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**Contested State Identities and  
Regional Security in the  
Euro-Mediterranean Area**

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACRS	Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security
AKP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi</i> , Justice and Development Party—Turkey
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASU	Arab Socialist Union—Egypt
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CEDEJ	Centre d'Études et de Documentation Économique, Juridique et Sociale, Cairo
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the EU)
Commission	Commission of the European Communities (also European Commission)
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSCM	Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean
EC	European Community (or European Communities)
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EuroMeSCo	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EMP network of strategic studies institutes)
FEMISE	Forum Euro-Méditerranéen des Instituts Économiques (EMP network of economic research institutes)
FIS	<i>Front Islamique du Salut</i> , Islamic Salvation Front—Algeria

GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
IBDR	International Bank for Development and Reconstruction
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations (as an academic discipline)
MAP	Mediterranean Action Plan
MDS	<i>Mouvement Démocratique Social</i> —Morocco
MEDA	<i>Mesures d'accompagnement</i> (financial instrument of the EMP)
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MNP	<i>Mouvement National Populaire</i> —Morocco
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Democratic Party—Egypt
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRP	National Religious Party (Mafdal)—Israel
OAS	Organization of African States
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA	Palestinian Authority
PJD	<i>Parti de la Justice et du Développement, al-hizb al-'adala wa at-tanmia</i> —Morocco
PKK	<i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan</i> , Kurdistan Workers Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PND	Parti National Démocratique—Morocco
Polisario Front	<i>Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía al Hamra y Río de Oro</i> , Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía al-Hamra and Río de Oro—Western Sahara
RNI	<i>Rassemblement National des Indépendants</i> —Morocco
Tagammu'	<i>Al-hizb at-tagammu' al-watani at-taqaddumi al-wahdi</i> , National-Progressive Unionist Party—Egypt
UC	<i>Union Constitutionnelle</i> —Morocco
UJT	United Torah Judaism (ultra-orthodox party list)—Israel
UMA	<i>Union du Maghreb Arabe</i> , Arab Maghreb Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFP	<i>Union Nationale des Forces Populaires</i> —Morocco
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USFP	<i>Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires</i> —Morocco
WEU	West European Union
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

## Introduction

Explanations of the lamentable status of Mediterranean regional security generally tend to focus on the fate of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. This study aims at highlighting a different aspect, namely the negative impact of unsettled state identities on the emergence of regional security schemes in the Mediterranean area. More specifically, the case under consideration is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) initiative of the European Union (EU), which was launched in November 1995 in Barcelona. During the first years of its existence, the EMP relied on a region-building approach to regional security, thus implying the promotion of common interests and common regional themes. However, implicitly or explicitly the EMP's region-building approach was bound to affect the self-definition of states, the type of regional relations, and the preferred concept of regional order. By focusing on the case studies of Egypt, Israel, and Morocco, this study argues that domestic conflicts over state identities put a strain on the ability of states to consistently engage in Euro-Mediterranean region-building and to develop a strategy toward regional security. Thus, this analysis attracts the attention to *domestic constraints* to regional security on a Euro-Mediterranean basis.

With the start of the Middle East peace process in the early 1990s, the Mediterranean witnessed a dramatic increase in diplomatic activity aimed at promoting stability and security. The EMP (or Barcelona Process), then comprising the 15 EU member states and 12 "southern" parties, was certainly the most encompassing policy initiative addressing Mediterranean security. However, this initiative did not seek to tackle security problems in the conventional way. Indeed, the EMP did not exclusively focus on the military aspects of security, it did not solely involve governments and the military, and neither was it aimed against a common enemy, as is often the case in "classical" security schemes. Rather, the primary aim of the Barcelona Process was to promote extensive regional cooperation in a large number of

different issue areas by involving various sectors of state and society. Moreover, the initiative emphasized the importance of common interests, common problems, and shared regional features in an alleged Euro-Mediterranean region. While the EMP can be seen as an original experiment of constructing a *security region*, it could not rely on any blueprints or instruction manuals. Indeed, the few cases that may qualify as successful security regions, such as the EU itself, NATO, or ASEAN, cannot be separated from the specific historical conditions under which they emerged. In addition, these cases greatly differ from each other in their purpose, rationale, institutional framework, and degree of integration.

The success of the EMP's region-building approach depended on whether the participating states would be willing and able of truly becoming part of the region under construction. In order to do so, they would have to alter their self-definition, type of regional relations, and the concept of regional order. Thus, the EMP's region-building approach had an implicit, yet significant impact on the *identity of states*. Yet, most states in the southern Mediterranean are facing domestic problems related to their political identity and the core values that characterize the state. Indeed, most Arab countries face the well-known tension between pan-Arab and statist identities, while they are simultaneously challenged by political Islam, a growing presence of religion in general, and "Western" values of modernization. Similarly, Turkey and Israel have witnessed internal conflicts regarding the primacy of secular versus religious, modern versus traditional, and "Western" versus "Middle Eastern" values. An unspecified "Mediterranean identity" is latently present in all these countries, albeit with a rather marginal political significance. In addition, most states in the Mediterranean must deal with the problem of ethnic and religious minorities, while they are also affected by processes of economic and cultural globalization. In short, most of these countries find themselves in a continuous and often difficult search for their identity. In view of these constraints, the question is, then, whether these states are capable of altering their self-definition in order to become part of a "new" Euro-Mediterranean region.

