

MStudies, The International Relations of the Modern Middle East

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Lecture 7 THE EU and MENA

Underlying themes: 2 Tendencies

- 1. Neocolonialism – Atavism over time becomes a new concept of EU soft-power in the context of the Cold War.** In the 1970s, the period of Detente, characterized by post-colonial absentism and the creed of non-intervention; 1980s gradual change that is definitive by the end of the Cold War.
- 2. The Mediterranean as the European periphery and Border-march – that is, a zone of indeterminate authority** (marking the limits of one power or another). Thus, the southern Mediterranean and Turkey are a European concern outside them being a North Africa or Middle East concern (blurring the question of autonomy).

I. The Colonial Context

- A)** By the end of the 2nd World War, Colonial mandate presence had ended in the region. In some cases, this was surprisingly recent:
- B)** Britain gives up Palestine in 1948
- C)** Egypt is given limited independence in 1927, Britain leaves Egypt in 1951; Leaves the Canal Zone in 1956.
- D)** Libya – British administration ends in 1951 (they'd taken over from the Italians)
- E)** Iraq – Independence granted from 1928-32; but British presence ended in 1958.
- F)** In the Gulf, Kuwait given independence from Britain in 1961; British presence does not come to an end in the rest of the Gulf until 1971. In leaving the Gulf, Britain crates the UAE and remained in charge of security in Bahrain until only about 10 years ago, and remains in charge of security in Oman.
- G)** Syria and Lebanon – France leaves in the 1940s.
- H)** Morocco and Tunisia France leaves in 1956.
- I)** Algeria it leaves in 1962.

J) Spain leaves N. Morocco in 1956, but doesn't leave southern Morocco until 1969 (Tarfaya and Sidi Ifni); leaves Western Sahara in 1975.

II. Post-Colonialism: What it really meant. The main links: economic, security.

A) Economic: This was oil, and later, gas as imports, and manufactured goods as export.

i) 30% of Europe's oil comes from Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Syria (today a portion comes from Central Asia via Turkey).

ii) Since 1982, 19-25% of Europe's gas, via pipeline from Algeria to Italy (in the Transmed line or since 2008, the Libya to Sardinia line) and to Spain (via the TransMaghreb line through Morocco, though a new line is being built direct to Spain). Likewise, LNG is being shipped from Algeria to France and Britain.

iii) **France – Adopted a neo-colonial policy expressed through 'Cooperation' – a programme of cultural exchange and economic aid.**

iv) **Italy and Spain** – had minor post-colonial links. Ongoing squabble over eviction of Italian settlers from Libya in 1970. Italy remained Libya's main trade partner. **Spain** maintained links with the Rif in the north of Morocco, but these were minor (they provided Franco's personal guard, for example).

B) Security –

i) **Britain involved in security in the Gulf: Oman, Bahrain, UAE. In 1963**, it became especially concerned with Kuwait, when Iraq massed troops on its borders, in its first attempt to reclaim its rights over Kuwait dating back to 1913 when it was part of the Basra Velayat, but Britain insisted on its independence in the British Ottoman Agreement.

III. 1970s – Change in Priorities. Migration becomes the dominant concern. **Where did it come from, and go to?**

1) North Africa migration is the dominant one.

A) Algeria – to France. Begins in the 1920s and is the longest tradition.

B) Morocco, Tunisia migration to France as well as to the **BENELUX and to Germany** begin in the 1950s.

These have created permanent European communities.

C) Moroccan migration to Britain in the 1960s primarily to work in the National Health Service and Postal Service.

D) Post 1970s, new migration from NA to Italy, Spain and the UK.

This also involved asylum seekers mainly because of the war in Algeria.

2) Turkey

Post-WWII to Austria and Germany (In response to labour needs to rebuild their countries).

3) Balkans

Final major wave: includes asylum seeking, in the 1990s, mainly to Germany.

4) Migration from the Middle East is minor except for Egyptians and Palestinians.

A) Temporary Migration – elite phenomenon that grows out of the oil boom and price rises: Migration from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia to Europe's capital cities (London, Paris, Rome, primarily) – for extended holidays, and health.

B) Paralleled by another temporary migration based on asylum-seeking, but also economic migration of unemployed, which it conceals.

