over the

past twenty years or so. Brown, to take only one of this group, has been concerned to attack the idea of IR theory as a separate and weaker growth than political theory by redefining political and social theory in ways that include the core questions posed by international relations. This project hinges on a shift in the definition of the scope of political theory away from excessive concentration on the state or on relations between state and civil society, to something more like the general search for a just society. 'A focus on justice – as opposed to the state,' Brown writes, 'produces a very different and richer account of international theory.'

A focus on justice was consistent with resurgent interest in the just war and with the then still recent balance struck by Bull between order and justice in *The Anarchical Society*. It sought to place normative issues at the heart of IR theory. It also brought Brown hard up against the key dichotomy in his first major book, between communitarian and cosmopolitan approaches to social justice. The reason for this is that many traditions of political thought have conceived of justice as something only making sense within a political community while others, such as the Stoics in the Ancient

world or Thomists in late-medieval Europe, have regarded relations between states as capable of being governed by justice.

Brown's attempt to fuse IR and Political theory used the communitarian/cosmopolitan divide that had been the focus of much discussion during the 1980s; it drew on classic texts by political theorists and philosophers, re-interpreting them in order to support a unified speculative tradition, and it also drew support from a concurrent revival of normative speculation across the social sciences, beginning in the 1960s, that had begun as a site of resistance to behaviouralism and neo-positivism. Within this frame are to be found such thinkers as John Rawls, Charles Beitz, Onora O'Neill and Thomas Pogge. But to those working on international relations in general and war in particular, it was perhaps Michael Walzer who had the first and greatest impact with his *Just and Unjust Wars*, a reaction to United States experience in Vietnam.

The just war tradition that Walzer sought to harness has generally been held to provide a robust and comprehensive framework for

arguing about war.[1] It offers guidance on the declaration and conduct of war; it has exerted a profound influence on the law of armed conflict; it has been remarkably resourceful in accommodating the moral dilemmas arising out of irregular warfare, nuclear weapons, and precision-guided munitions. Most of all, it appears to offer an arena within which those of many faiths and of none can meet on equal terms. The tradition is just that, a tradition and not a theory; marked disagreements persist on particular questions, including the identification of legitimate authority, double effect, and conditional deterrence. It is all too often reduced to a mere box-ticking exercise, to justify some specific instance of resort to force or military episode, when it ought rather to be thought of as a space for moral reflection. But at least the parameters of debate are secure, with pacifists and advocates of the unconstrained use of force consigned to the fringes.

Something along these lines appears to be the dominant view in Britain and the United States. I believe it to be mistaken, perhaps even pernicious. It encourages complacency and shuts the door on a wide range of moral experience, both personal and collective,

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[1] . Acknowledge my own Cam article on which I rely for next x pages.

intrinsic to modern warfare. It neglects some important resources available to Christians confronting the evils of warfare, such as the narratives of the Passion, of pilgrimage, of witness and of trusteeship for the natural world. It dissuades the secular mind from any profound consideration of its moral predicament or contemplation of non-Christian thought about military virtues by encouraging it to ride in the slipstream of the Church. It allows pacifists and nihilists alike too easy a dismissal of rational approaches to warfare.

So if those engaged in the planning, authorisation and conduct of contemporary armed conflict are to limit the moral harm to which they – let alone their enemies – are exposed, just as they now routinely seek to address psychological and physical damage, then the talk of love, justice, and authority which constitutes just war discourse needs stiffening with an altogether tougher range of modern moral experience of command and combat.

The trouble is that just war thinking was revived around the close of the nineteenth century after two centuries of neglect in a version very much indebted to Aquinas and his Spanish Dominican successors. They wrote at a time—broadly between 1200 and

1650—when (as we have seen) the monarchs of France, England, Spain, and several other European countries were steadily establishing sovereign authority over consolidated territories at the expense of Pope and Emperor. The discovery, in the second half of this period, of orderly political communities in the Americas that had neither accepted nor – like the Turks – rejected the gospel, merely aggravated the position by confirming the autonomy of international relations from any single faith, and its technical anarchy, or lack of any supreme temporal authority capable of arbitrating between princes. In these circumstances, a doctrine of how armed conflict between sovereigns could be contained within the moral realm was sorely needed, and this is what the later scholastic theologians attempted.