Seeking to answer this question necessitates an analysis of both regional and domestic politics across the Mediterranean. Moreover, the altered prospects of peace and regional security since the launching of the Barcelona Process must be considered. Indeed, during much of the 1990s, multilateralism and collective security were the signs of the times, particularly in the Mediterranean and Middle East

(Walt 1991; Karsh and Sayigh 1994; Maoz 1997). At the same time, there was an increasing preoccupation with alternative approaches to security in the study of International Relations (IR). Influenced by the unpredicted and surprisingly peaceful end of the cold war, IR had started to depart from its traditional focus on "hard security" issues, strategic conditions, and military strength and to give greater importance to domestic factors, culture, and identities. The EU's attempts to forge a Euro-Mediterranean region as an alternative approach to security corresponded to this particular historical context and general ideational development. Less than a decade later, however, the prospects of Euro-Mediterranean region-building dramatically deteriorated. The second Palestinian *Intifada*, or uprising, erupted at the end of September 2000, the Middle East peace process collapsed, and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, Samuel Huntington's division of the world into allegedly clashing civilizations gained currency (Huntington 1996). Differentiated considerations of complex phenomena in world politics threaten to give way to black-and-white thinking patterns, in which there are *evil states* that form an axis (Bush 2002), in which the "West" is contrasted to Islam, and the latter becomes a synonym for terrorism. Indeed, these simplifying thinking patterns translate into statements on the "superiority of the Western civilization," as Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi propagated (*Corriere della Sera* September 27, 2001), and into calls for launching a *crusade* against (Islamist) terrorism, to mention the ill-fortunate first reaction of U.S. president George W. Bush (*New York Times* September 17, 2001: 2). Animosity against Muslims has currently taken hold of the "West," including EU states, where it is often linked to the issue of immigration. States with predominantly Muslim populations have reacted with consternation to these developments. At the same time, the persistence of violence on the Israeli-Palestinian track, including Palestinian suicide bombings and harsh Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians, led to the reemergence of the "old" Arab-Israeli fault-line. Israel's military superiority and the perceived tolerance of its policies by the "West" have further strengthened anti-Western sentiments in many Arab Mediterranean states, and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has partly fueled such sentiments even further. The EU's regional security initiative has undoubtedly suffered from all these developments. But they have also overshadowed any alternative explanation for the difficulties of the EMP. However, the domestic identity constraints to Euro-Mediterranean security, which stand at the center of this study,

were present well before the collapse of the Middle East peace process and the events of 9/11. In fact, the EMP lagged far behind the expectations and witnessed repeated setbacks ever since it was launched. In spite of the initial interest of the participating parties, most EMP partners lacked a coherent strategy toward Euro-Mediterranean regional security, in the event that there was any strategy at all.

With the EU launching the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003–2004 in the context of the EU's latest round of enlargement, Euro-Mediterranean relations have entered a new phase. Although the Barcelona Process is formally still in place, the Neighbourhood Policy departs from the EMP's original region-building approach by proposing a differentiated and bilaterally oriented policy (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005). Hence, given the altered regional and global parameters of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the core time-span of this investigation encompasses the first seven years of the EMP, that is, from November 1995 until the end of 2002. Thus, the end date of our investigation is set roughly two years after the outbreak of the second *Intifada* and one year after the events of 9/11.

This book, which consists of two main parts, is structured along the following lines: The first part, which comprises three chapters, elaborates on the link between contested state identities and regional security in the Euro-Mediterranean area from a theoretical, historical, and regional perspective. Thus, by focusing on the specific features of the EMP initiative and its implications for state identity, the first chapter develops the argument and its underlying assumptions, while the second chapter takes the reader to the theoretical underpinnings of regional security and region-building, state identity, domestic conflicts over state identity, and foreign policy. Starting in the early 1990s, the third chapter provides a brief historical background to the EMP, and it also discusses Euro-Mediterranean relations and domestic politics in the southern Mediterranean from a broad regional perspective. The second part of this book moves to the detailed and empirical examination of three case studies, namely Israel, Egypt, and Morocco. Each of the three empirical chapters makes three moves: It first explores the emergence of the portrayed identity of the respective state, along with the salience of alternative (and possibly incompatible) identity preferences of different domestic groups. This part of the discussion considers developments since political independence as far as Egypt and Morocco are concerned, and since the founding of the state in the case of Israel. Second, we discuss the state's position toward, and engagement in, Euro-Mediterranean region-building. Finally, the EMP's

attempted identity manipulations are assessed in light of the domestic identity fault-lines and constraints.

The Mediterranean counts as the "the cradle of civilization" and as the origin of cultures in antiquity. The long and eventful history of the Mediterranean area has witnessed periods of fertile cultural exchange, but also of foreign domination, conflicts, and wars. Undoubtedly, ethnic and cultural diversity has characterized the Mediterranean area since the dawn of history, much in contrast to other areas such as northern Europe. Until the present, pronounced political, cultural, and socioeconomic heterogeneity along with conflicts within and among states are probably the most prominent features of the Mediterranean and Middle East. However, as in former times, the Mediterranean still lies at the crossroads between East and West, North and South. And in view of international developments of the last years, the importance of the Mediterranean is most likely to increase. The combination of these factors offers a challenging background to an inquiry into the identity dimension of foreign policy and regional security. As this book argues, contested state identities cannot be ignored in explaining the meager achievements of regional security schemes in general, and the EMP in particular—quite independently of worsening global and regional conditions. Thus, while contributing to a better understanding of Mediterranean politics, this research sheds light on contested identities as a crucial, but often overlooked, factor in the study of international relations.

## Region-Building and Contested State Identities

In its original design, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that was launched at the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 was an unusual, and quite ambitious, policy initiative. Initially comprising the then-15 EU member states and 12 partners from the southern Mediterranean,<sup>1</sup> the declared aim of the EMP was to turn the Mediterranean into an area of peace, stability, and prosperity (Barcelona Declaration 1995). With it, the main concern of the EMP was *security*.

As the EMP celebrated its tenth anniversary in November 2005, the balance sheet was not particularly positive. The eruption of the second *Intifada* in late September 2000 and the subsequent collapse of the peace process paralyzed the EMP's regional dimension during much of the last five years. And the frequent invocation of a "clash of civilizations" in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as the changed perceptions related to it, did not improve the prospects of Euro-Mediterranean regional security either. Although the EMP is formally still in place, its original design has witnessed significant modifications in the framework of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, launched in 2003–2004 (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005). However, the original EMP encountered serious difficulties almost since its beginning. Why is this so? Why was the EMP not able to take off, but rather witnessed repeated setbacks and stalemates ever since it was launched?

Although a number of explanations are possible, this book directs attention to domestic politics in the EMP partners, and in particular to the high incidence of domestic fragmentation in the southern Mediterranean. Since this fragmentation also revolves around the preferred political identity of the state, this book will link the latter to the ability, or inability, of EMP partners to engage in a regional security

project on a Euro-Mediterranean basis. Thus, the main argument explored in this book is that domestically contested identities of EMP partners negatively affect their ability to engage in Euro-Mediterranean regional security. This argument, however, is only conceivable if we take the particular nature of the original EMP into account, including the challenges it posed to state identity. Hence, this chapter makes a double move: It first explores the region-building approach that the EMP embodied and subsequently provides an overview of the problems related to state identities in the EMP partners. An integration of the findings helps to shed light on how the link between Euro-Mediterranean regional security and contested state identities in the southern Mediterranean can be conceptualized.

