

Marketing Rebellion: Insurgent Groups, International Media, and NGO Support

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Abstract. Many scholars view an emergent “global civil society” as an accessible, democratic alternative to the state system – a new political space where social movements frustrated at home can gain support from “principled” transnational advocacy networks. But, only a few movements from the developing world attract transnational backing. This article first proposes a framework clarifying the process, and then identifies structural and strategic factors explaining the variation. The article compares two movements that secured significant international support, Nigeria’s Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and Mexico’s Zapatista Army of National Liberation (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, EZLN), against similar groups from the same countries that failed to do so. On this basis, the article argues that “global civil society” requires reconceptualization – as a competitive arena where weak domestic challengers vie for scarce transnational resources, where those groups that gain support have structural or strategic advantages over others, and where transnational supporters act on interest as well as principle.

Introduction

Why do some social movements challenging states in the developing world gain substantial support from transnational activist networks such as the environmental and human rights networks, while other similar movements remain isolated and obscure? Why, for instance, have such diverse groups as Mexico’s Zapatista rebels, India’s Narmada Dam opponents, and South Asia’s child carpet workers won substantial backing from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) based in the developed world, while similar challengers from the same and other countries have not?¹

In recent years, many social movements in conflict with developing states have sought support from transnational NGOs. Because of contemporary developments in global communications and transportation, there are means readily available for pursuing patrons across national borders. In addition, recent proliferation of NGOs affords domestic movements many targets for transnational appeals.² While the number of movements seeking support is difficult to measure, it appears to be large. Major NGOs receive frequent pleas for action from around the world.³ Many challengers now have Internet websites, a chief function of which is to alert the world to their causes.⁴ And, large numbers of domestic movements attend international conferences on issues like human rights, indigenous

rights, and the environment where networking and support-building are routine activities.⁵

But, while the pursuit of transnational support is common, gaining it is neither easy nor automatic. Most domestic movements begin in international isolation and, because many now seek external allies, they compete against each other for the limited resources of transnational supporters. Even if we exclude cases in which the growth of external support is relatively easy to understand—for instance, cases of covert government aid to movements in strategically important conflicts, of Diaspora support for an ethnic movement in its home state, or other identity-based ties such as those between distant co-religionists—there are many movements for which the growth of NGO support remains a puzzle.

For the burgeoning literature on non-state actors in world politics, this puzzle opens a new research area with significant implications for current understandings of a much-heralded “global civil society.”⁶ In recent years, scholars in many disciplines have postulated the emergence of a global civil society composed of formal and informal organizations with constituencies, operations, and goals transcending state boundaries.⁷ Some analysts believe that growing global interactions between non-state actors have fundamentally changed world politics, forming an alternative political space marked by norms of sympathy, cooperation and assistance rather than the anarchy, self-interest, and competition of inter-state society.⁸ Even if they question the idea that a full-blown global civil society is developing, many scholars view recent proliferation of NGOs as creating a more accessible and democratic international environment.⁹ Arguably, these developments open new forums for voicing concerns slighted in the inter-state system and for mobilization by groups inadequately represented in their home states. In this view, transnational political action holds special promise for domestic social movements in conflict with repressive or unresponsive states, offering a means for these movements to engage supportive NGOs who may exert pressure on the state in a transnational “boomerang” pattern.¹⁰

Notwithstanding the growing literature on transnational relations and global civil society, however, many of these sweeping conclusions rest on narrow empirical foundations. In the key research area of transnational support for domestic social movements, most studies analyze only one or a few highly successful cases of transnational mobilization, such as the anti-Apartheid movement.¹¹ Moreover, because the underlying purpose of most such studies has been to challenge state-centered neo-realist conceptions of international politics, researchers in political science have focused primarily on the consequences of NGO networking on states and international organizations.¹² As a result, much of the literature ignores an issue critical to understanding global civil society’s character—the origins and dynamics of transnational support networks around particular challengers. Most scholars either assume the existence of transnational ties or attribute them to contemporary communication and transportation technologies without showing how these general conditions lead to transnational linkages in a few cases but not in other similar ones.¹³

While some recent studies systematically have analyzed transnational interactions, they have taken a top-down perspective that highlights the “principled” nature of actions by transnational NGOs.¹⁴ But to argue that NGOs and transnational networks primarily are moral actors is inadequate to explain the development of transnational support. Principles create only permissive guidelines for selecting one or another needy group; they do not help us understand how “moral” NGOs choose to support one movement rather than another. Moreover, a top-down perspective is one-sided: It ignores the active role of domestic social movements in the South in responding to opportunities on the international plane, promoting their own causes transnationally, and wooing potential NGO supporters. This critique is true even of Keck and Sikkink’s influential “boomerang” model, which starts with local level actors’ going around recalcitrant states in pursuit of international support. While Keck and Sikkink acknowledge, “for every voice that is amplified [by transnational advocacy networks], many others are ignored,” they spend little time analyzing why some challengers attract support while others do not.¹⁵

The foregoing approaches contrast with the bottom-up method taken by the literature on domestic social movements. Scholars such as Sidney Tarrow place movements themselves at the center of their analyses even while accepting that the broader “political opportunity structure” affects movement development.¹⁶ As Lipsky describes it, “the essence of political protest consists of activating third parties” whose involvement in a conflict can change the balance of power between the main contestants.¹⁷ For these scholars, the strategies local movements use to attract third party support are crucial to understanding the dynamics of contentious politics. Similarly, a more complete understanding of the transnational “boomerang model” must focus more directly on the local-level movements that set it in motion, on the ways in which they activate third party support across national boundaries, and on the reasons for variation in support levels between movements.

This article takes some preliminary steps toward filling this gap. First, I propose a framework clarifying how particular challengers attract transnational backing; and second, I identify factors that explain why some challengers gain such support while others do not. The starting point for the framework is the idea that challengers compete for international support against many other needy groups. In such an environment, a challenger’s chance of gaining support increases to the extent (1) that it can “pitch” its cause to transnational networks, thereby raising awareness about itself, and (2) that it can “match” itself to the concerns and needs of potential international supporters.

With regard to the “pitch,” it is both self-evident and crucial that a challenger cannot gain support unless it comes to the attention of transnational actors. Movements raise awareness about their conflicts either by lobbying transnational actors directly, or by indirectly attracting journalists to report about their issues. Before discussing factors that affect a movement’s ability to pitch its cause, the next part of the process – the “match” – should also be considered.

Here it is important to understand the structure of the international support “regime.” For our purposes, the NGOs composing this regime can be viewed as having three key attributes: an issue focus, preferred tactics, and organizational needs.

If the causes championed by domestic challengers “match” pre-existing features of the transnational support regime, their chance of gaining support increases. With regard to issue-matching, an initial problem for movements from the developing world is that their conflicts and goals – often localized, parochial, and obscure – may not jibe with the agendas of potential transnational supporters based, for the most part, in the developed world. If that is the case, they are less likely to gain support. This means that local groups whose causes match with internationally recognized categories would have an advantage over others in gaining support. It also means that movements whose causes do not match, would have incentives to reframe their issues so that they do.

With regard to tactical matching, NGOs will be more likely to support challengers who follow methods similar to their preferred ones, rather than other tactics that contradict NGO precepts about the appropriate means to achieve political goals. Again, this will give incentives for local groups to adopt tactics familiar to, and approved by, international audiences. As one example, domestic challengers around the world frequently follow mass mobilization and civil disobedience techniques popularized internationally by the American Civil Rights and Indian independence movements.

With regard to their organizational needs, transnational actors will carefully weigh the costs and benefits of backing a distant challenger. Aside from the direct costs of support, NGOs also run significant risks in lending their name and reputation to distant clients. If these clients or their causes later turn out to be illegitimate, an NGO’s own credibility, membership and contributions will often suffer. These considerations imply that before providing support, transnational NGOs will evaluate the legitimacy of a movement and the validity of its claims. On the benefit side, a transnational NGO is likely to consider the extent to which adoption of a movement can serve the NGO’s broader goals. Can, for instance, a local insurgent serve as a symbol of wider issues? Does a particular challenger already have such high international status that an NGO supporter will itself gain from the relationship, as may be the case with a *cause célèbre* such as China’s Tibetans?

