

MStudies, The International Relations of the Modern Middle East

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Lecture 1 The Pre-colonial Period: The Middle East's Awakening

(Trends, theoretical constructs, frameworks: not chronological history)

McKinder: Great power lay in land power; Mahan: great power lay in naval command; Cohen where these two overlap, shatter belt. ME : may not be focus of markets, but is location of resource expenditure.

I. The advent of the Modern Age

1. This lecture series is based on several important premises, the most important being to elucidate how the Middle East became modern. In the case of the Middle East, this locates the discussion firmly in the realm of international relations, for the process that took place in the Middle East was a result of outside intervention, and internal responses to them.
2. A second important premise is to examine the ways that various themes apply to this area of 17 different states (and, if we include North Africa, that makes 21): themes of state-hood, governance, ideology, economics, and inter-state relations, both regional and international.
3. Third premise: focus on the role and constant revival of Islam in the organization of society and polity in the Middle East. Variations among the

different nations are significant, and so are their commonalities – both often in surprising ways.

Fundamental Issues:

1. The advent of the modern age, and its affects on how the Ottomans, MohammedAli in Egypt, and the Qajars in Persia, responded, to pressure to deal with European intervention
2. The Middle East's reforms and the structures of Defensive Development

II. How does one **define modern**? Two important characteristics distinguish modern history: a) a world economy of integrated markets; and b) a world system of nation-states. These two inter-related phenomena evolved over centuries, the economic beginning in the early 16th, the political in the first half of the 18th century.

III. Three events took place in the early 16th century that fundamentally affected the Middle East .

1. The first was the **emergence of large-scale empires**, particularly the **Ottoman** , which lasted for four centuries and stretched from the gates of Vienna, to Romania and the Black Sea, and contained most of what we think of the rest of the Arab world today.
2. To the east there was the **Safavid Empire**, which encompassed not only present-day Iran, but most of today's Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a swathe of the Caucasus.

3. These empires, though vast, were not centrally managed but rather, the control of the central power was indirectly proportional to distance, the outlying territories being almost independent. Additionally, these empires did not provide the services we have come to understand as the job of government – education, health, policing, or infrastructure. These were provided, if at all, by local chiefs – much as they were in Europe at the time. Agriculture was primarily subsistence and likewise local. The empires' military systems were based on tribal levies rather than conscription; order depended largely on using that modern discovery: gunpowder. Taxes paid the military, and since there were few mechanisms to effectively collect taxes, the empires were often in financial trouble – a situation that reached a peak in the 17th century in Europe as well as the Middle East, where the Safavid Empire failed, and was followed by the Qajars, and the Ottoman empire began to shrink, no longer militarily unassailable, and economically vulnerable to Europe.
4. The **second event** launching the early modern period was the **commercial revolution of Europe**. Though the result of many factors, among the most important was the **discovery of the New World**, which introduced massive quantities of silver and gold into the global market, and trade across the Atlantic began to grow significantly, eventually eclipsing trade in the Mediterranean, which had previously been the focus of European commerce.

5. This set off a **banking revolution**, in which new financial instruments were created that changed the way investors, companies and governments in Europe did business – affecting not only British interests in India and Persia, but, European investments in the Ottoman empire. The most successful European states to emerge were Britain, France and the Netherlands, which operated as the core of the engine driving the modern world economy, bringing other parts of the globe into the market they dominated, but in a subordinate position. Indeed, this constituted **one of the great differences between past empires and modern world economic power: empires spread influence through conquest**, being otherwise roughly equal.
6. **Modern economic power** dominates through the production and export of manufactured goods , bringing subordinates into the system by importing their natural resources, and selling finished goods to their markets. Ultimately – and certainly by the time of Europe’s significant expansion during the industrial revolution - both the Ottoman and Persian empires were integrated into the world system, but as peripheries, which would have profound implications for the region’s future.
7. **Third event: the Protestant Reformation** triggered by Martin Luther, which split Europe **into Protestant and Catholic** sovereignties that fought **bitter religious wars** – ending once and for

all the perception of Europe as a united Christian entity. The efficient, highly competitive states that emerged and tried to gain advantage or at least balance each other, were **the beginnings of today's modern nation states**. Importantly for our purposes, the Middle East was one of the locations in which their competitions were most fiercely played out. The Seven Years War, for example, earned Britain France's colonial interests in east Asia, giving Britain full control of India. In response, France re-focused on the Mediterranean, prompting Napoleon to invade Egypt, and France to covet, and eventually take control of North Africa.