### The EMP's Approach to Mediterranean Security

Although the European Community (EC), and later European Union, has a long history of seeking to develop a coherent approach toward the Mediterranean (Grilli 1993; Lister 1997), previous efforts had remained interlocked with the cold war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The end of the cold war, along with beginning of the Madrid peace process in 1991, seemed to provide the adequate conditions for seeking to address Mediterranean security in a regional and multilateral framework (Commission 1992, 1993). Thus, in 1994, the EU Commission recommended to strengthen the EU's Mediterranean policy and proposed the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which took up the three-basket structure of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (Commission 1994, 1995a). At the same time, the EMP sought to reproduce the EU's own success story of regional security and prosperity based on an ongoing economic and political integration process. Yet in the case of the EMP, the EU's efforts targeted an area that is *external* to it. The somewhat experimental character of the EMP deserves a discussion of the EMP's incentives, tools, objectives, and underlying logic.

#### *Incentives, Objectives, and Tools*

What motivated the EU to launch the EMP? What were its main objectives and how are they reflected in the EMP's design? Due to the geographic proximity, the EU considers the Mediterranean as a "priority area of strategic importance." While acknowledging various areas of "Euro-Mediterranean interdependence, notably environment, energy,

migration, trade and investment" (European Council 1994), the EU's incentives for launching the Barcelona Process were undoubtedly pragmatic and self-interested.

Indeed, the EU sought to address perceived security threats deriving from a lack of economic development in its southern periphery which comprised rising Islamist fundamentalism,<sup>2</sup> combined with illegal immigration into the EU (Aliboni et al. 1996). In fact, already after the end of the cold war and the demise of Communism, "Islam" became a dominating threat perception in the "West," often reflecting traditional and distorted images of the Orient (Saïd 1995).<sup>3</sup> Given the presence of an already important immigrant population from the southern Mediterranean in most EU countries, along with rising xenophobia in Europe, EU governments consider the issue of immigration as particularly important. Moreover, the EU defined drug trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ecological hazards in or around the Mediterranean Sea as security issues. Finally, securing the EU's oil and gas supply from the southern Mediterranean and its hinterland, for which regional stability is crucial, was and has remained a key strategic consideration of the EU.

The EU's economic interests also played an important role. The aim of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area in industrial goods must clearly be seen in the context of the pressures exerted by economic globalization and the emergence of large trading blocs such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Thus, the EMP's free-trade agreements also aim at increasing EU exports while enabling the transfer of production sites to the southern periphery, where labor and production costs are much lower than in Europe. Certainly, this rationale may well go to the detriment of the Mediterranean partners (Tovias 1997) and turn them into "satellite economies of Europe" (Joffé 1996: 197). Yet EU officials tend to stress that, independent of the EU's economic benefits, in the era of economic globalization southern Mediterranean countries will have to liberalize their economies at any rate—with or without the EMP (Patten 1999a).

In view of these considerations, the EMP defined three main objectives: First, the "creation of an area of peace and stability based on the principles of human rights and democracy," second, the "creation of an area of shared prosperity" through the gradual establishment of a free-trade area, and third, the "improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the development of a flourishing civil society" (Commission 2000b: 7). To this end, the EMP stipulated a structured process of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in three



"baskets": First, cooperation in political and security matters; second, economics and finance; and, third, cooperation in social and cultural affairs. Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on these issues was to comprise both a bilateral and a regional dimension.

In the first basket, the EMP established a regular political dialogue for the promotion of peace, security, and stability, based on the principles of international law. These include respect for human rights, nonintervention in internal affairs, respect for the territorial integrity of states, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Furthermore, the dialogue was meant to foster cooperation in the prevention of and fight against terrorism, organized crime, and drug abuse. It also aimed at promoting WMD nonproliferation regimes, arms control and disarmament, along with confidence-building measures (Barcelona Declaration 1995).

In the second "basket," the stipulated free-trade area in industrial goods set the year 2010 as target date, based on bilateral agreements between the EU and single EMP partners in a first step, and free-trade agreements among the EMP partners in a second. Furthermore, cooperation in the areas of investments, environment protection, natural-resource management, energy policies, and scientific research was to be enhanced. The EU committed itself to financially support the stipulated reform process in the EMP partner states from the EU budget, economic assistance of individual EU members, and loans of the European Investment Bank (EIB).

Finally, the basket on social and cultural affairs was intended to promote the understanding between the peoples of the Euro-Mediterranean area based on dialogue and respect between cultures and religions. This basket also includes the development of human resources, health and sustainable development, job creation, the reduction of migratory pressures, and the common fight against illegal immigration, racism, and xenophobia (Barcelona Declaration 1995). The three-basket structure of the EMP already points to a *region-building approach* to security (Neumann 1994) that is characterized by a number of specific features, as the next section discusses.

#### *A Region-Building Approach to Euro-Mediterranean Security*

Although the Barcelona Declaration (1995) also mentions military security,<sup>4</sup> the reference to economic development, political dialogue, and cooperation in social affairs shows that Euro-Mediterranean security is defined in much broader terms. With it, the EMP reflects a

traditionally more *European* approach to security (Müller 1993). But why and to what extent did the original EMP display a region-building approach? Four aspects, elaborated below, are worth considering here.

First, unlike Europe's Mediterranean policy hitherto, which was mainly bilateral, the original EMP displayed an explicit regional and multilateral design. Although the EC/EU traditionally labeled its southern periphery as "the Mediterranean," the idea of a *Mediterranean region* is far from being self-evident. Describing a geographical reality, we would not necessarily find the term in a dictionary of political regions. But instead of spending time on debating on whether a Mediterranean region exists or not, the EU simply treated it as axiomatic from the outset (Commission 1994, 1995a, 2000a, 2000b; Bin 1996; FMES et al. 1997). Thus, the main assumption seemed to be that, at the end of the day, it is not relevant whether a Mediterranean region really exists: what matters is that people believe that it does. With it, the social, cultural, and political construction of the Mediterranean was central to the EMP.