Which challengers are most likely to succeed in pitching and matching? As between challengers from different states, a key issue is the home state’s policy toward exit by representatives of the challenger and entry by members of transnational networks. As Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink argue with respect to human rights violations, victims from states that limit or prohibit access to transnational networks can find it far harder to raise awareness than those from more open regimes.¹⁸

Beyond state policy, access to transnational networks hinges on characteristics of particular challengers, including economic resources, leadership endowments and organizational capabilities. Wealthier challengers have a greater chance of raising international awareness through such simple means as traveling abroad to lobby NGOs, issuing press releases, publishing documents, establishing web sites, or purchasing professional public relations services. With regard to leadership, challengers guided by individuals having prior contacts with or stature among transnational networks for a variety of non-political reasons are likely to have easier access to these circles for subsequent political struggles. Similarly, challengers with superior

knowledge about how best to present their case to international audiences have a significant advantage over others. Such knowledge can be critical to a challenger's reframing obscure local conflicts to match the goals, tactics, and organizational needs of transnational NGOs. Thus pre-existing familiarity with transnational discourses, with the ways in which transnational claims are made, and with potential supporters themselves all increase the likelihood of gaining transnational support. Even a seemingly accidental factor such as a leader's charisma hinges in important ways on material underpinnings. If a leader is articulate in a world language, has knowledge of the media and public relations techniques, and understands internationally resonant issues his chance of being found "charismatic" by international audiences increases.

Finally, a challenger's organizational ability, especially its capacity to mobilize a constituency for mass action, affects its likelihood of attracting NGO support. Apart from drawing attention, protest marches and demonstrations can prove to international actors that a movement has a vibrant local constituency and a pressing problem, thereby assuaging concerns about the movement's legitimacy. Differences in organizational capabilities have a variety of sources, often historical, sometimes resource based, but whatever their origins, these differences can have a profound impact on a group's ability to mobilize.

To explore these propositions, the following sections compare the Ogoni movement of Nigeria and the Zapatista rebellion of Chiapas, Mexico – both of which moved from international isolation in the early 1990s to major support in the mid 1990s – against similar cases from the same countries that failed to attract such backing. I have chosen these cases because they are representative of a large universe of social movements frustrated at home, seeking NGO support abroad, but which at the outset of their quest for support appeared unlikely to gain it because of their small size and pre-existing obscurity. Comparing transnational success and failure of multiple Mexican and Nigerian cases should tease out some of the factors involved and provide a preliminary assessment of the framework developed above. This research design also reduces the selection bias of previous studies that have examined only successful cases.¹⁹ Since I compare within countries, I do not test whether the openness of a challenger's home state has an impact on its access to transnational networks.²⁰ Moreover, since I compare groups that have sought support during the same time period, I control for new technological developments and for recent growth in NGO numbers and resources. My focus is, thus, primarily on how characteristics and strategies of insurgent groups affect their likelihood of gaining support from transnational networks.

Transnationalization of the Ogoni Conflict

Since the late 1980s, Nigeria's Niger River Delta has been the site of mobilization and protest by ethnic minorities demanding increased political power, economic justice, and control over natural resources.²¹ These mobilizations are recent manifestations of minority discontent that has plagued Nigeria since its independence in 1960 as well as in the British colonial period. Ranging in size from a few hundred thousand to several million, the minority groups together constitute perhaps

10 percent of Nigeria's approximately 110 million (in 2000) people. Their native territory, the Delta, is rich in oil and the source of most of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings. Yet the "oil minorities" have reaped few benefits, instead remaining some of the poorest people in Nigeria. In the early 1990s, the minorities, weak and isolated in a Nigerian political system dominated by three far larger ethnic groups, sought to internationalize their unsuccessful domestic struggles. Out of this cauldron of minority protest, a single movement, among the 300,000-500,000 Ogoni people, mounted sustained mass mobilizations and built a robust international support network. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) organized the Ogoni to demand "political autonomy within Nigeria"²² and brought world attention to the group's conflict with the Nigerian state and Royal Dutch/Shell ("Shell"), the multinational oil company. International NGOs including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth provided substantial publicity and support for the Ogoni cause.²³

In the wake of Ogoni success in publicizing their plight, other Niger Delta minorities sought to emulate their international strategies, among them the Ijaw, Ogbia, Ikwerre, Urhobos, and Nembe Creek communities.²⁴ But none of these movements has succeeded in arousing the support of major international actors or in attracting substantial media reporting. In 1995, when the Nigerian state executed MOSOP's leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and smashed the Ogoni movement domestically, the international community turned Nigeria into a pariah regime. In three ensuing years of harsh repression on the Delta, the Ogoni movement continued its activities outside Nigeria through protests, conferences, publications, and websites. Meanwhile, similar struggles by other Niger Delta minorities remained unknown internationally and weak domestically, with only sporadic and uncoordinated protest activity—most of which was easily and bloodily repressed by the military regime of General Sani Abacha.

With the death of Abacha in 1998, mobilizations among the Niger Delta minorities again mounted. Exiled Ogoni leaders returned to Nigeria to revive MOSOP's local political networks, while other minorities have sought to build their own movements. The result has been further unrest and violence. Protest has been directed against the new government and the oil companies, but increasingly it has also involved confrontations between rival ethnic groups over land and political power.²⁵ Among the Ogoni as well, internal divisions that had long plagued the movement and new ones that erupted during the years in exile, have weakened the movement. While other Niger Delta minorities have established overseas offices and websites,²⁶ the Ogoni have remained the best known of the many Delta movements. Moreover, the Ogoni struggle was important to the development of concerted cooperation between international human rights and environmental networks, and Saro-Wiwa has become an international symbol of these overlapping issues.²⁷ But, *why* did the Ogoni become an international *cause célèbre* in the mid-1990s, while the other Niger Delta movements did not?

Formed in 1990 by Ogoni elites, MOSOP's primary goal was Ogoni "political autonomy within Nigeria" through which the Ogoni sought a number of subsidiary aims: political power over Ogoni affairs; control over a "fair proportion"

of oil production and revenue distribution; “adequate” representation in national political institutions; preservation of Ogoni culture, religion and languages; and protection of the Ogoni environment.²⁸ MOSOP hoped to achieve these goals through mass protest, but mobilization efforts in 1990 quickly fizzled.²⁹ In August 1991, however, MOSOP leaders introduced an additional strategy, arousing international pressure against the Nigerian state.³⁰ For approximately one year, MOSOP failed in its efforts to gain transnational NGO support and international media coverage. But after further strategic changes in late 1992 and early 1993, the Ogoni began to win significant external backing.

The pattern of NGO support in the Ogoni case provides important clues about how transnational networks operate. The Ogonis’ primary backers came from three activist networks: the minority/indigenous rights, human rights, and environmental networks. The Ogonis’ earliest and most consistent NGO supporter was the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), an organization based in The Hague which seeks to give its member “peoples” a greater voice in domestic and international politics.³¹ UNPO played a key role in MOSOP’s efforts to broaden its transnational support, facilitating MOSOP’s contacts with other NGOs in Europe and acting as a media and NGO clearinghouse for MOSOP press releases faxed from Nigeria.³² In the environmental network, Greenpeace International and Friends of the Earth International initially rejected Ogoni appeals in 1991-1992. Then, in the first months of 1993 these and other environmental NGOs began providing substantial support including letter-writing campaigns on behalf of imprisoned Ogoni leaders, widely-distributed reports on environmental and health problems in the Niger Delta, and press releases, protests and sit-ins against state repression and environmental abuses by Shell.³³ Amnesty International also rejected the Ogonis’ initial pleas for action in 1991 and 1992. Beginning in mid-1993, however, Amnesty along with other human rights organizations took increasingly vigorous public actions condemning Nigerian state abuses of Ogoni activists.³⁴