8. The **Napoleonic adventure** had two important outcomes: **first**, it prompted the emergence of **Mohammad Ali in Egypt**, whose political and economic dominance rendered Egypt an autonomous entity within the Ottoman empire, and whose family line remained in power until 1953; **second**, it forced Britain to reassess its policies to protect its position in the eastern Mediterranean, and hence, to decide that its best policy was to ensure Ottoman stability in the face of French, and Russian power plays.
9. This took place in two permutations: 1. what came to be known as the **Eastern Question**, which centred around the Mediterranean and the Ottoman empire; and 2. **The Great Game**, which focused on Persia as a strategic prize being contested by Russia and Britain. **The Eastern Question reflected 2 significant processes**: one external, triggered

by French-British (and later, German) rivalries; the other internal – namely, the increasing fragmentation of the Ottoman empire, and its growing economic vulnerability to European penetration.

10. Ottoman Empire: Initially, in the 1500s, the Ottomans granted economic **capitulations** to the French, a move initiated by Constantinople as both a diplomatic and trade offensive. Capitulations granted economic, commercial, legal, and religious rights and privileges to foreign representatives, a strategy that not only curried favour with the recipient power diplomatically, but ensured the Ottoman empire obtained the commodities it needed and could pay for. What began as a smart move, however, soon **took on a life of its own** as **all the European powers demanded similar privileges**, and as Ottoman merchants increasingly found they were operating at a disadvantage. Not abolished until the early 1900s, capitulations eventually led **first**, to significant **friction between Christian and Muslim communities** within the empire. This was because the Christians allied themselves economically and legally to foreign Christian communities who were operating inside the empire under these treaty arrangements, gaining themselves the same economic and cultural privileges; **second**, it contributed to Ottoman debt. This was because European economic penetration, often untaxed and benefiting from monopoly control over important stocks and goods,

drained the Ottoman economy of income, and the Sultan's government of control and legitimacy.

11. At the same time, Ottoman ability to maintain its empire in the face of modern pressures began to crumble. Militarily no longer able to compete against Western armies, it was forced in the early 19th century to relinquish first its eastern European holdings and then a large swathe east of the Black Sea; additionally, by the mid-1800s, it faced serious nationalist uprisings in the Balkans, with those countries eventually breaking off.

IV. The Ottoman and Qajar Response

1. As power shifted West, the Eastern response was both rapid, and based on the premise, promoted by Western scholars, diplomats and tradesmen at the time, that **there was but a single path to modernity, which had to duplicate the European experience**. In other words, **traditional societies needed to become secular, free, bureaucratic and scientific to become 'civilized'**. Reform could be imposed from outside. However, Sultans, Shahs and Khedives (what Mohammad Ali's dynasty in Egypt came to be called) for the most part adopted reforms from within, in a process called **defensive developmentalism**.
2. **Mohammad Ali's reforms in Egypt predated the Ottoman and Qajar efforts**. He realized he needed new structures to confront the Europeans, and focused on 3 main areas, which became the pattern for reforms

throughout the region that would run right through the 19th century. The new structures of **defensive developmentalism** were: **a) military, b) economic, and c) administrative, specifically to increase taxes** and promote state control. They can be seen to characterize the *Tanzimat* reforms adopted later in the Ottoman empire, and the reforms in Algeria, Morocco, and those in Iran.

- a) **Military Reform:** This began the process, since the armies of the Middle East had begun to suffer serious defeat at the hands of the Europeans, which had undergone their own military overhaul in the 19th century, especially in Prussia and France. There, technological, tactical and disciplinary improvements had created formidable, professional armies. **Mohammad Ali wanted an army that not only could counter the Europeans, but could offer protection against the Ottoman Empire,** so he could build up his own family dynasty. Buying European arms and the know-how to build local munitions factories, instituting regular recruitment, standardizing uniforms, and bringing in European trainers to re-organize the troops, instill new tactical knowledge, and develop a professional officer corps – these and other important changes swept the military establishments of not only Egypt, but the Ottoman and Qajar empires.
- b) In the Ottoman empire, a new army corps, the *nizam-e jadid* was established by Sultan Selim III, and included, by 1806, 24,000 soldiers. Under a successor to Selim, Mahmoud II, the *nezam-jadid* destroyed the

Janissaries, an elite corps that had gained enormous power, and virtually taken over Constantinople and hamstrung the empire. The replacement of the Janissaries by the *nezam-jadid* gave the Sultan considerably greater control over the state, and the ability to institute significant policies of reform. Because of the European competition for power in the ME, there were ample opportunities for the ME states to bring in European military officers sent either by allies committed to enhancing the capabilities of their Middle East partners, or demobilized officers and troops looking for new employment.