Reduced to its bare bones, it runs like this. Justification of resort to war requires a formal declaration of hostilities—all other remedies having been exhausted—by a proper authority with a reasonable prospect of victory, moved by right intention to make good an injury or wrong of sufficient importance to outweigh the unavoidable evils that will result from the conduct of hostilities. Once engaged in warfare, combatants are enjoined not to attack

non-combatants and to use no more force than is needed to achieve their objectives.

Some of the bread-and-butter debates that constitute contemporary debate within the tradition leap from the page. They are daily on our lips.

Where does legitimate authority reside in a world where many states have long since lost control of large tracts of their territory and armed groups flourish without any clear political programme or aspiration to secession or control of the state, while permanent alliances or regional unions such as NATO or the European Union begin to acquire a measure of autonomy, even from their most powerful members, and uncertainty about the authority of the UN Security Council is aggravated by the pretensions of the United States to a quasi-imperial regulatory role?

How are we to regard collateral damage? – Is it justified by the outcome of a military operation, or must it be the unintended outcome of an attack upon a legitimate target, as in the Scholastic doctrine of double effect which excused the harm done in war provided that the primary intention was to right a wrong and attain

peace? Do precision-guided munitions make the dilemmas of unintended harm easier or more difficult to cope with? Mistakes, such as the destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, become less credible. Assassination, as was attempted against Saddam Hussein at the very start of the Third Gulf War in 2003, becomes much easier. Indeed, it has been frequently resorted to since. But is either morally acceptable? What of military contractors engaging in logistical and support activities near the battlefield? Are they non-combatants? What of reservoirs, telecommunications equipment, transport infrastructure, all of which serve civilian as well as military purposes? Does the distinction on which discrimination relies any longer make sense?

What of nuclear deterrence? How can the use of weapons of mass destruction ever avoid harm to non-combatants; how may it ever be thought proportionate either to the wrong that gave rise to a conflict or to any military objective? More subtly, can it be right to threaten to do wrong if by so doing one minimizes the change of ever having to carry out the threat? Can military personnel be trained and equipped to carry out nuclear attacks, their missiles targeted on enemy cities, without being in a deep sense corrupted by the unavoidable intention to do what could never be justified?

What are we to think of the further set of dilemmas created by the rise of intelligence, secrecy and deception in modern warfare? John Buchan, writing at the close of the First World War, concluded that the day was past when the display of masculine virtues on the battlefield was decisive. The tale he tells in *Mr. Standfast*, a novel modelled on John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, is of the replacement of masculine virtues by stereotypically female wiles, a process aggravated by the declining relevance of the military front in an era of total warfare, in which whole populations were mobilized and at risk. The Cold War, an undoubted struggle fought out through threat, espionage, propaganda and often irregular proxy wars was to reinforce this sense of emasculation and inversion, leading Michel Foucault, in his 1976 lectures at the *College de France*, to suggest that political theory ought perhaps to suppose war the normal state of affairs, and all our social institutions derived from it.[2]

What, finally, are we to think of war when it is more and more mediated, even for the combatants, through representations: the map, the bomb-sight, the radar screen, the satellite television

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[2] . Il faut defendre.

image. Is it still the same institution? Does it still evoke the same moral responses? The question of ontology, of what war, which simmered below debates about the causes of war, still lurks beneath debates about the ethics of war.

If these are challenges for traditional just war thinkers, with their apparatus of discrimination and proportionality, they are equally daunting for those attached to the notion of international society, who may want to maintain a place for war as a functioning institution, but see a world in which it has become more and more savage, meaningless and dysfunctional. One attempt to think about this can be found in an edited volume reflecting on Hedley Bull's *Anarchical Society* thirty years after its first publication.[3] Among the issues raised is the radical change that occurs in the character of warfare in a unipolar system. In present conditions the image of war on which both positive and normative IR has long relied, in which sovereign states, equal under the law, confront one another, is no longer very useful. War takes on more the character of rebellion, and United States responses to security challenges assume rather more the character of punishment! At this point, it may be thought, French experience of closely juxtaposed empire

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[3] . Jones in Little and Williams? (eds)

and humiliation and thought about colonialism and post-colonialism assume much greater relevance than before to those concerned about international relations.