Critical to Ogoni success in obtaining NGO support was MOSOP’s ability to “pitch” the movement, raising awareness about itself among potential transnational supporters. Shortly after MOSOP’s decision to seek international support in August 1991, Ogoni leaders began direct lobbying of transnational NGOs.³⁵ MOSOP leaders, particularly Saro-Wiwa, made numerous lobbying trips to human rights and environmental NGOs in Europe and North America in the early 1990s. In addition, movement leaders networked at international conferences, making their first key contacts with UNPO at the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (UNWGIP) conference in Geneva in summer 1992. The crucial nature of Ogoni ability to access transnational networks becomes clear when one considers that, prior to late 1992, the situation of Niger Delta peoples was little known to most NGOs that would soon give them support. The single international news story that discussed Ogoni demands in this period presented the group as one of many Niger Delta minorities unhappy over the consequences of oil production and its failure to benefit from Nigeria’s oil wealth. Focused on the Omadino and Itsekiri ethnic groups, the story mentioned but gave no special prominence to the Ogoni autonomy demand. Nothing in the story provided a clue that the Ogoni, rather

than the other groups, would become an international *cause célèbre* within two years.³⁶

For several reasons, MOSOP was able to pitch the Ogoni cause more effectively than similar Niger Delta movements. One factor was Ogoni resources, primarily the personal wealth of Ken Saro-Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa used his money not only to educate his children at elite schools in England, but also to underwrite many MOSOP activities, including frequent foreign lobbying trips and various publications.³⁷

MOSOP also differed from other Niger Delta movements in its leadership's pre-existing linkages to transnational networks. Saro-Wiwa was an internationally known author with personal ties to British literary, journalistic, and human rights circles. As Saro-Wiwa wrote, "It was to [the well-known British novelist] William [Boyd] that I turned whenever I hit a brick wall in my solicitation on behalf of the Ogoni. I remember his asking me, sometime in 1991, to contact both Amnesty International and Greenpeace. I telephoned Greenpeace."³⁸ During a trip to Germany as part of a sponsored program on African literature in summer 1992, Saro-Wiwa visited the Association of Threatened Peoples, whose staff urged him to attend the UNWGIP conference to "present the Ogoni case before a world audience [and to] ... meet several nongovernmental organizations interested in human rights."³⁹ As discussed below, Saro-Wiwa also established a close relationship with two British filmmakers. After he told them of his "frustrations in campaigning for the Ogoni cause," they promised to help him. On his next visit to England, said Saro-Wiwa, "we went knocking on several doors: Friends of the Earth, Survival International, and others."⁴⁰ While these contacts did not at first lead to support, they did raise awareness of the Ogoni among transnational NGOs and made subsequent support possible.

In addition to wealth and connections, the Ogoni leadership was skilled at public relations techniques. Saro-Wiwa was a successful entrepreneur and television producer, while other prominent Ogoni leaders had worked in business and advertising in Nigeria. As Saro-Wiwa stated,

I had ... learnt quite a bit about how to promote an idea or a product during my television production days ... Now as I tried to promote Ogoni, all the foregoing came together and made my work not only easy but also inexpensive. I am quite convinced that if we had hired a public relations firm to promote our cause, it would have cost us millions of dollars and we would not have achieved the success we did, a success which proved a nightmare to our opponents.⁴¹

By contrast, other Niger Delta "oil minorities" have not had the Ogonis' wealthy, knowledgeable, and well-connected leaders. Despite political and economic grievances comparable to the Ogonis' and despite similar domestic tactics, the other minorities have gone largely unknown and unsupported abroad. In one telling incident in 1991, a film crew working on a television documentary for the British national television station Channel Four traveled to Nigeria to report on the state's 1990 killing of 80 ethnic Etche people peacefully protesting oil company

operations on their traditional homeland near Ogoni territory.⁴² When the producer arrived in Port Harcourt, Nigeria and inquired about the issues, he was quickly directed to Saro-Wiwa, who guided the film crew to the massacre site, narrated key incidents in the film and helped shape the final production. By contrast, Etche leaders, far less experienced with media, transnational organizations, or public relations techniques, were largely ignored despite being handed a golden opportunity to promote their own cause. As the producer of the film stated in an interview, Saro-Wiwa appeared prominently in the film because he was “the most articulate spokesperson for any of the ethnic groups on the Delta.”⁴³ The documentary, broadcast nationally in Britain in October 1992, heightened awareness of the Ogoni among environmental NGOs, while the Etche were forgotten.⁴⁴

These factors also helped MOSOP learn to reframe its movement in terms that increased its appeal to international NGOs. Major support for the Ogoni arose only after MOSOP made several strategic shifts in late 1992—shifts that helped create critical “matches” between the Ogoni and potential NGO supporters. One such match concerned MOSOP’s goals.

In its initial lobbying efforts in 1991 and 1992, MOSOP had framed its conflict around ethnic minority rights. This framing emphasized MOSOP’s goals of “political autonomy within Nigeria,” preservation of Ogoni culture and language, and a greater share of oil revenues—all outgrowths of long-standing Ogoni demands against the Nigerian state.⁴⁵ While appropriate to the Nigerian context, however, these demands left most of MOSOP’s initial NGO contacts unmoved. Only the minority rights organization UNPO backed the Ogoni; more prominent environmental and human rights NGOs rejected Ogoni overtures. Greenpeace International and Friends of the Earth International staff have stated that MOSOP’s demands appeared deeply enmeshed in murky and difficult issues of Nigerian politics that did not match the NGOs’ environmental agendas.⁴⁶ The *Ogoni Bill of Rights*, for instance, focuses on political autonomy and portrays environmental issues as the Nigerian state’s responsibility.

Beginning in late 1992, however, MOSOP took actions that led the NGOs to reverse their initial rejections. First, MOSOP reframed its grievances to highlight environmental problems caused by a Shell subsidiary. Thereafter, Shell’s “ecological warfare” against the “indigenous” Ogoni became an increasingly prominent part of MOSOP’s rhetoric both at home and abroad.⁴⁷ As part of this strategic shift on November 30, 1992, MOSOP issued a Demand Notice to Shell ordering it to pay the Ogoni \$10 billion in royalties and reparations or quit Ogoniland within 30 days. Expecting that Shell would disregard this notice, Saro-Wiwa planned a major Ogoni protest for January 4, 1993. This march was also planned to coincide with the start of the United Nation’s International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. In December 1992, MOSOP feverishly organized the demonstration in Nigeria, while Saro-Wiwa journeyed to Europe to encourage transnational environmental groups to visit the Delta to witness the protest.⁴⁸

In the wake of the Channel Four documentary, the Demand Notice, and MOSOP lobbying on environmental issues, NGOs that had earlier rejected MOSOP

overtures changed their views. First among these was Greenpeace International, which agreed to send a photographer to document the march commemorating a self-styled “Ogoni Day in the International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples.” With MOSOP’s new framing around environmental issues, Greenpeace saw support for the Ogoni as a new opportunity “to have a go at Shell – attack them.”⁴⁹ In this view, the Ogoni could serve as a powerful symbol of multinationals’ environmental abuses useful in ongoing conflicts with Shell and other companies. As Greenpeace and other environmental NGOs such as Friends of the Earth and the Sierra Club gave increasing prominence to the Ogoni, MOSOP responded by making Shell’s “devastation” of the Ogoni environment the central focus of its domestic and international campaigns.⁵⁰ This reframing had great resonance among the Ogoni population because of long-standing resentment over Shell’s failure to employ indigenes and bring prosperity to the Ogonis.⁵¹ Moreover, there was a factual basis for complaints about Shell’s environmental record.⁵²

Nonetheless, environmental issues were not MOSOP’s initial core concern and improving the Niger Delta environment would not “solve” the Ogoni conflict. Instead, reframing to highlight issues of the environment and Shell’s misconduct was part of a successful effort to gain support from transnational environmental NGOs. In a 1993 interview, Saro-Wiwa complained that the developed world cared more about endangered animals than about the Ogoni people.⁵³ But while criticizing this bias, MOSOP also responded adaptively, reframing its conflict around environmental abuses by a multinational corporation.