- c) Two major **difficulties**, however. **The first**, was that as alliances shifted in Europe, the commitment of any given Western power to enhancing the military capability of a Middle Eastern partner would wax and wane. Thus, security policies involving military enhancement in the Middle East were dependent on policy shifts among states in Europe. **Example:** the case in **Qajar Persia**, where a succession of British, French, Swedish, and Russian training and munitions programmes served primarily to confuse administrative procedures and waste resources. Thus, a British programme brought in one set of uniforms and armaments, that, when the British withdrew, to be replaced by the French (because the British had signed a treaty of friendship with the Russians and were no longer interested in equipping a modern Persian army against them), were scrapped for new uniforms and armaments. The result was a motley set

of uniforms used by the recruits, and collections of arms that did not fit many of the munitions being produced.

The second difficulty was that as tribal warfare tactics, and as-needed call-up to arms, were replaced by regular recruitment and the tactics of a standing army, **costs of maintenance for the central government soared**. This meant that the states involved needed to expand revenue streams, so they could afford these new, expensive militaries.

3. This led to **new economic policies** as the **second factor** of defensive developmentalism. To achieve greater control over income, and expand revenues to modernize their militaries and protect their territories, the Middle East states encouraged **a shift in the agricultural sector, from subsistence farming to the cultivation of cash crops**, such as cotton, silk and tobacco, which could be exported to Europe. The choice to develop such crops – in essence, raw materials necessary for the European manufacturing industry - reflected the induction of the Middle East economies as peripheries to the modern core economies of Europe. In other words, they shipped out commodities and received in return finished goods.
 - a. To bring these crops to market, **railroads, ports and other public works** were built, which enhanced the control of the state over larger areas of its territory and population, and provided a boom in income. Unbeknownst to the leaders of the Middle East, however, the transition to cash crop farming was a measure that, though it would provide **short-**

term returns, would render them **vulnerable to volatile pricing on the global market** and at the same time, saddle their states with long-term devastation of their agricultural food base.

- b. In Egypt, **Mohammad Ali confiscated huge tracts of arable land** for cash crop farming, bringing them under government monopoly control for higher profitability. **Religious endowments, as well as the lands of the Bedouin**, were in this way seized, and tribes were forced to settle on poor, unused land. A growing number of **landless peasants**, displaced by the switch to government-run cash crop farming, began to migrate to the cities.
4. In the **Ottoman empire**, the economic dimension of defensive development occurred in **two periods**. The first, often called the '**liberal**' *Tanzimat* period (*Tanzimat* meaning 'regulations') dated from about **1839, the second, often called 'autocratic' took place under the long reign of AbdulHamid II, lasting from 1878 to 1909**. Under the first *Tanzimat*, the Ottoman government shrank back from its free-trade arrangements with the Europeans, and instead, focused on programs to encourage internal wealth accumulation: it encouraged private industrial production, reorganized the guilds, issued credit and seeds to farmers, attempted to establish state-run factories, and, like Egypt, promoted cash-crop farming. Unlike Egypt, however, the far-flung provinces of the empire were, even with new 19th century technologies, difficult to manage, and they varied widely in their capabilities and needs. Silk

farming in the Levant, for example, required drastically different forms of infrastructure and community organization than the tobacco farmers of the Balkans.

The **'liberal'** moniker attached to this period stemmed from the **application of 'liberal' Western ideas**, particularly British, which led the government to codify and extend **secular law**, and which culminated in the adoption of the short-lived **Constitution of 1839**.

5. The second, **'autocratic' tanzimat under Sultan AbdulHamid II** takes its label from the fact it was a top-down set of programmes driven by the court that **drew on Islamic**, rather than European liberal rhetoric.

Nonetheless, it has been argued that the second phase was the more effective, not least because, through the instrument of Islam, the government extended its control over its territory in a significant way.