I want to conclude this lecture by making good a couple of promises: to expose you to some contemporary French thought about international relations and, in so doing, to complete the methodological *tour d'horizon* begun last week by providing some feel for post-structuralist thought about war, relying substantially on work by Paul Virilio and Jean Baudrillard, but making reference also to James Der Derian as one major conduit for the transmission of post-structuralist thought into academic International Relations. Note that neither Virilio nor Baudrillard is or ever has been a professor of International Relations, any more than Sartre, Camus, Foucault or Derrida.[4]

Much writing on war since the 1970s has taken a radical turn, going beyond any critique of the place of war within the political order to question the institution itself at a more profound level. This

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[4] . The biographical details of these men, as of other writers on international relations, are of interest. Here it is sufficient to note that Virilio, Derrida, Foucault and Baudrillard all held academic positions in France in architecture, philosophy, history of thought and sociology respectively, though Baudrillard preferred to dissociate himself from any discipline in his later years, and all of them were men of many parts. Virilio, for example, was an expert in stained glass and worked with Matisse in the early post-war period on Paris churches.

challenge relies heavily on issues of representation and perception. How is war viewed and experienced? Let me give two examples. The first is Baudrillard's discussion of hyper-reality; the second, Virilio's preoccupation with the relationship between war and cinema.

Baudrillard makes much of the concept of hyper-reality. Where once upon a time representation was of real things in the world – the map representing territory, the mirror reflecting what stood before it – it now more often consists in the representation of representations as when, for example, the image seen by those operating a weapons system becomes the image broadcast on a television news bulletin. According to one of his most virulent critics (Norris) Baudrillard claims that the world of perception in which we live has become divorced from reality, as it was once understood, because of successive mediations of reality through representation of representation of representation, *ad infinitum*, and also because of the general surfeit of representations and interpretations. This might be summed up as a combination of vertical and horizontal superfluity. It is not just that we are separated from reality by several successive instantiations of representation, but that it is representation all the way down. So if

there was, as Baudrillard claimed back in 1991, no Gulf War, then it would hardly matter, because there wasn't anything else either. The argument, Norris suggests, would be entirely solipsistic.

If this really were the argument, then I would be in agreement with Norris, unable to see that this left us in any worse a position in principle than that of Kant, two centuries ago, pointing out that we could experience the material world only through sense data (that is to say representations) of things-in-themselves. But if the argument is that there has been a change in the degree to which we experience life through representations, made possible by technological developments, then it would be hard to disagree with Baudrillard. Patton (his translator) notes the contast Baudrillard's draws between the precision with which information was managed during the Kuwait crisis in order to create a clear justificatory narrative for military response against Iraq, and the wild profusion of interpretations that flourished in the aftermath of the high-intensity phase of the ensuing war. 'Not only does the real vanish into the virtual through an excess of information – Patton suggests – it leaves an archival deposit such that "generations of vido-zombies … will never cease reconstituting the event" ' (Patton 129). Baudrillard's response is '[d]on't try, given this shower of

information, to reconstitute the truth. It can't be done. Nor would it change the past.'

Brian Patton argues that Baudrillard's central claim is not that mediation of events through mass media representations now smothers reality so completely that there is no reality (what I referred to a moment ago as 'representations all the way down'). It may rather be that he is making a different and more plausible point.[5] 'Instead of treating the hyperreality thesis as a universal claim about the collapse of the real into its forms of representation, which leads only to the futile hypothesis of a general solipsism, we should treat it as a specific ontological claim about social reality. Informational events such as the Gulf crisis are a feature of postmodern public life, and it is these that are in question.