By itself, however, MOSOP’s reframing of its issues does not fully explain NGO responses to the Ogoni. A second set of factors relates to the NGOs’ organizational needs. In their initial appeals to transnational NGOs, MOSOP leaders presented little evidence that the organization was a legitimate representative of the Ogoni people or that Ogoni grievances had a factual basis. Instead, according to several of their earliest NGO contacts, MOSOP leaders sought to persuade simply by “telling stories,” many seemingly exaggerated and sensationalized, about environmental problems in the Niger Delta.⁵⁴ These unsubstantiated pleas formed an insufficient basis for NGO support. For Ogoni leaders, however, demonstrating mass support was difficult because MOSOP’s 1990 attempts at popular mobilization had failed, and the grassroots movement lay moribund.⁵⁵

When news of the Channel Four documentary reached Nigeria, however, interest among the Ogoni populace mounted. MOSOP leaders capitalized on this development by organizing the Ogoni Day March.⁵⁶ MOSOP carefully orchestrated the march, mobilizing tens of thousands of Ogoni and outfitting them with twigs symbolizing environmental issues and signs proclaiming Ogoni solidarity with indigenous peoples worldwide.⁵⁷ As a result, the march demonstrated MOSOP’s significant support among the Ogoni masses, support that was then documented on videotape by MOSOP and by international observers such as the Greenpeace photographer.⁵⁸ Over ensuing months, MOSOP also organized a series of mass mobilizations including a candlelight vigil, fundraising drive, and boycott of national elections in June 1993. For potential environmental supporters, the videotapes, observers’ testimony, and continuing mass mobilizations offered evidence of apparent

Ogoni unity behind MOSOP and of Shell's environmental abuses. This proof helped assuage important concerns about MOSOP's legitimacy that had earlier inhibited NGO support.⁵⁹

For the argument presented here, it is important to underline the reasons that MOSOP was able to create these substantive and organizational matches. First, unlike the other Niger Delta minorities, MOSOP had the opportunity to learn from direct interactions with transnational NGOs. As part of UNPO, for instance, MOSOP leaders took formal courses in media relations, nonviolent mobilization, and political activism at the United Nations.⁶⁰ Moreover, in conversation with staff at environmental and human rights NGOs in Europe in 1991 and 1992, Saro-Wiwa was told the reasons that key NGOs such as Amnesty and Greenpeace decided not to support the Ogoni. Based on these conversations, Saro-Wiwa shifted the issue framing and met the organizational concerns of transnational NGOs. By contrast other Niger Delta minorities, lacking contacts, knowledge, or wealth, had only sporadic interchanges with transnational NGOs, and their opportunities for learning about how to improve the presentation of their causes were therefore limited.

Transnationalization of the Zapatista Uprising

Shortly after midnight on January 1, 1994, 2,000-3,000 fighters from the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, EZLN) seized four towns and the major city of San Cristóbal in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas.⁶¹ Previously unknown, the Zapatistas quickly drew sympathetic coverage from the international media. Within one week of the uprising, over 140 Mexican and international NGOs also surged into Chiapas.⁶² Outside Mexico, Zapatistas picketed consulates, flooded President Carlos Salinas' office with angry letters, and circulated Zapatista communiqués on the Internet. On January 12, 1994, President Salinas declared a unilateral cease-fire permitting the rebels to retain their arms and territory. Acting under tremendous pressure – not from the retreating rebels but from their new supporters – the government also opened unconditional negotiations six weeks later. The 1994 negotiations failed to end the conflict after the Zapatistas' grassroots constituency voted down a proposed settlement, but over ensuing months, the Zapatistas received moral, tactical, and material support from sympathizers around the world. They became darlings of leftist intellectuals, academics, and solidarity networks. Their leader, the masked Subcomandante Marcos, became an international celebrity.

In February 1995, when the new government of President Ernesto Zedillo restarted a military campaign against the Zapatistas, their domestic and international allies rallied to their support, again forcing the government into a ceasefire and negotiations. The eventual result, the 1996 San Andrés accord on indigenous rights, was never implemented, and as of March 2001, the conflict has remained unresolved. The Zapatistas continue to maintain control over a small but significant territory in the Chiapan countryside. Communities in the region have been polarized by the continuing conflict, and backers of the government have at times used violence against Zapatista villages, with 46 *campesinos* killed in one massacre in

Acteal in December 1997. Nonetheless, the Zapatistas, backed by an extensive network of domestic and international supporters, have remained important on the Mexican political scene for their championing of indigenous rights and broader democratization. International supporters keep in continuous contact with the rebels through email and Internet websites, and thousands have visited Chiapas since 1994 to lend solidarity and support.⁶³ The Zapatistas have also become symbols of a new transnational movement against neo-liberalism and globalization that their revolution helped spark.

In 2000, with the election of opposition party President Vicente Fox, prospects for peace appear to have improved. Fox made resolution of the conflict a top priority for 2001, and, in response, the Zapatistas stated that a small delegation would travel to Mexico City to lobby for passage of the San Andrés accords. In late February, the delegation began a two-week solidarity tour of southern Mexico accompanied by an assortment of domestic and international supporters. On March 11, 2001, the Zapatistas trooped triumphantly into Mexico City's central plaza for a rally that attracted tens of thousands of supporters, and on March 28, they addressed Mexico's Congress, again moving the indigenous cause to the forefront of international news.

For the Zapatistas, transnational NGOs in four loosely defined sectors have been major sources of external support. First, the Zapatistas have won significant assistance from indigenous organizations and indigenous rights groups in the Americas including the National Congress of American Indians, the Indian Law Resource Center, and the Assembly of First Nations.⁶⁴ Support has also come from various left-leaning solidarity organizations. In some cases, these groups have sent money, supplies, and personnel to the Zapatistas; in other cases, they have worked outside Mexico, providing networks for circulating pro-Zapatista information. While it is difficult to generalize about the identity of these NGOs, many opposed NAFTA passage in 1993 and have now joined in loose movements opposing global economic liberalization.⁶⁵

A third set of NGOs includes various humanitarian, social justice, and development organizations many of which are members of the umbrella organization International Service for Peace (SIPAZ). For the most part, NGOs such as the Maryknoll Society, Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, Peace Brigades International, and Witness for Peace have provided only indirect support to the Zapatistas primarily in the form of development aid to Chiapan communities sympathetic to the rebels. While such support does not directly assist the Zapatistas, it may build local support by providing benefits attributable indirectly to Zapatista actions. Finally, a number of major international human rights organizations including Human Rights Watch/Americas, Amnesty International, Physicians for Human Rights, and International Commission of Jurists have conducted investigations of human rights abuses in the zone of conflict. Again providing no direct support to the Zapatistas, human rights NGOs nonetheless shined a spotlight on Mexican government responses to the rebellion and may have helped prevent a final government crackdown on the rebels.

While the Zapatistas have remained important players on the Mexican and international political scenes for over seven years, another Mexican guerrilla movement

that erupted out of the oppression and poverty of neighboring Guerrero state in the summer of 1996, has failed to capture significant international support. Like the Zapatistas, the Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario, EPR), voiced a vague leftist ideology; like the Zapatistas, the EPR attacked cities and government installations, this time across a wide swathe of Mexico; and like the Zapatistas, the EPR courted public opinion and the media.⁶⁶ But, in contrast to the Zapatistas, the EPR failed to spark international interest, let alone the vibrant support networks ignited by the Zapatistas. As a result, the EPR has remained weak, the government indifferent to its demands. What explains the starkly contrasting international reception for two Mexican movements that, on the surface, appear similar?