C) This turns London (in particular) into a Middle East capital outside the Middle East - **Londonistan**. Of the five major Middle East newspapers, 3 are, or were originally, published in London – al-Quds (Palestinian), al-Hayat (Lebanese), ash-sharq al-awsat (Saudi). All first the Arab satellite channels start in London. Al-Jazeera originally BBC Arabic TV service owned by Saudi, but everyone fired when Saudi felt it wandered beyond its control; staff re-hired in Qatar, and al-Jazeera was launched.

D) This is resented in the Middle East, particularly when London becomes a major centre of opposition (and media) to existing regimes.

IV) The Consequences for European states?

- 1) Migration generates in the 1960s and 1970s severe **xenophobia** with riots in Europe. This is repeated in the 1990s.
- 2) Britain, France, Germany and others construct policies of **return migration**.

3) In the 1990s, the European Community (EC) develops a policy of **Zero Migration** – which turned out to be completely unrealistic, and it was forced to change to **managed migration** – selecting and controlling inflow. This creates a huge bureaucracy for controlling the movement of people.

4) **Security Overspills from ME conflicts** affect European capitals: terrorist actions, sieges of embassies, bombings on the train and urban transport system, etc. (paralleled by hijackings, hostage-taking in ME).

a) **1970s, 1980s** – between Palestinians and Israelis

b) **1980s**– between Iran and Iraq

c) **1980s** – Lebanese Civil War

d) **1990s, 2000s** – Trans-national terrorism stemming from Middle East.

5) **Asylum**

Explosion of applications beginning in 1990s as a result of failure of the peace process, War in Iraq. (10-fold in UK, 5 fold in mainland Europe).

6) In this decade, MENA has become a transit zone for people from elsewhere (Africa, East Asia, Central Asia): This has led to Refugee

Camps – (Son Gat recently closed), and The Jungle, in France near the Channel.

7) Conclusion: This demonstrates how much MENA is part of the European periphery and Europe is part of the Middle East and North African states.

V) How to Respond? Security, Migration, Development inside the MENA region.

1) 1970s and '80s: The response to the conundrum makes it clear that this cannot be accomplished on a bilateral basis.

2) They realize there is a limit to what they can do because there is another player involved, and it is an area of a different conflict – the Cold War. The other player is the US (and by association, the Soviet Union), and the US is a particularly difficult partner because of how it deals with Israel.

VI) Collective Response of the EC – later the EU.

1) Historical view

French neo-colonialism was the key, together with North African dependency on European markets. In 1957, a Treaty provided special

access for North African products into the European metropolitan market. This affected such products as Algerian wine, for example, which had no possibility of being marketed elsewhere due to its quality, but which the French used to blend into their Vin du Table.

1969 – This process was formalized by a series of what are called multi-bilateral agreements (multi referring to the EC as a group agreement with each NA country separately), giving special terms of trade with advantages. The primary focus was **industrial and manufactured** goods to come into Europe without tariffs. **The intent:** to encourage industry and create jobs. **Agricultural goods**, on the other hand, were put under **restricted access**, because of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy, a system designed to support European agriculture so as to guarantee protection for its farmers and peasants. But, because North African states were primarily agricultural producers, the programme didn't help them very much. **Israel, however**, was on a different, more generous cooperation agreement dating from **1965**, which was a full-blown free-trade agreement.

1976 – The EC extended the idea of the cooperative agreements to the Middle East – and expanded them: 1) Unrestricted mineral and industrial access; 2) restricted agricultural access.

1986 – New Picture – with a major problem

Spain and Portugal join the Common Market – and each brings enormous agricultural production that make the Eurozone self-sufficient in the agricultural goods (tropical and semi-tropical) previously produced by MENA – a gap in the agricultural market that MENA had been able to exploit. **The result: The entire agricultural regime needed to be redesigned to create a more coherent policy.**

2) Setting is the end of the Cold War, The Beginning of the Maastricht Treaty and its 3 Pillars:

- a) Single Market
- b) Justice and Home Affairs
- c) Common Foreign and Security Policy

1992 – Europe rethinks its Med policy, in the context of Maastricht, which enables it to produce common policy in other areas. By 1993, Europe has the instrument to enunciate that policy.