- a) Abdulhamid asserted an Islamic **osmanlik – or Ottoman patriotism** - to tie his subjects together – an action that made sense within the changing religious emphasis of the empire, which, in losing many of its peripheral holdings, had likewise, lost many of its non-Muslim populations.

Abdulhamid's **osmanlik tied loyalty to the state with loyalty to Islam**, and projected a standardized Islam to achieve this. The state encouraged missionary work in the empire, disseminated religious propaganda, made the printing of Qorans a state monopoly, and integrated the ulema into imperial institutions at all levels, including the Council of Public Works, the Council of the Arsenal, and the network of imperial schools. Famously,

Abdulhamid built the Hijaz Railway, that connected Constantinople with Medina, and, like his contemporaries in Persia and Egypt, instituted a vast programme to reconstruct his capital and lay out new cities.

- b) To accomplish all this, Abdulhamid, like his predecessors behind the first *tanzimat* period, had to collect funds. In effect, the **economic and political aspects of defensive development were tightly interlinked**, and depended on the need for tax reform so that the state could collect funding directly. Tax reform immediately impacted fiscal administration and socio-political structures, with the result that it extended the arm of the state into all corners of the empire.
6. Thus we come to the **third structural change of defensive developmentalism**: a rehaul of **the tax administration** and reorganization of the instruments of state. This meant eliminating not only the **tax farmers** but the other intermediaries that sapped the resources of the state. Tax farming had become endemic in the Ottoman empire, a practice in which the right to collect taxes was sold to middlemen, who could practice extortion, but likewise, skim off revenues through corruption. The *tanzimat* response, particularly in the first period, was to introduce new, uniform legal codes to restrict such practices, as well as educating new administrators, and experimenting not only with centralized economic planning but political planning as well.

7. In sum, defensive developmentalists sought, and sometimes succeeded in building a state apparatus that not only was capable of disciplining its population through law and conscription, but in penetrating the lives of their peoples in ways that differed materially from how governance had operated before.
8. The **impacts** of these changes, both economic and political, were often unexpected and too often **disastrous**. An example of a process undertaken in the 'liberal' *tanzimat* period that had completely unanticipated effects was the effort to adjust the relationship between religious communities through two decrees, the Hatt-e Sharif of Gulhane (1839), and the Islahat-e Farmani (1856).. These attempted to promote the allegiance of Ottoman identity through equality for all citizens in a way that would transcend religious allegiance. However, Muslims objected to the special economic and political privileges perceived to have been granted to Christians, while Christians objected to the decreed dominance of Muslims, and the responsibilities of equality, which now included military conscription (which previously Christians could avoid by paying a fee). In this way, attempts at creating an overarching equality of citizenship and identity created instead sectarianism and opposition.
9. Even more important were the unintended **economic impacts**. By investing in **cash crops**, the ME states in effect **mortgaged their futures** for short-term returns. To build the infrastructure necessary to streamline their markets – which, in Egypt included **building the Suez**

canal, which opened in 1869, and securing the countryside for transporting the crops to the coasts for export, as well as to invest in associated industries, such as ginning cotton, they had to borrow heavily. Thus they **took out loans from European states**, as well as from European communities operating with capitulation privileges inside the empire. This in effect **encouraged European economic expansion** into these states. The **contradiction is tragic**: the developing ME states were becoming indebted to the Europeans so as to enable investment in militaries that would enable them to protect themselves from European intervention.

10. In the process, the **economies shifted emphasis**.

- a) On the one hand, they became integrated into the global market while at the same time drastically reducing their inter-regional trade.
- b) On the other, they became dependent on the global price of the cash crops they now produced as such a high percentage of their agricultural output.

11. This turned **disastrous** when sudden price shifts occurred, such as with the **drop in cotton prices after the end of the American civil war**, during which time Egyptian revenues collapsed. A further shock to the economies of the region occurred at the time of the **first international economic depression of 1873**, which forced Egypt, for example, into bankruptcy, its **debts to Britain having reached 90 million pounds**.

This led to foreign creditors taking over the supervision of the Egyptian

budget, and the management of over 50% of its revenues. As part of this process, Britain bought up the **majority of the shares of the Suez Canal** at firesale prices. This in turn led to a general uprising called the '**Urabi Revolt in 1881**'. In turn, as Britain considered any serious disturbance in Egypt a threat to its eastern Mediterranean position, and therefore its access to India through the Suez Canal, the economic collapse can be seen as having been at the root of the subsequent British intervention, and its occupation of Egypt until 1956.