Second (allegedly) shared values, interests, and identities played a prominent role within the EU's regional approach. Not surprisingly, the seminal work of Fernand Braudel (1972) on the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II, stipulating the coherence of the Mediterranean, was repeatedly quoted in EMP documents. Similarly, there were recurrent references to "unifying" images of the Mediterranean, such as the "cradle of civilization," the "birthplace of three monotheistic religions," or the "area of cross-cultural fertilization" (Bin 1996; FMES et al. 1997). This process somewhat reminds us of an attempt of creating a security community characterized by shared values among its members (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998). However, the EMP was never about expanding the EU—which qualifies as a security community—to include the Mediterranean partners. Indeed, it did not envisage EU membership for the EMP partners. Thus, as a weaker version of security community, we may define the aim of the EMP as the creation of a *security region*. In a security region, common values and identity themes, on which the indivisibility of security rests, may not be as deeply anchored and institutionalized as in a security community. Pragmatic considerations and common interests may thus play a greater role. However, a security region still presupposes that a group of states believes that its members inhabit the same geographical space within a given regional order, in which the security of its members is indivisible. For this reason, security regions must rely on common values that underscore

the region's uniqueness and provide some sort of "we-feeling."<sup>5</sup> However, in order to become truly part of such a region, the participating states must alter the way they define themselves. With it, the EMP sought to reshape the concept of regional order prevailing in the EMP partner states, while altering the patterns of regional relations—which include relations between former or present adversaries as well as relations to the EU. Thus, the EMP at least inexplicitly implied the *manipulation of the identity of states*.

The third key element of the region-building approach is the involvement of various state and nonstate actors, along with the importance attached to civil society. In this vein, the Barcelona Declaration (1995) explicitly calls upon the participants to "strengthen and/or introduce the necessary instruments of decentralized co-operation to encourage exchanges between those active in development within the framework of national laws." Similarly, the "improvement of the mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the development of an active civil society" is defined as a key priority of the partnership (Commission 2000: 4). Thus, an active civil society is viewed as indispensable for the emergence of a common regional agenda. This reasoning explains why the EMP subsumed cooperation in such "exotic" areas as education, culture, and social affairs under the headline of security.

Finally, the EU's approach to Mediterranean security was based on a long-term vision. In this vein, the EU stated that the "ultimate benefit of the efforts undertaken within the framework of the Barcelona process will not be visible until some time in the future" (Commission 2000a: 16). This perspective was certainly realistic, mainly because the concept of security varies considerably from state to state across the Mediterranean (Perthes 1996; Guazzone 1996; Said Aly 1996), and given that interstate and intrastate conflicts are an persistent feature of the region. Particularly with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU stated that "the Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interest of peace, stability and development of the region, but . . . will contribute to their success" (Barcelona Declaration 1995). Thus, while treating the Barcelona Process as a future-oriented meta-project, the EU could relate to persisting conflicts in the region as if they were short-term events at a "lower" level. In this vein, the EU stressed that the EMP was meant to prepare the ground for peacemaking, but that it would acquire its particular importance *after* a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement will be reached (European Council 2000).

Thus, the EU's region-building approach to Mediterranean security as reflected in the EMP implied the restructuring of internal political processes as well as the establishment of a permanent dialogue. But within this approach, security also relies on civil society and is finally about the emergence of common interests, values, and identifications. With it, the EMP *sought to redefine the concept of security*. At the same time, the logic of the Barcelona Process also reflected the EU's particular way of exerting influence in world politics, as the next section argues.

#### *EU Normative Power and the EMP*

The EU has often been termed a "civilian power" in international politics (Duchêne 1973). This concept describes the exertion of influence through nonmilitary means—mainly economic diplomacy—and the importance attached to the spreading of democratic values. The notion of "civilian power" also came to comprise a reluctance to use military force in world politics, unless it is viewed as a last resort for achieving humanitarian objectives, along with the conviction that dialogue, consensus, and international law shall regulate international relations. In this context, the EU's international role has also been termed postnationalist, implying the tendency to disconnect the state from the nation (Waeber 1996). While these observations do not necessarily apply to single EU member states, the EU's "civilian power" is obviously also related to the lack of military power under a common EU command. Yet the EU succeeded in turning this "flaw" into an asset, and the civilian-power narrative became central to the EU's self-perception (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002).<sup>6</sup> Certainly, the emergence of this self-image may also be linked to Europe's traditional reliance on the United States in matters of international security, as Kagan (2003) argued. Nevertheless, there is an EU-specific set of values that defines both the EU and its external relations, which, with some exaggeration, may be termed a Kantian-type of culture (Adler and Crawford 2006).

In fact, the values promoted by the EU on the international stage reflect the core themes of how the EU *defines itself*. This is the basis of the argument of Ian Manners (2002) on "normative power Europe." The relationship between EU identity and its policies has been highlighted in different cases and contexts (Waeber 1996; Wintle 1996; Merlingen et al. 2001). Exporting EU values is also central to the EU's security policy, since the "EU as civilian power achieves security by

instilling expectations and dispositions in near-abroad states, to the effect that the adoption of EU norms and values will gain them inclusion into the ranks of the EU" (Adler and Crawford 2006: 10).

The region-building approach of the EMP corroborates the normative-power argument, since the liberal set of values that underpins the EMP mirrors the EU's core values. Thus, the EU's defining principles of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy are interchangeable with those of the EMP, identified as "partnership, dialogue and consensus, not majority voting" by a senior EU official (Di Cara 2001). Similarly, the EMP promotes inclusion and cooperation as a basis for regional peace and stability, which very much correspond to Europe's own experience. Certainly, in view of the political realities in the Middle East and Mediterranean, seeking to export the European model to this area seemed out of touch with reality. This narrative is explicable, however, by keeping in mind that the EMP reproduced the EU's own historical experience, which is central to both Europe's self-definition (Waever 1996) and its exertion of normative power.

With the launching of the EMP—and at least until the EU adopted the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003–2004—the EU's normative power exercise vis-à-vis its southern periphery became attached to the Mediterranean theme. This theme came to comprise the regional dimension of the EMP as well as the EU's positions on different political issues in the region, such as the peace process or human-rights practices. Thus, in spite of the formal separation between the Middle East peace process and the EMP (Barcelona Declaration 1995), it is illustrating that the EU's declarations on the Middle East peace process are regularly published in the EU's electronic EMP publications, such as *Euromed Report* or *Euromed Special Feature*.<sup>7</sup> Chris Patten, former EU commissioner for external relations, also blurred the distinction between the different issue areas when he stated, "Let me turn now to the other pressing challenges to Europe's Mediterranean policy: the Middle East peace process" (Patten 2000).