Baudrillard's thesis, on this reading, is not a general one, but relates to an important and growing class of events. 'Since informational events are, by definition, always open to interpretation, they may serve a variety of public ends; they constitute an important vector of power. What matters is to control the production and meaning of information in a given context.'

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[5]. Zurgrugg (ed.) *Jean Baudrillard : Art and Artefact* (Sage 1997) 128.

(check to source). This brings us back into the realm of the political, and the contemporary or post-modern point seems to be that in an age of immediate mass communication of images and generation of interpretations, the privilege of participants in narrating events is entirely lost, presence no longer counts for much, and the minutes are, so to speak, written before the meeting.[6]

Emphasis on technology, representation, the direction or manipulation of events, and the mass media provides an appropriate curtain-raiser for the second of my two examples of modern French thought about warfare. This concerns the relationship between cinema and war. It was Buchan, back in 1918, who included in his novel, Mr Standfast, a scene that nicely illustrated this point. Richard Hannay hotly pursued by German agents as he races back from Scotland to London with vital information about a final German assault planned to take place on the Western Front, finds himself on the Yorkshire moors after his plane crashes. Coming over the crest of a hill he sees the Western Front laid out before him. The Ministry of Information (for which

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[6] . An early example might be found in John Buchan, simultaneously journalist, historian and novelist of the First World War. Possibly Orwell, Homage to Catalonia?, the struggle in which he was engaged unrecognisable when read in *The Times*?

Buchan himself worked) are making a propaganda film with real British troops. By knocking out the director, Hannay – a senior officer in the British army when not spying – is able to manoeuver the actor-soldiers in such a way as to frustrate his (real) pursuers. Similarly, Patton (129) noted of the Kuwait war that, for the first time, 'the power to create a crisis merge[d] with the power to direct the movie about it'. The same appears at the conclusion of John Le Carré's *Absolute Friends*. There, the ultimate objective of the intelligence agencies in a post-9/11 world is to create a video of events in Germany that suggest (quite falsely but entirely credibly) that an Islamist terrorist plot on German soil has been foiled, thereby bringing the German government and German public opinion into line with United States and British official policy.

In short, Virilio may not be that original, but he has been very much taken up by James Der Derian, one of the most interesting figures in contemporary IR, among the last of Hedley Bull's graduate students, and with a broad knowledge of and sympathy with French thought. According to Der Derian, 'Virilio uses the language and experience of military phenomena to show how the violence of speed, coupled with … other technological innovations, has altered the representation of war – the face of battle itself – as well as the

war of representations that goes on in advanced industrial societies' (133). The central struggle between cultures is no longer to establish sovereignty (Devetak) so much as to regulate perception. The problem with Virilio's writing is that it is highly discursive. So I will note just three aspects of his approach without trying to impose on him anything so modernist as a coherent argument (Pick).

First of all, throughout the past century, cinema and warfare (I would qualify this and say 'battle') have been analogous industrial processes. Where the cinema has camera, viewfinder and spotlights, the mid-twentieth-century anti-aircraft battery had guns, sights and searchlights.

Second comes the alienation of the General or Director, both of whom Hannay embodied at a moment symbolic in Buchan's stereotypical terms, of both his emasculation and his empowerment. Gradually, the direction of battle and cinema alike becomes less a matter of direct unmediated activity and experience and more a question of editing – that is to say of ordering, interpreting and shaping a mass of images arising from reconnaissance, intelligence, targeting, aiming, shooting, story-

bards, and so on. Perhaps this is true of life more generally? –

Witness the rise of the soap opera and the splendidly mis-named

'reality show' as moral regulators. This surely was one message of

Mario Vargas Llosa's wonderful novel, *Aunt Julia and the*

Scriptwriter, which juxtaposed soap opera narratives with its

primary narrative. The effect of this, for Virilio, has been to

obliterate older relations between time and space and between

individual persons in time and space. [7]