The first crucial factor is the Zapatista movement's superior access to the international media. In the two weeks following each group's initial attacks, there were 471 stories on the Zapatistas and only 167 on the EPR in major international newspapers.⁶⁷ During periods of negotiation with the government, the Zapatistas held frequent news conferences and press interviews. Moreover, the Zapatista territory in Chiapas has been secure enough since 1994 that hundreds of journalists and supporters have been able to visit.⁶⁸ By contrast, interviews with the EPR have been possible only with great difficulty and after elaborate security precautions.⁶⁹

What explains these contrasts in access? As in the Nigerian cases, differences in the movements' underlying endowments as well as differences in strategy play a key role. In the Mexican cases, the Zapatistas' advantages over their less successful competitor movement were chiefly organizational and cultural rather than material. The economic and military resources of both movements were small, especially by comparison to the Mexican state. But, the two groups differed in the number of members under arms. Through years of activity in the Lacandon jungle region, the Zapatistas developed a disciplined local following from which they mobilized thousands of rebels on January 1, 1994. While the EPR appears to have engendered considerable sympathy among the poor of rural Guerrero, the group has never been able to mobilize more than a few hundred into armed action.

In part because of this advantage in size, the Zapatistas could implement a different strategy of action than the EPR: seizing a city and using it as a temporary platform for domestic and foreign appeals. The capture of San Cristóbal was a major blow to the Mexican government – but more importantly, it immediately raised the stature of the Zapatistas from virtual obscurity to significant challenger to the regime. After their retreat from San Cristóbal, the Zapatistas' standing increased further as Mexican and international protest forced the government to open high-level negotiations with the Zapatistas and to leave the rebels in *de facto* control of a significant territory in rural Chiapas. Moreover, since early 1994, the Mexican government, constrained by the Zapatistas' popularity in Mexican civil society, has done little to prevent the rebels from distributing communiqués by fax and email, granting hundreds of media interviews, and welcoming thousands of supporters to the region.

By contrast, the EPR never had the muscle to take a city or to establish a territorial base. Instead, it used hit and run attacks against police and army installations.

Its violence, while widespread, was therefore smaller in scale and impact than the Zapatistas' use of force. Moreover, the group emerged on the Mexican scene more slowly and less dramatically than the Zapatistas. In June 1996, the EPR peacefully disrupted a funeral march commemorating 17 *campesinos* killed by government agents. In doing so, the EPR alienated Mexico's left-wing opposition party the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) whose leader, Cauhetemoc Cárdenas, had presided over the march. After Cárdenas condemned the EPR as a "grotesque pantomime" and pawn of the Mexican government, the EPR attacked in August 1996.⁷⁰

In attracting media attention and third party support, the Zapatistas also have benefited tremendously from the personal charisma of their main spokesperson Subcomandante Marcos. Articulate in Spanish and English, prolific in written and oral communication, and attuned to contemporary cultural currents, Marcos became almost as much a focus of media attention as the Zapatistas themselves. Through the strong, sometimes humorous prose displayed in his communiqués and interviews, Marcos quickly became an internationally recognized symbol of the Zapatistas. The Zapatistas have opportunistically responded to and skillfully exploited the explosive interest in him shown by the media and civil society. Asked in an interview whether the EZLN had become too closely associated with him, Marcos responded: "I don't gain anything personally. It is the movement that benefits, because this way more people pay attention to the issue."⁷¹ By contrast, the EPR has no leader to match Marcos's charisma and verve, no appealing personality to popularize the movement or counter the government's campaign to portray the group as a terrorist organization.

By itself, however, Zapatista access to the press and transnational networks does not equate to support for the movement. To explain support, one must also look to Zapatista goals. Superficially, these goals appear similar to those of the EPR, i.e. an end to poverty and repression in Mexico.⁷² But three important differences produced contrasting responses from transnational supporters. The Zapatistas prominently opposed NAFTA, adopted a pro-indigenous agenda, and called for peaceful democratic reform of the Mexican government through the actions of civil society organizations.

The Zapatistas' decision to attack on NAFTA's implementation date provided an international link for what might otherwise have been seen as a local or at most national conflict. Raising NAFTA as an issue created a match between Zapatista goals and those of the many North American NGOs that had worked to oppose the agreement's November 1993 passage by the U.S. Congress. That the uprising occurred so soon after the NAFTA battle – apparently vindicating some of the arguments of defeated NAFTA opponents – facilitated the rapid development of new support networks around existing ones.⁷³ The Zapatistas' later and broader attacks on "neoliberalism" also fit well with a new theme for many left-leaning NGOs around the world, opposition to economic "globalization."⁷⁴ Since their uprising, and particularly since their 1996 Encounter for Humanity and Against Neo-Liberalism, the Zapatistas have been important contributors to the growth of this loose global network opposing globalization.

A second related framing, the Zapatistas as a movement of Mexico's oppressed Indians, also had great international resonance. How did this classification of the Zapatistas as indigenous occur? Of particular importance was Marcos's statement on January 1, 1994 that NAFTA represented a "death sentence ... an international massacre" for the Indians. This statement gained great prominence, helping to make the uprising appear chiefly an Indian revolt against a "dictatorship that had been waging an undeclared, genocidal war for many years."⁷⁵ In other early communiqués, the Zapatistas made strong statements condemning Mexico's "historic injustice against its original inhabitants" and its continuing treatment of the indigenous as "anthropological objects, touristic curiosities, or part of a 'Jurassic park.'"⁷⁶

This "framing" in turn helped increase international attention and support both from a natural constituency of other indigenous organizations outside Mexico and from non-indigenous groups.⁷⁷ Mexican journalist Blanche Petrich captured the Mexican public's "unstoppable surge of sympathy and understanding" after the initial shock at the rebellion: "Why wouldn't they rebel!' people were saying. 'This country has been extremely unfair to them.'"⁷⁸ Similar if less fervid sentiments echoed in the US and Europe.⁷⁹

The Mexican government clearly saw the power of the indigenous image early in the uprising and, with its initial military response, opened a war of words against the Zapatistas. Aimed at tarring the group as violent radicals lacking popular support, government propaganda included accusations that Zapatista leaders were "foreigners," "professionals of violence," and members of notorious Mexican terrorist factions, the Revolutionary Workers Clandestine People's Union Party (PROCUP) and the Party of the Poor.⁸⁰ The Zapatistas in turn fought early and hard to retain their indigenous credentials:

The government says it is not an Indigenous uprising, but we believe that if thousands of Indigenous people rise up in arms, then yes, it is an Indigenous uprising ... Currently, the political leadership of our struggle is totally Indigenous: 100% of the members of the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committees in the combat zones are ethnic Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolobal and others.⁸¹

A final aspect of Zapatista goals also proved internationally appealing. From the beginning of the uprising, the Zapatistas sought active participation from domestic and global civil society: "The struggle must be fought on all fronts and here your [civil society's] sympathy, your support, the publicity you give our cause, your making your own the ideals we demand, your spreading the revolution by awakening the people wherever you find them, will be very important factors leading to the final victory."⁸² The Zapatistas consistently have viewed civil society as an accountable and progressive alternative to conventional political and economic institutions at home and abroad. And, they specifically have rejected state power for themselves: "It is civil society that must transform Mexico – we are only a small part of that civil society, the armed part – our role is to be guarantors of the political space that civil society needs."⁸³

Linked to this reliance on civil society was the Zapatistas' advocacy of a nonviolent transition for Mexican politics. While the Zapatistas used armed force to grab international attention, they stopped using their weapons within days and quickly came to appear less violent than the Mexican government. The Zapatista offensive lasted only two to three days; many Zapatista fighters were poorly armed; and the Zapatistas seemed to have little appetite for war, retreating into the countryside within days as the army mounted its counterattacks. By contrast, the government appeared more violent than the Zapatistas both because of its past abuse and neglect of the Chiapan peasantry and because of its heavy-handed counterattacks shortly after the rebellion's start.⁸⁴

Army actions had a particularly important impact on human rights organizations. For example, changes in the reaction of Human Rights Watch/Americas tracked changes in the government response to the rebellion. A contemporaneous statement by Juan Mendes, director of Human Rights Watch/Americas, encapsulates the shift: "At the beginning we were pleased by the measured form in which the Mexican federal government appeared to be responding, but now we are worried because this moderation appears to have disappeared."⁸⁵ With the ceasefire and continuing stalemate in Chiapas, the Zapatistas recognized the advantage of maintaining a nonviolent stance relative to the government. As one of their representatives has stated, "the first party to fire a shot loses politically."⁸⁶

By contrast, the EPR has spouted a class-based rhetoric reminiscent of the failed leftist politics of the past. Thus, the EPR claims to act on behalf of a generalized population of Mexico's "oppressed," and early on in its offensive, it repeatedly called for a "short-cut to democracy" through armed popular struggle rather than emphasizing the role of civil society in such a transition.⁸⁷ Nor did the EPR tie itself to an internationally prominent issue such as NAFTA. Additionally, EPR leaders did not deny and eventually acknowledged linkages to feared terrorist groups including PROCUP from which the Zapatistas vociferously distinguished themselves. The EPR had also alienated Mexico's Leftist PRD, as noted earlier, by disrupting the June 1996 funeral march. As a result, the popular Mexican response to the group was muted. Where the Zapatistas won backing from crucial national and local constituencies, the EPR did not and, consequently, its international resonance has been far smaller than the Zapatistas'.