Moreover, the region-building logic imposed itself on the EU's bilateral relations with the single EMP partners, which predated the Barcelona Process by far. In this vein, the bilateral and multilateral tracks of the EMP were institutionally linked to each other through MEDA (*Measures d'accompagnement*), the main financial instrument of the EMP.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, free-trade agreements, on which bilateral negotiations had started long before the launching of the partnership, were a posteriori linked to the EMP and termed "Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements," as in the case of Tunisia, Israel, and

Morocco.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, high-level visits of EU officials to single states in the region were regularly depicted as EMP events. In this vein, the visit of former EU Commission President Romano Prodi to various EMP partners in January 2001 was put under the EMP headline, although Prodi mainly discussed strictly bilateral issues, such as trade relations, human rights, or, as in the case of Algeria, the EU's contribution to political stability (*Euromed Special Feature* January 29, 2001, February 21, 2001). The EU clearly expressed its propagated order of priorities by stating that within its Mediterranean policy "[m]ultilateralism is now as common as, and even prevalent over, traditional bilateral approaches" (Commission 2000b: 15; italics added). But how does the EU's vision for the Mediterranean compare to reality? The next section turns its attention to this question.

#### *Vision and Reality*

Certainly, the Barcelona Process has shown a remarkable degree of continuity thus far. There have been regular conferences and informal meetings of the EMP foreign ministers, along with regular sectoral ministerial meetings under the different chapters of the EMP, and seminars involving government officials, policy advisers, and academics. Different networks, such as among research institutes (such as the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, or EuroMeSCo), chambers of commerce, and industrial federations have been established. Training seminars for Euro-Mediterranean diplomats are being financed through the EMP. A continuous political dialogue and various decentralized projects have been established (Aliboni and Said Aly 2000). And the establishment of a project on the prevention and mitigation of natural and man-made disasters, in which all the EMP partners take part, counts as one of the most important projects in the realm of confidence-building measures.

Despite the initially scarce attention paid to the third basket of the Barcelona Process, it produced some interesting initiatives, such as the projects on the common cultural heritage, youth exchange programs, initiatives in the audio-visual area, and various other civil society projects. Resulting from the greater importance given to intercultural dialogue after 9/11, the so-called Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, located in Alexandria, Egypt, was established in 2004. In the economic realm, most southern EMP partners have signed a bilateral free-trade agreement with the EU by now—Syria being the last EMP partner to have



concluded negotiations in 2004.<sup>10</sup> As for the financial assistance through the MEDA program, €3,435 million of the allocated €4,422 million was transferred between 1995 and 1999; MEDA II, which covers the period between 2000 and 2006, is endowed with €5,350 million. Loans from the EIB reached € 4,808 million between 1995 and 1999, and for the period 2000 to 2007 the EIB has a mandate of € 6,400 million, plus € 1 million in own resources.<sup>11</sup>

As the EMP enters into the second decade of its existence, the overall evaluation of its achievements greatly depends on how one measures success or failure, but it is clear that the EMP did not live up to the high expectations it had initially raised. For instance, there has been a notable lack of progress on "hard security" issues, such as arms control and WMD nonproliferation regimes (Selim 2000; Heller 2000; Biscop 2003). The EU has also been relatively weak in promoting democratization and improving human-rights conditions in most EMP partners (Jünemann 2001; Commission 2000b: 5). The overall economic rationale of the EMP, along with the relatively meager financial support for the modernization process it prescribes, also remains problematic (Tovias 1997; Kienle 1998b). In this context, the EU's protectionism regarding trade in agricultural products has repeatedly been criticized (Tovias 2006). Additional flaws comprise the slow pace of the negotiations and ratification process of Euro-Mediterranean agreements, the reluctance of some EMP partners to accelerate the pace of economic transition, the persistent low volume of South-South trade, and rather limited EU investments in the region (Commission 2000b: 5). Admitting that the "spirit of Barcelona" had been fading away over the years, the EU Commission repeatedly called for reinvigorating the partnership. In this vein, the EU's Common Strategy on the Mediterranean, adopted at the 2000 EU summit in Feira, stressed the necessity to adopt more concrete measures as well as a stricter follow-up of the EMP (Jünemann 2001).

However, a number of important regional and global developments also impacted on the EMP over the years. To begin with, the EMP was launched in the general euphoria that accompanied the signing of the Oslo II accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had taken place only two months earlier.<sup>12</sup> Yet from 1996 on, the Oslo peace process recurrently entered stalemates, and collapsed at the end of 2000. Rather unsurprisingly, it turned out that the fate of the Middle East peace process affected the progress of the EMP. Second, 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe and other parts of the world most dramatically evidenced the

seriousness of international terrorism of an Islamist matrix. Yet the sudden fame of the oversimplifying thesis on the "clash of civilizations" of Samuel Huntington (1996), the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments in the "West," and repeated statements equating Islam with terrorism were certainly not helpful to Euro-Mediterranean relations. Moreover, after 9/11 the EU became even more lenient regarding human-rights violations in some of the EMP partner states for the sake of combating terrorism. Finally, with the 2004 EU enlargement, 10 new member states entered the EU, including Malta and Cyprus, two former EMP partners. In December 2004, the EU also set a date for the start of accession negotiations with Turkey. Without Turkey, however, the remaining EMP partners will consist of eight—and if the current EMP "observer" Libya should fully join the EMP, nine—Arab states and Israel. In the current state of affairs, this is certainly not a good recipe for enhancing regional cooperation. More important, however, the EU's newly developed Neighbourhood Policy (Commission 2003, 2004), which resulted from EU enlargement, relies on an explicitly bilateral and differentiated approach toward the EU's eastern and southern neighbors. Thus, it overrides the regional logic of the EMP (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005).