Third, and finally, cinema and other screen representations of war

seem to carry out their task of mediation very faithfully and directly

in a way that words or paintings cannot. But Virilio points out that

this seeming transparency or reliability of film and visual media is

deceptive, because they offer immediate and all-too-plausible

means to convey illusion, misinformation and deception. The world

believes the story put around about the armed raid that concludes

Le Carré's novel largely because it is so clearly compatible with

the news footage shown on television which, incidentally, makes a

small fortune for the novel's villain. The reader knows better (for

the novel, its author ironically implies, may be a more reliable form

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[7] . Commentaries on modern war that echo its confusion of time and space and of facticity and invention include Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse Five* and Tim O'Brien's *The Things They Brought With Them*.

of representation: – As if!) What is certainly true is that the use of decoys, both visual and informational, has grown as the means of generating, capturing, storing and processing visual and audio materials have grown. Allied radio traffic and decoy military camps in Kent and Essex deceived the German High Command about Allied invasion plans in 1944.

Much of this commentary on warfare, representation and deception is perceptive, and changing information technologies have made these issues more important than they once were. At the same time, postmodernists have perhaps exaggerated the novelty of some of their contentions. Romanticism, originating in reaction against the excessive rationalism of the Enlightenment, though often attempting to maintain that reaction in some kind of creative tension with the Enlightenment, is a sprawling intellectual rabbit warren, every bit as complex and variable as the liberalism it confronts, but far less well understood or referred to by contemporary IR theorists. But Romanticism, from its inception, has always been in part about driving a wedge between representation and reality, not to destroy either, but to cultivate awareness of the limits of each, trying, for example, to put in question the relationship between author, text and reader, as in the

Diderot story to which I referred in my second lecture – 'This is not a story' – or in the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott (much concerned with war!) in which fictional and historical characters are placed cheek by jowl in historically accurate and occasionally footnoted narrative frameworks to create the illusion of veracity. Think, finally, of the transformation wrought by Romanticism in the battle paintings, starting with Gros's 'Eylau' and moving through Turner's 'Field of Waterloo' (1818) to David Wilkie's 'Chelsea Pensioners' (1822), commissioned by none other than Wellington himself, in which the battle has been replaced by media coverage and its impact.

Where does this leave us? On this I side with Der Derian.[8] The critique of any possibility of uniquely reliable forms of representation offered by postmodernism need not leave us up a creek without a paddle. It need not lead to nihilism. It need not rule out empirical research. Poststructuralism, which for Der Derian is the appropriate methodological response to the postmodern predicament, is 'an attempt to understand – without resort to external authorities or transcendental values – why one moral or political system attains a higher status and exercises more

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[8] . James Der Derian, 'Post-Theory: the Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations' inn Doyle and Ikenberry (eds.) *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (1997)

influence than another at a particular historical moment'. The two salient features here are anti-foundationalism and an acknowledgment of the political character of a society saturated with power relations, the first functioning as a critique of the second.

There is however a third feature of the postmodern predicament implicit in Der Derian's formula, and that is difference. If the project of the Enlightenment was to obliterate difference by affirming universal truths and values, that of postmodernism is acknowledge difference and learn to live with it. This may lead to sharp disagreements with liberals over ethical issues. Take only two issues: child soldiers and terrorism.

Contemporary warfare in many parts of the world is technologically primitive, fought by teenagers, largely using small-arms. This is scandalous, but it is also the way of life that represents the best chance of survival for those orphaned by the continuing conflict into which they are subsequently inducted. Millions are marked by this experience, and those marks will remain as signs of difference long after any particular conflict has ceased. To ignore this is to court disaster.

Turning to terrorism, two logics operate, both connected by asymmetries of power. In the face of an overwhelmingly superior force, enemies of the constituted authority have no option but to employ irregular methods. These may be restricted to military targets, but to attack non-combatants, whether in a focused or an indiscriminate manner, is to enlist the targeted groups and the media as allies in the war of propaganda, putting pressure on decision-makers to negotiate and compromise. The social structures and cultural dispositions of the enemy are put to use. Algerian bombers in the 1950s hoped that the wives of the *pieds noirs*, whom they believed to be the dominant force in francophone families, would force their husbands to leave Algeria once civilian women and children began to be slaughtered.[9] More recently, Al Q'aida has relied on the monumental character of its targets and