In addition, to the international resonance of Zapatista goals, there were also organizational reasons that the Zapatistas attracted support. For potential international supporters, there were few doubts about the legitimacy of the Zapatista movement. Here again the media was important because on-the-spot reporting provided strong evidence of Zapatista grievances. New reports also substantiated the group's legitimacy as representative of a large constituency of poor Mexicans.⁸⁸ The reaction of Mexican civil society also proved important. Within days of the rebellion, ordinary Mexicans took to the streets in large numbers to call for an end to the government's counterattacks. In Chiapas in the weeks after the ceasefire, a surge of local land occupations and protests showed deep sympathy for Zapatista goals.⁸⁹ Finally, perceptions of Zapatista legitimacy increased because internationally known figures in Mexican civil society, including Catholic Bishop Samuel Ruiz,

head of the Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Center, quickly vouched for the bona fides of the movement as an expression of popular discontent with government policies.⁹⁰ No such outpouring of popular support or expert endorsement greeted the EPR's attacks.

Conclusion

Such case studies clarify an important dynamic in world politics, explaining both routine contacts between non-state actors and rare cases in which seemingly unlikely social movements gain substantial NGO backing. Support hinges on a movement's success at raising international awareness and its ability to match the concerns of transnational actors. The article has explored factors affecting both stages of the process, highlighting strategic and adaptive actions taken by local movements to demonstrate or devise a match with the substantive, tactical, and organizational interests of transnational actors.

More broadly, the cases challenge the common assumption that contemporary transnational support is a result of technological globalization – of the “CNN effect,” the Internet, or the wide-bodied jet.⁹¹ Instead, what made the difference for the transnationally successful movements were such old-fashioned political factors as resources, contacts, and strategy. The Zapatistas gained their critical, initial audience through armed and rhetorical force that attracted media reporting, while the Ogoni gained theirs through persistent NGO lobbying. Once this initial support had developed, technology indeed had an impact, helping to expand the network and facilitating contacts among network members. But, these effects occurred only *after* the movements had risen to international prominence and had developed critical initial support bases using more traditional political means. The other Mexican and Nigerian movements, less adept at these methods, failed to gain support although they sought it during approximately the same time period.

These case studies also challenge the view often advanced by transnational NGOs that the groups they support are particularly needy and therefore especially worthy of support. If a hypothetical “meritocracy of suffering” explained NGO support, Nigerian groups such as the Etche, who were victims of the 1990 massacre, or the Ijaw, a far larger Niger Delta ethnic minority suffering similar problems, should have won support. Instead, the movements most likely to gain transnational backing are those best able to exploit political opportunities beyond their home states.⁹²

Finally, these Mexican and Nigerian cases challenge more systematic scholarly accounts of transnational issue networks highlighting their “principled” goals. While moral claims distinguish NGOs from most states, focusing on these claims obscures that NGOs have their own organizational interests and needs. This article stresses that, in a context of many needy insurgents but limited transnational support capacity, one must look at these factors to understand how NGOs select their clients. To be specific, the substantive, tactical, and organizational match factors discussed here offer more leverage than NGO principles in explaining which local groups will be backed.

These conclusions also have broader implications, cutting against the grain of recent enthusiasm about an emergent global civil society. While recent growth in

NGO numbers may have created a more favorable environment for transnational support, the availability of these opportunities by no means guarantees that particular movements will be able to realize them. In fact, from the perspective of needy groups in the developing world, global civil society may be less a realm of altruistic behavior than a competitive arena in which many weak groups vie for the attention of potential patrons. Transnational NGOs have specialized agendas and limited resources making them highly selective in choosing local clients from numerous similar groups.⁹³ As a result, many needy groups may find themselves with little recognition or support despite NGOs' principled beliefs and good intentions. Those movements that gain attention are likely to have various advantages over similar movements that do not: location in a state which permits exit; significant resources; experience in the developed world; pre-existing contacts with transnational actors; and knowledge of the international media. For less fortunate groups, international attention is concomitantly less likely, suggesting that claims about global civil society's democratic character require qualification.

In addition, the case studies indicate that local movements enhance their likelihood of gaining transnational support by conforming their conflicts, goals, and identities to a limited set of internationally understandable conflict frames. Attracting support will often require local groups to adapt to the expectations and concerns of transnational NGOs, raising questions about global civil society's openness to diverse subordinate voices. Groups that cannot or will not do so will have difficulty gaining NGO support. All else equal, the movements most likely to gain support will be those with the sophistication to seize transnational opportunities and adjust their movements to match them.

NOTES

1. This article defines "social movements" as organized groups challenging state institutions chiefly outside institutionalized political channels. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 3-4. I use the term "challenger" interchangeably with "movement." NGO "support" encompasses both direct transfers of money, materiel, personnel, knowledge, and strategic advice to movement organizations and indirect actions such as publicity, advocacy, and lobbying in favor of a movement or against its home state among foreign publics, states and international organizations.
2. For statistics documenting recent growth of transnational NGOs in key sectors, see Jackie Smith, "Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector," pp. 42-58 in Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).
3. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
4. See, e.g., movements linked at such websites as Anti-War.com, Autonomy, Secession, Independence and Nationalist Movements, <http://www.visi.com/~homelands> (last accessed March 21, 2001); NativeWeb: Resources for Indigenous Cultures around the World, NativeWeb Hosted Pages, <http://www.nativeweb.org/hosted/> (last accessed March 21, 2001); and Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, UNPO Members, <http://www.unpo.org/member/> (last accessed March 21, 2001).
5. See for example the roster of domestic movement organizations attending UN sponsored conferences on human rights, indigenous populations, and the environment. Julie Fisher, *The Road from Rio: Sustainable*

