

Part I

**Determinants and
correlates of support
for the use of force**

2 The impact of basic motivation on foreign policy opinions concerning the use of force

A three-dimensional framework

*William O. Chittick and
Annette Freyberg-Inan*

Introduction: the role of motivation in foreign policy opinion formation

In Chapter 1 three sets of questions concerning the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy were formulated. These revolve, respectively, around the content and nature of public opinion, the determinants and correlates of public opinion, and the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. This chapter addresses both the first and the second of these sets of questions. Our interest in this chapter is to study the impact of basic motivation on public opinion concerning issues of foreign policy in general and those involving the use of force in particular.

We suggest that individuals' basic motivational dispositions towards foreign policy issues vary along three dimensions.¹ These same three dimensions can be seen to structure public opinion concerning issues of foreign policy, an observation that is in accordance with our expectation that a distribution of specific opinions should be structured in accordance with the structure of more basic dispositions. We suggest that information concerning individuals' positions on the three dimensions of motivational disposition is helpful in predicting specific opinions. We thus identify the structure and nature of individuals' underlying motivational dispositions as important determinants of the structure and nature of public opinion on issues of foreign policy.² We believe that knowledge of its psychological determinants is a prerequisite for studying the impact of public opinion on the foreign policy making process, which is the third and perhaps the most difficult task attempted in this volume.

The structure of foreign policy attitudes

Most progress in the study of the general nature of public opinion with respect to issues of foreign policy has been made in the examination of

its structure. This does not mean that there remain no differences of opinion, particularly concerning the extent to which individuals' opinions on a range of foreign policy issues show a consistent pattern. If there is no structure to public opinion in general, we are left to study the causes of issue-specific opinions and opinion-fluctuations, remaining largely incapable of prediction. If there is structure to public opinion, however, we may be able to employ its characteristics as dependent variables in the search for general determinants of public opinion formation. Thus, the identification of structure is a prerequisite for the systematic study of the general sources of public opinion, with which this chapter is primarily concerned.

As was shown in Chapter 1, a consensus has gradually emerged that foreign policy attitudes are indeed structured and that their structure is multidimensional, although various analysts differ on the nature and number of primary dimensions. While most analysts support the claim that foreign policy opinion is structured along two dimensions, Chittick, Billingsley and Travis have argued that foreign policy opinion is structured along three primary dimensions (Chittick *et al.* 1995). Some of this discrepancy can be attributed to the methods the analysts use to interpret their data. However, most scholars have opted for less complicated interpretations at least in part because they lacked a theory of public opinion formation, which might have warranted a more complex approach. Thus, in the second section of this chapter, we will clarify the theoretical bases for our suspicion that foreign policy opinion is structured along three dimensions which correspond to variances in individuals' basic motivational dispositions. In sections three and four, we employ public opinion data to explore the plausibility and usefulness of our framework for assessing the impact of basic motivation on foreign policy opinions.

The role of motivational dispositions

We conceive of public opinion with respect to foreign policy issues as a set of dependent variables at least partly determined by individuals' basic motivational dispositions. We establish a three-dimensional model of the structure and operation of motivational dispositions with respect to issues of foreign policy. By examining the structure and operation of such dispositions, this chapter explores one of the possible sources of differences of opinion on foreign policy issues in general, and concerning the use of force in particular. We suggest that our three motivational dimensions can be employed simultaneously to classify individuals with respect to the basic components of their general orientation towards issues of foreign policy. Our ultimate hope is that knowledge of the nature and operation of relevant motivational dispositions can be used to help predict public opinion across foreign policy issues.

In order to determine the effects of public opinion on foreign policy it is necessary to look not only at its contents, but also at the robustness and

the saliency of the relevant views. In addition, it requires the mapping of channels of communication between public and elites, the examination of decision-making mechanisms at the elite level, as well as the consideration of feedback effects. We are here only concerned with employing information on the sources of public opinion towards the explanation and prediction of its structure and contents. This should be viewed as a first step towards a more complete assessment of its general nature, which would have to include additional sources, and as a prerequisite for the proper understanding and judgement of its impact.

Our approach is general. It transcends specific political contexts, thus offering possibilities of accounting for and predicting public opinion on issues as of yet unforeseeable. It is applicable across time and place, thus offering guidance to attempts to overcome the exaggerated reliance of empirical studies on the public opinion-foreign policy nexus on US data from the Cold War. It also does not distinguish between elites and the public at large, since we do not expect the structure of motive dispositions or the nature of their impact to vary across social strata.

Motive dispositions

Motives are commonly conceptualised to be activators of behaviour. In fact, in the words of psychologist K. B. Madsen (1974: 13; see also McClelland 1985), 'it is not possible to understand, explain or predict human behaviour without some knowledge of "motivation" – the "driving force" behind behaviour'. Motivation is usually studied as a part of the human organism, or human nature. It interacts with environmental factors insofar as the environment can facilitate or restrict the operation of motives and insofar as it provides stimuli for what psychologists refer to as 'motive arousal'. Motives are aroused by internal or external stimuli, such as hunger or provocation, and determine how human beings will react to such stimuli. Motive arousal may be explained as a function of three main variables: motive dispositions, or needs, such as physical drives, characteristics of the incentive, that is, the opportunities which present themselves to fulfil these needs, and expectations of the attainability of goals, or the difficulty and likelihood of taking advantage of those opportunities.