12. **In the Ottoman and Qajar empires**, debt and bankruptcy likewise led to forfeiture of government control over their finances, with Europeans taking charge of their income and expenditure streams through management of customs and postal revenues, as well as their tax assessments, in order to repay the debt. In the case of the Qajars, **concessions were also granted – for tobacco, railroads, streetcars, and of course, oil – to foreign investors.**

13. **The Qajars**

a) Significantly, the **Tobacco Concession of 1880**, which granted control over the cultivation, sale, distribution and export of all Persian tobacco to a British businessman, prompted serious popular unrest, and the *ulema* – or Shia clerical class – becoming instrumental in mobilizing the challenge to the monarchy. With his entire population boycotting tobacco consumption, the Shah was forced to rescind the concession at a cost of

10 times what it originally was negotiated for. The Tobacco Uprising had two significant outcomes:

1) It constituted the first modern example of Shia clerical involvement in the affairs of the polity – a position the clergy held perpetually in reserve due to its status as a conduit to the divine, and the importance of **consultation and consensus** in the structure of Islamic-based society – but which it had not used against the monarchy in modern times. This would have significant consequences in the **constitutional revolution** of 1906, and importantly, in the '50s, with Iran's nationalization of oil, and of course, in the subsequent takeover by the clergy in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

2) It led to the first of many significant loans from the French, British and Russian governments, a situation that was exacerbated by Persia's **tagging of its currency to silver rather than gold**. When silver was discovered in California, and the bottom dropped out of the global market, the Persian economy collapsed, leading to the arrival of a series of European and American financial advisers tasked to re-organize Persia's treasury and customs.

b) The state of Persia's finances also reflected the **competition between Britain and Russia in the Great Game**, as Russia eyed Persia as a candidate to finally achieve a warm water port, and Britain saw Persia as a strategic bastion for the protection of India. To each of these great powers, **Persia's**

weakness was its greatest threat for it meant that it could too easily fall into the hands of the other.

1) To gain leverage over Persia, each negotiated privileged trading terms that significantly reduced the tariffs that constituted an important part of Persia's commercial income;

2) Additionally, each developed new, often faster trading routes as a result of new railroad and port construction, but which had the effect of redirecting **commerce away from the traditional silk route through Persian territory**. This drastically reduced the carriage charges that Persia had previously collected – and economically depended upon.

3) The jockeying between the Britain and Russia eventually led to the carving up of Persia into **spheres of influence**, with the Russians commanding the north, which included billeting their **Cossack Brigade** in Tehran, and the British taking the south, their traditional stronghold, and home to the **South Persia Rifles** - and, after 1909, the location of the **Anglo-Persian oil fields**. Although Persia was in serious debt, and much of its territory badly compromised, the Qajar Shahs adeptly played one power off against the other, ensuring that the country was never formally colonized. However, it earned the Qajars the ire of the British and Russian envoys attempting to gain ground against the other, and a reputation for being unscrupulous, indecisive and corrupt – a legacy the Qajars continue to have in most historical accounts of the period.

- C) The combination of external pressure and the resulting economic and political disintegration in Persia led to the development of a **nationalist, constitutionalist movement** composed of intellectuals and bourgeoisie. The importance of the constitutional movement, not only in Iran, but in the Ottoman empire, was that **it made the state the site of political contestation, politicizing the public sphere**. To quote Gelvin's *A History of the Modern Middle East*, the significance of this point is that 'in the wake of the constitutional movements, control of the state apparatus became the focus of political activity' (144). In Iran, the intent of the movement was not to remove the monarchy, but to contain it by restricting its power. In **1906**, widespread uprisings led to the success of the movement, and Mozzafar-edin Shah was forced to accept a constitution which limited his power through the establishment of an **elected majles, or parliament**. Importantly, the Constitution also required that all laws be vetted by a **group of 6 ulema** to ensure they conformed with Islamic practice.
- D) In Shia Islam, the ulema were the inheritors of the Prophet Mohammad's religious authority. Drawn from the word 'ilm', which means knowledge, the ulema were 'learned men', and the transmitters of God's revelation to mankind. In the Shia tradition, they likewise were interpreters of his divine law, in that the light of God – *irfan*- which Muslims believe infused Mohammad, is believed by Shias to have passed down his bloodline through his son-in-law Ali and the 11 imams succeeding him, and after