- Development and the Non-Governmental Movement in the Third World* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); United Nations, Committee on Human Rights, Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, *Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Thirteenth Session*, UN Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/24 (1995), pp. 4-7.
6. Research on non-state actors and transnational relations has a long history in international studies. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Peter Willetts, ed., *Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982). Recent theorizing about an emergent global civil society includes Ann M. Clark, Elisabeth Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstetler, "The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women," *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1998), pp. 1-35; James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and James N. Rosenau, "People, Nations and Credit Cards" *International Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1999), pp. 291-320; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, *op. cit.*
 7. This organizational definition of "global civil society" is similar to that used by Martin Shaw, "Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1994), pp. 647-667; Louis Kriesberg, "Social Movements in Global Transformation," pp. 3-18 in Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, *op. cit.* Questions about the definitions of civil society have been raised by G. Dale Thomas, "Civil Society: Historical Uses Versus Global Context," *International Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1998), pp. 49-64. For broader definitions, see Paul Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of a Global Civil Society," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1992), p. 313.
 8. Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier*, *op. cit.* On the role of NGOs in promoting norms, particularly anti-corruption norms, see Jennifer McCoy and Heather Heckel, "The Emergence of a Global Anti-Corruption Norm," *International Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2001), pp. 65-90.
 9. Keck and Sikkink, *op. cit.*; Alison Brysk, *From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Alison Brysk, "From Above and from Below: Social Movements, the International System and Human Rights in Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1993), pp. 259-285.
 10. Keck and Sikkink, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13. Still, local movements' external support may expose them to international intimidation and pose uncomfortable compromise of principles. See, for an example Susan Dicklitch, "NGOs and Democratization in Transnational Societies," *International Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2001), pp. 27-46.
 11. See, e.g., Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995), pp. 451-479; Sonia Serra, "Multinationals of Solidarity: International Civil Society and the Killing of Street Children in Brazil," pp. 219-241 in Sandra Braman and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, eds., *Globalization, Communication and Transnational Civil Society* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1996). An obvious exception to the study of successful single cases is Backer and Carroll's study of the Carter Center's failed efforts in West Africa. See David Backer and David Carroll, "NGOs and Constructive Engagement," *International Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2001), pp. 1-26.
 12. Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Much of the constructivist literature in international relations also highlights the impacts rather than the origins of international norms. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1998), pp. 324-348. Similarly, studies of the "CNN effect" typically examine the effects on policy-makers and the public of media reporting about distant conflicts. Martin Shaw, *Civil Society and Media in Global Crises: Representing Distant Violence* (London: Pinter, 1996); Steven Livingston, "Beyond the 'CNN Effect': The Media-Foreign Policy Dynamic," in Pippa Norris, ed., *Politics and the Press: The News Media and Their Influences* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1997).

13. For research taking the existence of transnational coalitions as the “point of departure,” see essays in Risse-Kappen, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Wapner, *op. cit.* Works emphasizing the pervasiveness of globalization and the role of technological factors include Rosenau, *op. cit.*; Lipschutz, *op. cit.*
14. Keck and Sikkink, *op. cit.*; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). In Cambodia, however, a bottom-up movement co-exists with internationally supported NGOs, acting in different ways with other leadership. See Caroline Hughes, “Mystics and Militants: Democratic Reform in Cambodia,” *International Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2001), pp. 47-64.
15. Keck and Sikkink, *op. cit.*, p. x.
16. Tarrow, *op. cit.*
17. Michael Lipsky, “Protest as a Political Resource,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62, No. 4 (1968), p. 1153.
18. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
19. Because evidence concerning cases that fail to gain transnational attention and support is less available and accessible than evidence concerning success cases, the article includes more information about the latter.
20. The essays collected in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, *op. cit.*, take important steps toward testing this proposition. See also Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
21. Portions of this section will appear in revised form in “Globalization and the Social Construction of Human Rights Campaigns,” in Alison Brysk, ed., *Globalization and Human Rights: Transnational Problems, Transnational Solutions?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming 2002).
22. Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990, reprinted in Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Marc Sills, “The Martyrdom of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Future of Ogoni Self-Determination,” *Fourth World Bulletin*, Vol. 5, Nos. 1-2 (1996), pp. 5-21.
23. Friends of the Earth International, *Earth Alarm*, Vol. 10 (June 1993); Greenpeace International, *Shell-Shocked: The Environmental and Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria* (London: Greenpeace International, 1994); Amnesty International, *Urgent Action*, UA 268/93 (August 10, 1993); Human Rights Watch/Africa, “Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis: A Case-Study of Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria,” *Human Rights Watch/Africa Report*, Vol. 7, No. 5 (July 1995).
24. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Osaghae, *op. cit.*
25. Human Rights Watch, *The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
26. Examples include websites for the Ijaw and Urhobo people, <http://www.ijawcenter.com/>; <http://www.urhobo.com/index.html>, (last accessed January 5, 2001).
27. Aaron Sachs, *Eco-Justice: Linking Human Rights and the Environment*, Worldwatch Paper no. 127 (Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 1995).
28. Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), *Ogoni Bill of Rights* (1990), *op. cit.*
29. Ken Saro-Wiwa, *A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 99.
30. MOSOP, *Addendum to the Ogoni Bill of Rights* (1991), reprinted in Welch and Sills, *op. cit.*
31. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), <http://www.unpo.org/> (last accessed April 23, 2001).
32. Author’s interviews with UNPO staff, The Hague (July 11-12, 1996).
33. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth International, *op. cit.*; Greenpeace International, *op. cit.*
34. See, e.g., Amnesty International, *Urgent Action*, UA 268/93 (August 10, 1993); Human Rights Watch/Africa, *op. cit.* Many other NGOs in Europe and North America also played important roles in the Ogoni support network. Rather than giving a comprehensive account of the network, however, I focus on the above NGOs because they were the Ogonis’ earliest and most prominent supporters and because their pioneering actions set the stage for broader NGO support.
35. Saro-Wiwa, *op. cit.*, p. 88. Author’s personal and telephone interviews, Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Netherlands, Friends of the Earth International, Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Amnesty International, Survival International, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (May-July 1996).

36. Naomi Wimborne, "Nigeria's Impoverished Oil Producers Demand Recognition," *Reuter Library Report* (January 8, 1991); available from NEXIS, News library, Wires file.
37. Saro-Wiwa paid for publication of the *Addendum to the Ogoni Bill of Rights* as an advertisement in Nigerian national newspapers in 1991, and he self-published a political tract circulated to NGOs in 1992, *Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy* (Port Harcourt: Saros International, 1992). Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.* p. 89; Author's interviews, MOSOP (July 21, 1996). For a fascinating account of the costs to Saro-Wiwa's family of his obsession with the Ogoni cause, see his son's personal account, Ken Wiwa, *In the Shadow of a Saint* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000).
38. Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, 138-139. See also Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59, 65, 118, 147, 152.
42. The official Nigerian investigation of the massacre is in Rivers State of Nigeria, "Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Umuechem Disturbances" (January 1991), copy in author's files.
43. Author's telephone interview, film producer (June 25, 1996).
44. Glen Ellis and Kay Bishop, "The Heat of the Moment" (London: Channel Four, October 8, 1992).
45. See MOSOP, *Ogoni Bill of Rights*, *op. cit.*; Ken Saro-Wiwa, *First Letter to Ogoni Youth* (Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Saros International, 1983); Ken Saro-Wiwa, *The Ogoni Nation Today and Tomorrow*, 2nd ed. (Port Harcourt: Saros International, 1993 [1968]).
46. Author's telephone interviews, Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Netherlands, Friends of the Earth International, Friends of the Earth Netherlands (London and Amsterdam, July 1996); Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
47. MOSOP, "Statement of the Ogoni People to the Tenth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Palais des Nations, Geneva, July 1992," in author's files.
48. Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.*, p. 105; Emmanuel Efeni, "Agony of Ogoni Community," *Guardian* (Lagos) (December 28, 1992), p. 7.
49. Author's telephone interview, consultant to Greenpeace International (June 26, 1996). Author's interviews, Greenpeace Netherlands, Friends of the Earth International, Friends of the Earth Netherlands (London and Amsterdam, July 1996).
50. Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.*; Welch and Sills, *op. cit.*
51. Eghosa E. Osaghae, "The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation and the Future of the Nigerian State," *African Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 376 (1995), pp. 325-344; author's interviews, MOSOP officials (London, July 1996); author's interview, MOSOP officials (St. Louis, MO, March 14, 1998).
52. In a 1995 study, the World Bank concluded that the Niger Delta's environmental problems were serious but that many of the worst problems were unrelated to oil production. The study also concluded, however, that the local population held the oil companies responsible for most environmental problems. David Moffat and Olof Lindén, "Perception and Reality: Assessing Priorities for Sustainable Development in the Niger River Delta," *Ambio*, Vol. 24, Nos. 7-8 (1995), p. 536.
53. Chris McGreal, "The Plight of the Ogoni," *Newsweek International* (September 20, 1993), p. 43.
54. Author's interview, Friends of the Earth International (Amsterdam, June 18, 1996); author's interview, Survival International (London, July 17, 1996).
55. Author's interview, MOSOP (London, July 21, 1996); Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-106.
57. Two Nigerian newspaper accounts give a figure of 500,000 marchers. Cyril Bakwuye, "Ogonis Protest Over Oil Revenue: Want Self Determination," *Daily Sunray* (January 6, 1993), p. 1; Kenneth Ezea, "Day Ogonis Cried for Reprieve," *Guardian on Sunday* (Lagos) (January 17, 1993), p. A13. Given that the total Ogoni population is thought to be 300-500,000, these estimates are suspect. A third Nigerian periodical estimated 100,000,000 participants. "Exploitation: Stung by Alleged Neglect, Ogoni Community Takes Case to UN, Fights for Reparation and Control of Oil," *Newswatch* (Lagos) (January 25, 1993), p. 9. None of these sources indicates the method used in estimating crowd size.
58. Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.*, pp. 105, 114, 135; Ken Saro-Wiwa, "These We Demand," interview by Godson Ukpevo, *Newswatch* (Lagos) (January 25, 1993), pp. 10-11; Author's interview, environmental activist present at Ogoni Day March (London, July 19, 1996).