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[9] . Jean-Pierre Lledo. See also Robert Louis Stevenson, *The Dynamiter* (London: Longmans, Green, 1885). [My references are to *The Stories of Robert Louis Stevenson* (London: Gollancz, 1928]. The eponymous antihero, also known as Zero, discussed targeting with his landlord, Somerset, hoping to win his sympathy by explaining to him the many trials of the dynamiter's craft. He discloses that he was the perpetrator of the Red Lion Court explosion. Somerset is puzzled. That episode was a fiasco, causing little damage. Zero protests: a child was killed. Somerset objects: the effect of the explosion, as of explosions generally, was indiscriminate. But war is indiscriminate, Zero points out (441). Rather than attack obvious targets such as royalty or statesmen, he seeks to touch public sentiment. 'Our appeal,' he explains, 'is to the body of the people; it is these we would touch and interest.' And this objective is most easily attained by killing housemaids and nurses (442) because they stand between classes, of interest to both. He then tells Somerset of the attempted bombing in Leicester Square. They had planned to place the bomb very near a statue of Shakespeare for symbolic effect, but also because the nearby benches were favoured by poor women and elderly men, while children played nearby. All of these, he explained, belonged (443) to 'classes making a direct appeal to public pity, and therefore suitable with our designs.'

the power of western pass media to amplify the message of its attacks. There is logic even in seeming irrationality.

To truly recognise the difference of others is at the very least to pay respect – which is not at all the same thing as granting approval or acceptance – to the reality of their culture and the predicament they face when confronted by overwhelming superior forces. It is to accept that warfare must always, to an extent, be assymetrical and intransigent because if we could all agree on the proper purpose and conduct of war, we would probably be sufficiently in agreement about other things for hostilities to be unnecessary.

A logic of this sort relies on complicity. Complicity is not the same as responsibility. It is close to the notion of agenda setting, which I have employed in an earlier lecture to indicate one of several ways – description and definition being others – in which the dice are loaded before observation and theorizing can get off the ground. When Virilio concentrates his attention on technology he is neither praising nor blaming those who make ever more speedy and destructive weapons, but he is contributing to a discussion that concerns itself with this rather than with other aspects of warfare.

Similarly, when Baudrillard accused the people of the United States of complicity in the events of 9/11 (*Le Monde*, first Saturday of November 2001) he was not suggesting that US citizens had aided or abetted Al Q'aida, even unwittingly. Rather, he was drawing attention to the way in which United States culture had conjured up a world in which images of the Twin Towers would be instantaneously shown across the world and would have instant recognition and particular resonance.

Think, if you were unfortunate enough to see it, of the first moments of destruction in 'Independence Day' (1996). Skyscrapers dissolve in flames, targeted by rays from the alien spaceship. In short, US culture was always already primed to amplify those three or four thousand deaths in the Twin Towers in a way that Pakistani culture had been unable to amplify or commemorate the deaths of a larger number if its citizens as victims of terrorism in the closing years of the twentieth century. My concluding point, then, would be that uncritical acceptance of orthodox IR theory would, in my book, constitute a form of intellectual complicity analogous to that which magnified the destruction of the Twin Towers so vastly. Some would say that there has been just such a complicity between International

Relations and the US military-intelligence complex. But I take heart from the screenings of Pontecorvo's *Battle of Algiers* at the Pentagon and the Naval War College, from the teaching of literature to West Point cadets, and from the continuing dialogue between Pentagon officials and critical theorists like James Der Derian and Cynthia Weber.[10] Notwithstanding its policy, there have been signs, even within the Bush administration, that difference is recognized at the heart of power, though it remains to be seen whether this is merely a variant of the familiar liberal tactic of giving space to difference, as one might play a fish, in order to tire it out and suborn it finally to power.

As for this course of lectures, I hope it has risen above or – to put it another way – sunk below that totalising kind of liberalism, and left you in no doubt of my own commitment to a critical and pragmatic for of political realism.

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[10] . Elizabeth Samet, *Soldier's Heart* (2007?)