A number of additional conflicts between and within states in the area also impacted on the Barcelona Process. The civil war in Algeria following the aborted 1991 elections is but one case in point. In general, many Arab states witnessed domestic conflicts, often related to the rise of Islamist opposition movements. Relations between Morocco and Algeria have remained difficult. During much of the 1990s, relations between Turkey and Greece remained tense, and the conflict over Cyprus has not been settled yet. Neither have EU-Turkish relations been easy over the years, given that the EU repeatedly postponed the decision on Turkey's EU membership. And while Turkey and Syria repeatedly clashed over the Kurdish issue in the late 1990s, Ankara entered a strategic relationship with Israel from 1996 on, to the dismay of Arab states (Gresh 1998). Syria and Turkey, on the other hand, signed two military cooperation agreements in June 2002, much to the displeasure of Israel (*BBC Monitoring Middle East* June 10, 2002). Moreover, while Spain and Morocco repeatedly argued over fisheries and immigration, in July 2002 both sides almost clashed militarily over the small and uninhabited Parsley/Laila islet. Outside of the EMP framework, but still around the Mediterranean, the 1990s also witnessed conflicts between Greece and Macedonia,

Libya and its neighbors, and, most prominently, the countries of former Yugoslavia.

Thus, in the light of a number of regional and global developments, along with recurring conflicts and altering patterns of alignments in the last decade, there was no development toward the recognition of common interests or values in the Euro-Mediterranean area. In the following sections, this observation is further elaborated.

### Seeking to Explain Setback

In the early 1990s, the conditions for peace in the Middle East and, with it, for Euro-Mediterranean security, seemed more than promising. What explains, then, the deteriorating prospects toward the end of the same decade? Is it really a matter of altered conditions, or are there additional factors which may explain this outcome?

#### Common Explanations

In the literature, the most common explanations of the EMP's difficulties point to the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict (Aliboni and Said Aly 2000; Biscop 2003). Another set of explanations revolves around potentially contradicting "logics" within the EMP (Solingen 2003). Thus, stability and economic liberalization may contradict each other, since economic reforms may actually cause instability, at least in the short term (Tovias 1997). Wide-ranging *political* reforms may also be incompatible with stability, the events in Algeria being the best example. Similarly, the EMP's implicit assumption that economic liberalization will eventually lead to democratization remains questionable (Solingen 2003; Bicchi et al. 2004). And security and democratization may contradict each other, particularly in the context of fighting terrorism in the post-9/11 era (Haddadi 2006). A third group of explanations points to cultural diversity and the power of history. According to this argument, Europe underestimates the colonial experience of the South (Said Aly 1996; Guazzone 1996), while failing to understand the complex political realities in the region. Fourth, a more optimistic explanation points to the time factor. In view of the pronounced diversity in the region and the proneness for conflict within and among states, a Euro-Mediterranean region cannot be expected to emerge overnight. Finally, some analysts dismiss the value of cooperative, or "soft," approaches for inducing change in the Mediterranean and Middle East altogether (Heller 2004).

The last point raises the question of viable alternatives. Indeed, the "balance-of-power" approach of the cold war did not succeed in preventing conflicts and wars in the region. Similarly, bilateral development cooperation characterizing Euro-Mediterranean relations in the previous decades was rather unsuccessful. And military means may not enhance regional stability and security either, as the current situation in Iraq demonstrates. On the other hand, the region-building logic of the EMP was remarkably successful in other areas. The European integration process after World War II and the CSCE experience serve as examples here. The fact that the recently launched "Greater Middle East Initiative" of the U.S. administration takes up the EMP logic also shows that the latter is not that absurd after all. Certainly, some of the explanations for the setbacks of the EMP are plausible to a certain extent, particularly their combination. Some questions, however, remain unexplained, such as the oscillating nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations in general, and the failure of *any* regional initiative thus far, be it the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process, or the EMP.

In fact, while the EU adopted a regional strategy toward its southern periphery, the EMP partners did not develop a Mediterranean policy of their own. Thus, EU officials repeatedly regretted that the EMP partners lacked a "national strategy" vis-à-vis the Mediterranean (Di Cara 2001), and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum (2001) reached the same conclusions. However, the states of the southern Mediterranean have actually a long history of belonging to the same grouping in international relations, as discussed further below. The failure of the EMP partners of developing a Mediterranean strategy may have different reasons. One is certainly the persistence of conflicts and unstable regional relations. Indeed, it is difficult to develop a consistent strategy if the political situation in the region repeatedly witnesses dramatic changes, as during the last decade. But a state's failure to respond to a regional and multilateral policy logic may also have domestic reasons. Thus, it is possible that the promotion of common values and regional identity themes in the framework of the EMP's region-building approach encounters domestic resistance in some states. In a similar vein, regional security on a Euro-Mediterranean basis may not be compatible with the propagated core values of single states. It is even conceivable that recurring interstate conflicts in the region and the difficulties to engage in regional security schemes are two expressions of the same disease, which originates at the *domestic*

level. The next paragraphs briefly explore key domestic issues and political patterns in the southern Mediterranean.

### *Domestic Fragmentation in the Southern Mediterranean*

While the nation-state is a relatively recent invention in the Mediterranean and Middle East (Luciani 1990; Lewis 1998), many societies in the region are characterized by a high degree of cultural, ethnic, and religious heterogeneity (Kliot 1989; Roque 1997). In most states, the religious-secular fault-line has deepened, and there are different challenges to state authority and prevailing identity themes.

As for Arab Mediterranean states, political leaders have been employing different strategies to counter the strengthening of Islamism, ranging from co-optation to plain repression (Chartouny-Dubarry 2000). The Islamist challenge certainly exploits political and economic discontent against the background of worsened economic conditions, which also eroded the legitimacy of the providential Arab state (Sadiki 2000; Dawisha 1988a: 282-283; Ibrahim 1998). Particularly in times of economic and political troubles, the Islamist discourse seems appealing, since it offers certainties in assigning guilt for crises, thus blaming the "corrupt and infidel elites" and their attachment to the "unbelieving West." Fouad Ajami (1999) has suggested that the Islamist phenomenon actually reflects the ideological bankruptcy of pan-Arab and socialist ideologies against the backdrop of reality. The Islamist challenge also implies an internal conflict about the interpretation of Islam (Said 1995: 333; Roberson 1998; Al-Ashmawy 1989) and its place in public life. Thus, the phenomenon entails a much wider domestic fragmentation on intrinsic values, and finally the identity of the state. But secular opposition movements are also challenging state authority, and with it, traditional identity themes.