the occultation of the 12th imam, to have vested that charismatic authority in the ulema, as the representatives of the imams. This gives Shia ulema greater interpretive authority than their Sunni equivalents, and **a status of wielding divine authority within the organization of society**. Yet, although the representative parliament outlined in the constitution became a fixture of Iranian politics, even when the Qajars were ousted and it became little more than a cipher under the two Pahlavi Shahs, the article on clerical oversight was never put into practice. It was a gap in Iran's appropriation of modern governance that would rankle the clergy for the next 6 decades, until at last, Ayatollah Khomeini would expand and make dominant the concept in the constitution of 1980.

14) The Ottomans

- b) Debt and bankruptcy in the **Ottoman Empire** led to the European-run **Ottoman Public Debt Administration** – and the moniker for the empire as **'The Sick Man of Europe'**.
- c) As in the case of Persia, an important outcome of the economic pressures of defensive developmentalism, and the increasing loss of national or ethnic pride in the face of foreign financial involvement and trade dominance, was the **rise of nationalist movements**. These translated European ideas of citizenship and social responsibility into Middle Eastern and Muslim forms of political expression. In the Ottoman empire, it led, in the **1880s to the rise of the Young Ottomans**, who proclaimed

the *tanzimat* policies of the first period a failure, and instead, the need for an ideology that could inspire all citizens of the empire, based on Islam and the principles of *shura* – **which means consultation**. When Sultan AbdulHamid II ascended to power and instituted a new set of *tanzimat* reform policies, he expanded on their notion that an Islamic-driven modernization was the most effective basis for centralization and development, and for resisting the challenges coming from the West. Though he – and the whole institution of the sultanate - were overthrown by the **Young Turks in 1908** on an initial platform that eschewed Islamic practices, these young officers soon espoused policies similar to those of the deposed sultan, a reflection of the entrenchment of modern Islamic ideas in processes of creating new state structures.

15) In sum, what were the effects of defensive developmentalism in Persia, Egypt and the Ottoman empire? Further, what did they accomplish and how did this contribute to modernism? There were several implications – some more successful than others.

1) **Conscription, cash-crop farming and the building of infrastructure** meant that the **government now directly employed** large numbers of the population. This radically changed the **relationship between the state and the people**, and built up popular expectations of governance in which services and salaries were provided by the state. In turn, the state's legitimacy was now connected to its control over its entire territory and population.

2) Western training of officers fostered a **new class of professional soldiers**, while other defensive developmentalist policies introduced Western ideas and commercial methods into the empires of the Middle East, spawning a new class of **bureaucrats and intellectuals**. New military schools and Western-inspired education systems were established, and ideologies such as *osmanlik* promoted, which engaged populations in shared activities and responsibilities.

3) Increased **vulnerability to European intrusion** and influence entrenched the peripheralisation of the Middle Eastern economies. In this process, the Europeans conducted policies that protected their own economies, maintaining their privileged trading positions through the capitulations agreements, discouraging investment in Egyptian, Persian and Ottoman industries so as to protect their own at home, and taking military, diplomatic and economic measures to protect their own citizens, many of whom were the investors to which the Middle Eastern states came to owe money.

4) The hardening of divisions between religious and ethnic communities in reaction to the first *tanzimat* policies, which were designed to foster equality and unity within the population, contributed instead to communal conflict based **on the use of religious platforms to express socio-political grievances**, and which, in combination with local opposition to foreign dominance, and sudden economic hardship, led to new conceptions of the 'other'. This in turn spawned new political ideas and ideologies, organized oppositions, and at last, to **nationalist and constitutionalist movements**, some of which succeeded in changing existing political structures, even if only temporarily.

5) Finally, the **revival of Islam as both a cultural strategy and religious tradition upon which to re-interpret modernization** in ways legitimate to the Middle East, can be seen to have invigorated Islamic practices within a newly developing public sphere, and linked them to the development of new political practices.

In sum, the transformation of the Middle East during this period was significant, through both failure and success, in that defensive developmentalism was instrumental in spreading the principles and the power of the modern state and in politicizing modern state systems in the region.