3) The Renovated Mediterranean Policy

- a) **The EU realizes that simply satisfying old patterns of trade is no longer the issue. It must manage migration by encouraging development in the home countries of MENA.**
- b) It can do this through preferential trade arrangements

c) It must also, improve economic performance by helping to build infrastructure, provide loans for small business development, strengthen the rule of law.

d) **New instrument: Horizontal Funding.** This is a significant development, as it provides for region-wide projects

i) **First example of a direct attempt to see the problem in terms of regional integration**

ii) **First example of direct attempt to intervene.**

e) **The attempt does not really work.**

4) **The Moment: The Hopes and Grandiose Plans of the New World Order,**

including Baker's Tripartite Peace Initiative. Based on the idea that there was a Peace Process, and that it could be built on to develop regional integration for economic purposes for the sake of development, Europe too develops a grandiose new Project: **The Barcelona Process, more**

formally called: The European-Mediterranean Partnership

a) This is an attempt at an **integrated policy**

b) To seriously restructure the **European periphery**

c) To improve security to make **migration unnecessary**

d) To devise a **long-term policy**

e) **This was a policy that could not have been conceived prior to the Peace Process**

f) *It implied the Peace Process.*

5) The objectives of the Barcelona Process

a) Create a zone of 'shared peace, prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean'

b) Provide a policy for the Mediterranean – not all the Middle East – only the littoral states, but including Turkey and Israel.

6) Although the target is migration, It is also a Security Policy.

a) As a security policy, it's an experiment in **soft security**

b) It is also based on concepts of **collective security** and ultimately, **cooperative security.**

c) It expands its security reach to deal with Weapons of Mass Destruction (**WMD**), **People and Drug Smuggling, and International Crime.**

d) Thus, it has a very wide agenda, articulated through economic cooperation to achieve economic development. The reason it took that route: it paralleled the paradigm by which the EU constructed itself.

7) However, there is another driver: Confidence Building

- a) This draws on measures articulated in **1975** in Helsinki in a European **Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE)**
- b) Now, in the post-Cold War euphoria of the 1990s, this is revived as a European Policy by Italy and Spain - the most southern of Europe's states and those directly receiving the first waves of migration. A new CSCE is convened just before the invasion of Kuwait which built on interim efforts that had taken place in the 1980s and 1990s to achieve collective security through confidence building, including the 5+5 Talks, the Mediterranean Forum, Dialogue for the Organization and Cooperation of Europe, and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.
- c) This contributed to building a **holistic policy**, which is what **Barcelona was too**. The Economic aspect was primary, but security was important, and overlaying both were the social and political aspects.

8) The Structures of the Barcelona Process : **3 Baskets**

- a) **The first, and primary Basket: Economic**
 - i) **The aim:** To achieve endogenous economic growth in the south
 - ii) **The basis:** The principle of multi-bilateral association agreements designed to construct free-trade areas in industrial goods only.
 - iii) **The significant difference:** In the previous agreements, only the EU opened its markets to MENA goods. Now, the

Mediterranean states had to open their markets too. **The purpose:** to stimulate industrial competition. **But:** because the EU was so much more efficient, a long period of transition was built into the process so that the opening of their markets would not kill off their industry. **Additionally: aid would be provided to allow them to restructure. Finally,** because their markets were too small to benefit from economies of scale, the idea was to force them to integrate over the long term, just like the EU had done. The **transition period** was to last 15 years.

iv) Israel was included in this arrangement, and in all the other Baskets of Barcelona, except that it retained its bilateral agreements with the EU on preferential trade, and so its position remained unique economically. **However, the great breakthrough was that Barcelona brought Israeli and Palestinian and other Arab representatives together in the same meetings – and often contentious process, but, something that grew more habituated over time.**

C) Basket 2: Security and Political Issues

i) Political: this was dedicated to:

a) **improve governance** on the assumption that without adequate rule of law you couldn't have economic development (ie there was a lack of respect for private property, contracts, etc.) To this was added the need for : **transparency, accountability.**

b) **Human rights**

ii) **Security** - creating a cooperative security tool, which was,

The Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability

D) Basket 3: Social and Cultural Issues

i) Construct a civil society, and encourage it

ii) Increase familiarity among the peoples and societies of the Mediterranean through linkages that would cut down on xenophobia.