In spite of their different political systems, Israel and Turkey share a similar experience in this regard. In Turkey, the rise of Islamist-conservative parties, such as the Welfare Party in the 1990s, and presently the AKP (Justice and Development Party), raises questions about Turkey's political identity (Ergil 2000). In Israel, the persistent struggle between religious orthodoxy and secular democracy entails a deep conflict about political culture and predominant values (Kimmerling 1998).

Over the last decades, several developments seem to have exacerbated the domestic divisions. Thus, processes of modernization and

globalization have led to the erosion of traditional social structures and identity themes in most states of the Mediterranean and Middle East. As for Arab states, the durability of which had somewhat surprised many scholars at the end of the 1980s (Dawisha and Zartmann 1988), the decline of pan-Arabism and the "triumph of the state" (Sela 1998: 350) may well have reduced one source of friction. But worsening economic conditions constitute new challenges to state authority. Moreover, the rise of Islamist movements entails an additional source of friction, especially for those states that entered military alliances with the "West," or adopted a moderate stance toward Israel. While the Palestine problem had a strong unifying effect on fragmented Arab societies, the advent of the Arab-Israeli peace process additionally generated new divisions and questioned the legitimacy of Arab rulers (Ajami 1992, 1999). In fact, making peace with Israel contradicts a number of unifying myths that are deeply rooted within Arab societies—not because they are intrinsic to Arab or Islamic "culture," but because their leaders promoted these myths for instrumental reasons over several decades.

Yet in Israel too, the beginning of the peace process brought a number of inherent contradictions to the fore. Recognizing the Palestinian right of national self-determination and the legitimacy of Palestinian territorial claims potentially undermines the moral justification provided by Israel's identity for its own territorial claims (Weissbrod 1997). Turkey, on the other hand, has witnessed an increasing protest of its ethnic minorities since the end of the cold war, such as the Kurds and the Shi'ite Alawi. With the erosion of the myth of national unity, a rising prominence of Islam, and economic liberalization, modern Turkey started to depart from its political foundations of nationalism, secularism, and statism (Kasaba and Bozdoğan 2000). In the quest for a replacement, modern Turkey is deeply divided on which way to choose.

To sum up, ethnic divisions, rising religious forces, political and economic discontent, and societal fragmentation around the southern Mediterranean entail domestic conflicts about the political design of the state. Over the last decades, several internal and external developments have exacerbated the societal fragmentation and contributed to the erosion of the unifying identity themes. It is against this background that we might understand the difficulties of EMP partners to engage in regional politics, which entail the promotion of themes and values that they allegedly share with their neighbors.

## An Alternative Explanation

The EU's promotion of regionalism and multilateralism on a Euro-Mediterranean basis did not have much impact on the foreign policy of most southern EMP participants. Considering the EMP's rationale of promoting common interests, values, and regional identity themes, the question of how the lack of a regional strategy of southern EMP states relates to the high incidence of societal fragmentation becomes crucial.

A number of scholars highlighted the impact of domestic politics on foreign-policy making (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1997). This argument has been widened by the proposition that national identity is strongly related to foreign policy as well as relations among states (Bloom 1990; Campbell 1992; Kienle 1995; Barnett 1999). Others have argued that "culture matters" in international relations (Katzenstein 1996b). Yet our discussion so far pointed to the importance of domestic conflicts about the political identity of states and their repercussion on foreign-policy making, particularly with regard to Euro-Mediterranean regional security.

### *Contested State Identities and Regional Security: The Argument*

Drawing attention to the identity dimension of foreign policy—identity referring here to the political identity of states—we argue that the lack of progress in Euro-Mediterranean region-building cannot sufficiently be explained without paying attention to state identities that are contested at the domestic level. The main argument is that the unsettled identity of a state puts a strain on the consistent evolution of regional security relations on a Euro-Mediterranean basis. Region-building necessitates a reconsideration of how a state defines itself and its place in the regional and international arena, and how it relates to other states. These questions, however, cannot be clearly answered as long as the political design of the state is contested at the domestic level. Inconsistent relations among the EMP partners, problematic relations with "Europe and the West," along with a lack of strategy toward Euro-Mediterranean region-building, would be a result of the deeply contested identity of these states. To put it simply, a state cannot consistently define who its enemies and its friends are, to which region it belongs, and, therefore, what the priorities of its foreign policy are, as long as it does not know what, or "who," it is. This

argument is particularly salient as far as region-building initiatives, such as the EMP, are concerned, precisely because they necessitate the emergence of common interests, values, shared beliefs, and regional identity themes. Hence, engaging in the creation of a security region necessitates the reshaping of state identity, and this may also require a choice of one concept of identity over others.

There is no doubt that many EMP partners share a number of "Mediterranean" features, which are often part of their cultural and literary traditions in one way or the other. But in all states, the Mediterranean option may potentially exclude more powerful identity preferences. At the same time, political leaders may be forced to promote strong "unifying" themes that are based on more "traditional" loyalties in order to keep potential domestic conflicts under control. This may explain why even under favorable global conditions in the post-cold war era, southern EMP partners were not able to consistently develop a Mediterranean policy, let alone a Mediterranean identity. By linking the inability to form regions to domestic identity conflicts, the setbacks and oscillating prospects of the Barcelona Process become intelligible. Hence, the domestic struggle over state identity will be treated as an independent variable that affects the ability to consistently engage in Mediterranean region-building, treated here as the dependent variable.

What are the inherent assumptions of this argument? As elaborated further in the next chapter, one set of assumptions regards the relationship between (contested) state identities and foreign policy in general terms: First, states tend to adopt a specific political identity in their relations to other states, which is reflected in their foreign policy. In this vein, it makes a difference in terms of foreign policy whether a state portrays itself as, say, a "liberal democracy," a "world power," an "Asian tiger," or a "guardian of Islam." Second, different identity preferences of domestic groups may entail different preferences regarding the type of foreign relations and regional order. Hence, religious fundamentalists (of whatever denomination) may have a quite different vision of international relations and regional order than secularist or liberal forces. Third, states that are characterized by strong societal fragmentation may use foreign policy as a tool for legitimizing state authority and/or increasing societal cohesion (Buzan 1991). This pattern has repeatedly been observed with respect to Arab states, often implying rather unpredictable foreign-policy actions (Dawisha 1988b). Finally, political elites of highly fragmented societies may be forced to use strong unifying symbols to ensure their



political legitimacy. These symbols, however, are most likely to be based on the motive of collective (or "national") exclusivity and distinctiveness, and may thus contradict the engagement in multilateral ventures.