59. Author's interviews, Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Netherlands, Friends of the Earth International, Friends of the Earth Netherlands (London and Amsterdam, July 1996).
60. Saro-Wiwa, *Month and a Day*, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-4, 145; author's interview, UNPO staff (The Hague, July 11-12, 1996).
61. This section draws from Clifford Bob, "Beyond Transparency: Visibility and Fit in the Internationalization of Internal Conflict," pp. 287-314 in Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, eds., *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency* (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
62. US House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, *Mexico: The Uprising in Chiapas and Democratization in Mexico*, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (February 2, 1994), testimony and statement of John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, pp. 17, 73.
63. Links to and information about many of the supporters can be accessed through the following website: www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html (last accessed March 21, 2001).
64. Jose Barreiro, "Native Response to Chiapas," *Akwe:kön: A Journal of Indigenous Issues*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1994), pp. 78-80; "Continuó el bombardeo en la zona sur de San Cristóbal," *La Jornada* (January 6, 1994), p. 3.
65. <http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html>.
66. Guillermo Correa and Julio C. López, "El comandante José Arturo analiza al país y explica al EPR," *Proceso* (Mexico City) (August 11, 1996), p. 22. Julia Preston, "Mexican Rebels Vow a Long, Hard Battle," *New York Times* (February 6, 1997), p. A10.
67. Comparison done using search terms "EZLN or Zapatista" and "EPR or 'Popular Revolutionary Army'" in NEXIS, Major Newspapers file. The two week comparison periods are January 1-15, 1994 and August 28-September 13, 1996.
68. In 1996, for instance, the Zapatistas held a series of "encounters" in the town of La Realidad attended by hundreds of activists from around the world.
69. See description of arrangements surrounding the EPR's first press conference with the foreign media in February 1997. Preston, *op. cit.*
70. Salvador Corro, "En una sangrienta noche de terror, las fuerzas del EPR destruyeron el mito de la pantomima," *Proceso* (September 1, 1996), pp. 13-17.
71. Subcomandante Marcos, interview by Medea Benjamin, n.d., in Elaine Katzenberger, ed., *First World, Ha Ha Ha! The Zapatista Challenge* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1995), p. 69.
72. Compare EPR, "Manifiesto of Aguas Blancas" (June 28, 1996), available from, <http://ouray.cudenver.edu/~whardy/epr.html> (last accessed February 27, 1997) with EZLN, "Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle: Today We Say Enough!" in *EZLN: Documentos y comunicados, 1 de enero-8 agosto de 1994* (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1993), pp. 33-35.
73. See Harry Cleaver, Introduction to *¡Zapatistas! Documents of the New Mexican Revolution, December 31, 1993-June 12, 1994* (New York: Autonomedia, 1994).
74. See links at <http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html>.
75. EZLN, "Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle," *op. cit.*
76. Subcomandante Marcos, "Introductory Letter from Subcommander Marcos," *Comuniqué*, Jan. 13, 1994, in *¡Zapatistas! Documents*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
77. North American indigenous organizations were some of the first to send representatives to Chiapas. Jose Barreiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80. For strong emphasis on the Indian aspects of the revolt, see, e.g., "La 'rebelión de indios mexicanos,' en la prensa de América y Europa: Exhorta el FMLN a Salinas a emplear la diplomacia," *La Jornada* (January 5, 1994), p. 13.
78. Blanche Petrich, "Voices from the Masks," in Katzenberger, *op. cit.* p. 46. Other contemporaneous commentaries agreed that the Zapatistas "stirred the guilt of a nation that glorifies its pre-Hispanic past and ignores the suffering of its indigenous groups today." Alan Riding, "Letter from Mexico: How Peasants Lit the Fires of Democracy," *New York Times* (February 27, 1994), sec. 4, p. 5.
79. Among many examples: Martin Edwin Anderson, Testimony, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Mexico: The Uprising in Chiapas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-143; Anthony Daniels, "Guerrillas in the Mist," *National Review* (December 5, 1994), p. 62; Enrique Krauze, "Zapped: The Roots of the Chiapas Revolt," *New Republic* (January 31, 1994), p. 9.

80. Republic of Mexico, *Informe de la Secretaría de Gobernación con Materiales de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional y la Procuraduría General de la República* (n.d.); Elena Gallegos and Emilio Lomas, "Seguimos dispuestos al diálogo," *La Jornada* (January 7, 1994), p. 1; Tim Golden, "Mexican Rebels are Retreating; Issues are Not," *New York Times* (January 4, 1994), p. A1; Gerardo Galarza, "En unos días el EZLN paso de ser un grupo de '200 transgresores de la ley' a una organización profesional y bien entrenada," *Proceso* (January 10, 1994), pp. 18-19.
81. EZLN, "Responses to Government Lies," January 6, 1994, in *¡Zapatistas! Documents*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
82. EZLN, "Editorial," December 1, 1993, in *EZLN: Documentos y comunicados*, *op. cit.*
83. Peter Rossett, "Understanding Chiapas," in Katzenberger, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 158. See also, e.g., EZLN, "The Communities Respond," Communiqué, June 10, 1994, in Ben Clarke and Clifton Ross, eds., *Voice of Fire: Communiqués and Interviews from the Zapatista National Liberation Army*, Clifton Ross, trans. (Berkeley: New Earth Publications, 1994), p. 105; Subcomandante Marcos, interview by Eugenio Aguilera, et al., May 11, 1994, in *¡Zapatistas! Documents*, *op. cit.*, p. 298.
84. See, e.g., Juanita Darling and Tracy Wilkinson, "Mexican Troops Step Up Drive to Crush Revolt," *Los Angeles Times* (January 6, 1994), p. A1.
85. Jim Cason and David Brooks, "La televisión de Estados Unidos destaca las presuntas ejecuciones y el bombardero aéreo: Analizan grupos de derechos humanos el envío de observadores," *La Jornada* (January 6, 1994), p. 17.
86. Cecilia Rodriguez, US Representative of the EZLN, "Chiapas Update: The Zapatistas and United States Intervention in Mexico," speech presented at Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA, November 20, 1996).
87. EPR, "Manifiesto of Aguas Blancas," *op. cit.*
88. See, e.g., Tim Golden, "Mexican Troops Battling Rebels; Toll at Least 57," *New York Times* (January 3, 1994), p. A1.
89. For descriptions of the eruption of popular Mexican support for and solidarity actions with the Zapatistas in late January and February 1994, see e.g., John Ross, *Rebellion from the Roots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas* (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), pp. 172-179. Alma Guillermoprieto, "The Shadow War," *New York Review of Books* (March 2, 1995), pp. 34-43.
90. Rosa Rojas and Gaspar Morquecho, "Nuevo frente de combate en San Cristóbal; tanques del Ejército ocupan posiciones," *La Jornada* (January 5, 1994), p. 6.
91. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier*, *op. cit.*
92. For a similar view, see essays in Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, *op. cit.*
93. Noting NGO specialization and its impacts on transnational support is Patrick Coy, "Cooperative Accompaniment and Peace Brigades International in Sri Lanka," in Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, *op. cit.*

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