E) Funding:

i) **The EU provided €4.58 billion in the first 5 years**

ii) **€5.3 billion in the next 5 years**

iii) Provisions of soft loans from EU Investment Bank, bringing the total to €20 billion.

9) Critique

- a) **Overall, the funding was too little** for the size of the project
- b) The Barcelona Process was a product of the transitional period of the '90s – a period of hope that things could be recast anew. It bore the marks of **a) Fukuyama – the end of history**, which was based on the normative 'good' of free markets and democratic societies; and on **b) Huntington – recognizing the dangers of the Clash of Civilizations**, and sought to overcome that through a policy of the Enlightenment. In other words, it was based on the belief that it could overcome the irrationalities of religious- and guilt-inspired politics – that rational people could find rational solutions. **And –** it was **predicated upon the US solving the Arab-Israeli problem** – which was key to establishing any real security in the region.

10) Problems

- A) Because the economic dimension was crucial**, that was the area in which problems emerged first.
- i) Barcelona created a **hub-and-spoke** arrangement, making the EU the focal point of all policy and all decisions came

from there. As did the funding, leaving the states on the ends of the spokes unable to establish their own linkages, and un-inspired to do so.

- ii) It took longer to reconstruct the economic difficulties of each country because they were each unique, and each had to sign up to programmes that had to be designed to suit their specific needs.
- iii) The process focussed on the industrial sector, and the agricultural sector, which enjoyed the real comparative advantage, was ignored.
- iv) The whole policy was to restructure the economies so as to attract foreign private investment, because that's where economic vibrancy emerges. But, no significant investors would invest outside the gas and oil sectors because better terms were to be had elsewhere. **The result:** they only got half of the investment being sought – until this decade, when the Gulf States wouldn't invest in the US after the disastrous Dubai World and Dubai Port World votes in the US Senate – which led them to take greater risks nearer home than previously.

B) CFSP The Common Foreign Security Policy

- i) This was the first time the CFSP was put into action, but the European states wouldn't cooperate, tried to cut funding, and were reluctant to become involved.
- ii) 'We think this is a great policy whose time has not come' was how the British Foreign Office official responsible for the strategy put it. Very simply, the states wouldn't concede sovereignty to a cooperative security body.
- iii) **The Arab-Israeli Dispute** - The Americans were unable to deliver on the Peace Process, so there couldn't be a collective security policy.

VII) 2001 – 9/11 and the New World Order.

- This comes just as the Neocons are making their bid, and America rewrites its agenda to focus on trans-national terrorism.
- Barcelona looks weak and of another world. It is rigid, extremely bureaucratic, and dictatorial, as every decision and programme is being run from Brussels.

VIII) The USME –Partnership Initiative, Dec. 2002

- 1) Put forward by Colin Powell as a Broader Middle East Initiative, based on an earlier Clinton Administration effort to set up a powerful programme for the Middle East called The Eisenstadt Initiative
- 2) A response to Barcelona, as the French had insisted that the US have no part in it. However, the US wanted to have a part in it because it shared strategic concerns in the region – so it can be seen to partially have been an attack on Barcelona.
- 3) **US-MEPI Structure:**
 - i) **Bilateral agreements, so anyone could apply**
 - ii) **Free trade area**
 - iii) **Improve Human Rights and Education**
 - iv) **Improve Governance**
 - v) **Empower Women**
 - vi) **Funded at a little over \$150 million for 5 years**
 - vii) Although it was a tiny project compared the Barcelona in terms of funding, it gave states of the Mediterranean an alternative. Barcelona was no longer the only game in town. Additionally, MEPI was more flexible.
 - viii) **The EU considered it a threat.**