These assumptions have a number of theoretical implications as far as social identities and foreign-policy analysis is concerned: First, states do not possess intrinsic or unchangeable identities. Rather, identities of states are social phenomena; the formation and reshaping of state identities are continuous social processes. Second, the shaping of state identities is not only a social, but also a highly political, process. Indeed, state identities may be manipulated and exploited by political elites for instrumental reasons, such as justifying state authority or specific policies. Third, although they can be manipulated, identities are "real." They influence the definition of "self," "other," regional order, and, in general, the perception of reality. In this vein, a state's self-perception affects the definition of foreign-policy interests, which are not fixed and primordial, but rather socially constructed in function of a state's identity (Wendt 1994). Finally, this research assumes the relevance of domestic factors for explaining foreign-policy outcome.

### Testing the Argument

In line with our argument, we expect that southern EMP partners with a strongly contested identity will be characterized by an inconsistent strategy toward Euro-Mediterranean region-building, or a lack of strategy altogether. Conversely, states with a low degree of identity contestation are considered more likely to develop a strategy toward regional security on a Euro-Mediterranean basis. This hypothesis, however, deserves some fine-tuning. Indeed, domestic identity conflicts may vary in nature and intensity across states, and they may not pose a foreign-policy problem in all cases, or regarding every foreign-policy issue. Thus, there are a number of intervening factors and variables, such as the degree of social polarization, and the type of state-society relations, which are explored more systematically in the next chapter.

But how does the causal link between contested state identities and Euro-Mediterranean regional security manifest itself *in practice*? The frequent reassessment of relations to the Euro-Mediterranean neighbors—in spite of material factors remaining the same—certainly points to a state's difficulties in developing a coherent regional strategy, or a lack thereof. And while we may expect different, and contradicting, interpretations of the objectives of the EMP, the Mediterranean identity

theme, along with references to common interests or values on a Euro-Mediterranean basis, will be notably absent in the official discourse.

In order to test our argument, we will provide a historical and regional perspective by discussing Euro-Mediterranean relations over the last decades and further elaborating on domestic developments in the southern Mediterranean. The three case studies that are analyzed in detail, namely Israel, Egypt, and Morocco, were chosen precisely because they differ from each other in many respects. Thus, at *prima facie* these states maintained different positions toward Euro-Mediterranean regional security and the EU as its main promoter. They are characterized by different political systems and state-society relations. And the political identity of these states seems to be unsettled to various degrees. A final consideration appertains to the general importance given to the Arab-Israeli fault-line in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern politics. While Israel is obviously central to it, it may be relevant that Egypt is a significant player in the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, while Morocco is situated at its periphery. A comparison of the findings in the three cases, thus, allows us to assess the relevance of our argument and its assumptions and to identify relevant intervening variables.

Thus, testing our argument in the three case studies entails the analysis of the predominant identity discourse and the domestic challenges, the exploration of each country's relations to its Euro-Mediterranean neighbors, and the subsequent investigation of the possible impact of domestic identity conflicts on foreign-policy making in general, and Euro-Mediterranean regional security in particular. Of course, assessing alternative domestic- and foreign-policy preferences, including those of the political opposition, is a tricky business in authoritarian states. For this reason, we also explore domestic trends that may indicate whether alternative identity preferences are present and relevant. Besides an extensive review of the academic literature, our empirical research consults official and semi-official documents on foreign policy and state identity. Interviews with government officials and experts support this investigation. As noted in the introduction, the time frame of this study is limited to the first seven years of the EMP, thus avoiding obvious explanations linked to the collapse of the peace process and 9/11. However, this book also considers developments that took place afterwards if they are relevant for the subject under consideration. As far as Euro-Mediterranean relations are concerned, the background provided by this book starts after the end of the cold war. For every case study, a short history of



state identity is provided. For Egypt and Morocco, the starting point of this investigation is the aftermath of national independence, and for Israel, the establishment of the state.

This book does certainly not claim that the discrepancy between vision and reality of the Barcelona Process can be explained in terms of identity alone. Politics in general, and international relations in particular, do not follow mono-causal explanations. The (temporary?) collapse of the Middle East peace process, the events of 9/11, and factors appertaining to the EU itself certainly had a negative impact on the prospects of Euro-Mediterranean regional security. This research seeks to show, however, that unsettled state identities are a significant and independent factor that must be considered for explaining the difficulties of the EMP in particular, and of regional security initiatives in general. By approaching international relations from an alternative perspective, this book supports the argument that foreign-policy interests "are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors" (Katzenstein 1996a: 2). Yet going beyond this affirmation, the research also evidences the relevance of *domestic factors* for the study of world politics, while opening up the "black box" of state identities. As we have touched upon a wide range of theoretical issues, the next chapter elaborates on the theoretical underpinnings of our argument.

## 2

## Theoretical Framework

This chapter focuses on the theoretical premises of the argument that contested state identities negatively affect a state's ability to engage with Euro-Mediterranean regional security. This discussion of the theoretical framework will start with a review of different schools of thought within the theory of IR. As this discussion touches upon questions of reality, truth, and knowledge, these issues will briefly be addressed in a second step. Subsequently, we theoretically elaborate on how identities, and in particular state identities, can be studied, while conceptualizing the impact of *contested* state identities on foreign-policy interests, and consequently, outcome.

## Interests and Identities in IR

The focus on contested state identities as a possible explanation of the difficulties of the EMP has led us to the questioning of the very nature of foreign-policy interests. Certainly, the argument of this book does not lie within the range of approaches that have been dominating IR during most of its relatively young existence as an academic discipline. In fact, since IR's theoretical preoccupation with foreign and security policy developed around the cold war, the realist school traditionally stood at the center (Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Walt 1991). As it is well known, realism defines "interests" in terms of military capabilities, deterrence strategies, and power politics. In spite of repeated calls for broadening the definition of security and interests from the mid-1980s onwards (Ullman 1983; Buzan 1983), the rationalist and systemic view prevailed in IR theory. With it, the predominant assumption is that a state's foreign policy and security interests are exogenous and a priori given, an assumption that is discussed—and challenged—in the following sections.