VIII) 2003 – The EU Neighbourhood Policy

- 1) **This** differs from Barcelona in that it is designed to construct a **Ring of Friends** around Europe.
- 2) **It** creates **bilateral** links with others with the intent that they can become incorporated into the EU economic market if they restructure themselves on the economic model of the EU (and including its model of polity and society).
- 3) **Neighbourhood states** can do this on their **own time frame**.
However, they can **never achieve full membership**.
- 4) **They cannot join the EU** decision-making institutions or have any input into its decision-making processes.
- 5) **Instead**, they become **Partners in the EU**. Thus, they can participate in the single market, but not in the Community. This is the position occupied by Switzerland, Norway and Iceland now. **The pitfall:** A state risks becoming vulnerable to EU decisions, as it is an entity that will always be bigger than the state.
- 6) **Critically**, this policy was designed to include and extend into **Eastern Europe** as a way to prepare the accession countries for induction into the Community in 2004.

IX) Now – Two Policies were Competing.

- 1) **Barcelona (EMP)** to create a **shared space**

2) ENP, to create **bilateral arrangements** emphasizing **hub-and-spoke**

X) 2007 – The 2 Policies are Combined

1) The old economic basket is replaced by the Neighbourhood approach.

A) It requires states to restructure according to European standards through action plans on a 3-year basis.

B) It gives **access** to European markets depending on the degree of restructuring, thereby building in the possibility of **conditionality**.

C) **Funding** to aid transition is increased;

D) It now covers all economic activities, although it still discriminates against agriculture.

E) There is no encouragement to integrate southern markets.

F) **In sum**, it is a switch to a bilateral approach and away from the multilateral, and it is a worse deal.

2) **Because** a solution to the Arab-Israeli Dispute has proved elusive, **the**

Security Basket is dropped. There is **no collective policy**.

A) **Instead**, there are **Securitized policies** on a bilateral basis in which the EU recruits southern Mediterranean states to act on its behalf to control migration flows across their territories.

B) The EU tightens controls on migration, making entry more difficult.

This is conducted through the European Commission and Frontex, to control movement.

C) In effect, this means that Europe's southern border is the southern

border of the South Mediterranean States. The Security Policy is designed to promote **Fortress Europe** – with the cooperation of the Southern Mediterranean.

D) 2nd Basket: In return, Europe has dropped its pressures for good

governance, because its priority is to support the security agendas of the Southern Mediterranean, and the US.

E) 3rd Basket: This too is dropped. Civil societies now are run by

GNOS – government controlled NGOs.

F) In sum, The policy is explicit: it became a Security Policy that

abandoned the principles of Barcelona.

XI) The final piece (of this unhappy saga) : 2007 Union of the

Mediterranean

1) The French realized this didn't work, and President Sarkozy initiated a

new idea in which the policy should be on economic development

only. This, it was argued, would encourage private investment. And

the French proposed to lead it.

- 2) The other EU states rejected France taking over the initiative, and so incorporated it into the Neighbourhood Policy.
- 3) The irony is, it is now similar to James Baker's plan to galvanize the Middle East in 1994. Called the MENA Economic Summits, it was a multilateral initiative in which the private sector would be encouraged to invest in region-wide infrastructure and productive capacity to improve the environment for private economic development. However, this collapsed in 1997, with the discouragement of Netanyahu.
- 4) At the moment, MENA receives 2-3% of global private investment.
And this is an area key to energy security!
- 5) The Arab Spring: a) EU policy is officially against even moderate Islamism, on premise it leads to extremism. B) France, Britain heavily committed through NATO engagement in Libya to nation-building there. C) Foreign investment post-Tahrir has fallen drastically. D) Rise in anti-Iranian nuclear posture post-Arab spring.

I) The Gulf

- A)** 30 % of Gulf trade is with the EU.
- B)** For 18 years, the EU and the GCC have been negotiating an economic agreement that has supposed to be parallel to Barcelona and create a relationship. However:
- C)** The GCC states are very different from the EU
- D)** They are very different from the Mediterranean states – they are not diversified economies.
- E)** There is also a conflict of interest. The GCC has developed a petro-chemical industry which makes building-block petro-chemicals for more sophisticated processes such as plastics. They are able to do this very cheaply, because the energy input costs are so low. This has compromised the EU petrochemical industry – and the EU is attempting to negotiate terms that would protect the European industry – so far with little success. The same applies to the aluminium industry that has grown in the Gulf because smelting imported bauxite from SE Asia is so cheap because the cost of energy is so low.
- F)** Further, the GCC is supposed to be integrating into a common market and common currency regime, but the disaffection among

its members, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, has made this a slow process.

- G)** Recently, the French have offered to provide Abu Dhabi with a nuclear fuel capability. Legitimate argument: the Gulf states electricity consumption per capita is so high that they need for an alternative. The energy gap in the Emirates is being argued to be a growing crisis – due to high-energy usage in industry, air-conditioning, and water-desalinization – among others.
- H)** Bilateral security relationships exist between the members of the EU and all the Gulf States.

II) Iran, and Iraq

- A) Principle: Constructive Engagement** (rather than containment) – based on changing behaviour through relations
- B) Apart from nuclear negotiation**, all relationships with Iran are maintained on a bilateral basis.
- C) Nuclear Talks with Iran: 5+1 Talks** (France, Britain, Germany, US, Russia, China). EU supports UN sanctions on Iran, which include embargoes on the export of goods, oil and technology that could be used for nuclear purposes, travel restrictions on the right of

certain Iranians to travel into the EU and a freezing of EU funds and assets owned by certain Iranian citizens and companies.

D) The EU has been little involved in Iraq since the invasion.

European Investment in Iraq low.

III) Israel/Palestine

A) Israel has rejected the EU as a political partner since 1980,

because of the Venice Agreement, in which the EU supported the Palestinian right to statehood. However, it accepts the EU as an economic partner.

B) A common policy eludes the EU on Israel because of an internal split among its members: Britain, Holland, Germany and Denmark are strongly pro-Israel; the rest are in various measures anti-Israel.

C) However, EU has sanctioned Hamas, attempted to support Abbas (Abu-Mazen) and the Palestinian Authority, and cut off aid to Gaza.

IV) Security –EU/ NATO and MENA

1) Soft- hard security split, which makes creating a common policy illusive

2) Istanbul Cooperation Initiative –a programme to give overall coverage to the Gulf. Along with the Mediterranean Dialogue – will engage any state that is democratic (and they stretch that definition to be broadly inclusive).

3) Civilian-Military relationship – help MENA states build up confidence in the idea of civil control of the military – a standard of democracies, but not typical of MENA states.

V) Turkey

- 1) 1965, EU in Ankara Agreement promised eventually to offer it access.
- 2) 2004 – it began formal negotiations – because of changes brought about by Turkey's primary party, the AKP. And these were real changes: beginning of a civil-military relationship.
- 3) Meanwhile, EU Enlargement took place, simultaneously with a rise in Muslim world extremism. This changed the view of several key members of the EU, particularly France. Were Turkey to join the EU, with a population of 90 million, it would be the second largest state inside the union.
- 4) The EU has, as a result, reverted to placing Turkey in with the rest of the Neighbourhood states – which makes Turkey livid,

and is encouraging more recent steps for it to look back at the Muslim world (the EU has done the same with Morocco, which never had as strong a case as Turkey, but previously, had been considered in a special category). As part of the Islamic world, Turkey carries clout – is Sunni like the majority, has better trade and industry, can engage both Iran and Israel, and has water. In effect, if the EU doesn't bring Turkey in, it will become equally strong outside (making one consider the political adage – it is always better to have an antagonist looking from the inside out, than looking from the outside in.)

- 5) The US wants the Turks inside the EU – as they have control and access to the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and it regularly puts pressure on the EU to accept it – so far without luck. EU position of Turkey joining the EU instead hardening as a result of PM Erdogan's Islamist approach and fallout with Israel.

In sum, there are certain areas of serious differences in interests between the US and the EU in the Middle East. The EU has so far not succeeded in creating an environment in which the southern Mediterranean attracts private investment, which means it remains an

unstable and economically reduced littoral. On the other hand, the EU, despite its claim to being a normative power, has constructed a system to protect its own security, lessening pressure concerning human rights and the rule of law on the regimes of the southern Mediterranean, in exchange for their cooperation in keeping migration limited into the Northern Mediterranean lands (it remains to be seen what deal is struck with the new Tunisia and Lybia. Egypt is seen as still continuing the same judicial and prison practices as pre-Mubarak).