It is useful to conceptualise the process of motivation as has been suggested by Russell Geen (1995); see also Heckhausen (1991). Actors are always simultaneously confronted with their own needs and with external situations which affect what is achievable. Both need and situation determine which behavioural incentives the actor will perceive. The actor then defines his goals accordingly, and will take action in order to achieve these goals. As David McClelland (1996: 443) confirms, 'A need in combination with a situation creates an incentive, which leads to a goal, which leads to action to attain the goal.' We are here specifically interested in examining the impact of motive dispositions, the most fundamental psychological

component in the process of motivation. In the complex reality of opinion formation, basic motive dispositions constitute only one relevant factor. However, we believe it is useful to concentrate on such dispositions, since we take them to be fundamental to both more general political orientations and specific opinions. In other words, we believe that they may be conceptualised as the highest level variables in a hierarchically constructed process of opinion formation.

The expression of public opinion, as a form of goal-oriented behaviour, is generally believed to be affected by both dispositional and situational factors. While situational characteristics, such as opportunities and constraints, and their interaction with dispositions are crucial in accounting for action, we believe that our focus on the formation of behavioural preferences justifies a primary concern with the impact of basic needs or dispositions towards basic goals. Such dispositions have an effect both indirectly, through their impact on perceptions of the relevant situations, and directly on preferences towards various behavioural options. We suspect that, since they are more fundamental, basic motive dispositions might be as important as or even more important than the traditional socio-demographic and political variables in predicting foreign policy opinions and support for or opposition to government policies in general and the use of military force in particular.

Basic motivation as a source of foreign policy opinions: an analytical framework

Even a cursory examination of the psychological literature reveals a plethora of individual motives, which psychologists believe to be operative in different contexts. However, a thematic approach to motivation has been developed, primarily by psychologists H.A. Murray (1938) and David McClelland (1985), which categorises motivation according to the primary need acknowledged: power, affiliation, or achievement. Power may be broadly defined as the desire for control over one's environment, affiliation as the desire to associate with and be respected by others, and achievement as the desire to accomplish personal goals. The practice of classifying motivation in this way has become common across disciplines and issue areas.³ For example, Abraham Maslow (1973) employs these three motives in his hierarchy of needs, where he places survival and safety (power) at the bottom; belonging and love (affiliation) in the middle; and respect and self-esteem (achievement) at the top of his list of basic needs. Foreign policy analysts have also employed this classification system. Richard Cottam (1977) identifies as many as fifteen different types of foreign policy motives, but he classifies them as: governmental (power), communal (affiliation), and economic motives (achievement). Similarly Arnold Wolfers (1962) identifies three basic kinds of foreign policy goals: security (power); milieu (affiliation); and possessional (achievement). Finally,

empirical studies by David Winter (1973, 1993) as well as Peterson *et al.* (1994) have successfully employed McClelland's motivational categories in attempts to link varying patterns of motivation to specific types of foreign policy decisions.

Perhaps the most interesting observation with respect to the existence of these three motivational themes in the foreign policy literature is that the main theoretical paradigms in foreign policy analysis each emphasise one of these basic themes or motives. The realist school has traditionally defined the concept of the national interest in terms of power.⁴ Power is generally emphasised as the central means to realise the most basic goal of the survival of the nation-state and to achieve all other possible interests. In the words of neo-realist Kenneth Waltz (1979: 118), states 'at a minimum, seek their own preservation, and at a maximum, strive for universal domination'. John Mearsheimer (1994/95: 10-11) supports this view, claiming that 'the most basic motive driving states is survival' and that this makes it necessary for 'states in the international system [to] aim to maximise their relative power positions over other states'.

Liberal theories, in comparison, tend to emphasise the importance of the achievement motive by stressing the economic and political-cultural needs of actors in the international realm. The work of Karl Deutsch (1957) on the development of pluralistic security communities, Ernst Haas's theories on regional integration in Europe (Haas 1958), and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's *Power and Interdependence* ([1977] 1989) are among the central contributions to the growing strength of liberal approaches to the study of foreign policy. These approaches emphasise the possibility of expanding the potential for cooperation among nations, which share common interests. They generally stress the importance of opportunities for achievement, which may operate as a driving force for concerted action, in opposition to the realist emphasis on the international competition for power.

Finally, a third and more recent approach to the study of foreign policy, constructivism, contributes insights into the role of the motive of affiliation.⁵ According to constructivists like Alexander Wendt, the fundamental structures of international politics are social, rather than material. These structures not only constrain the behaviour of individuals, but they are directly involved in shaping individuals' identities and interests (Wendt 1995). Recent work in the field of social cognitivism illuminates the mechanisms by which individuals develop goals and strategies through social interaction.⁶ Constructivist approaches in general help explain the importance of actors' need to belong to a larger community as well as the consequences of this need for political strategies and outcomes.

What is especially intriguing about the three bodies of literature sketched above is that none of these approaches can make a persuasive claim that the other two do not also make a significant contribution to the study of international relations and foreign policy choice. As soon as analysts

attempt to apply their understanding of international politics to particular states in the context of specific situations, they discover that they cannot account for decisions solely in terms of their preferred motive. Instead, it is commonly found that any meaningful treatment of particular cases requires an examination of the operation of all three motivational themes. For instance, in *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, a volume edited by Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995), various chapters by realist, liberal, and constructivist theorists create the impression that the end of the Cold War can only be sufficiently explained through the combined efforts of all three approaches. In addition, critiques of one or the other school of thought commonly include the observation that that school finds itself in need of 'a continual adoption of auxiliary propositions to explain away flaws' (Vasquez 1997: 899).⁷ The introduction of *ad hoc* propositions to cover areas where the theoretical approach has generated unsatisfactory explanations or predictions may well be viewed as an indication of an incomplete assessment of reality – perhaps stemming from an overly confining view of human motivation.

Three dimensions

Given the fact that the three motivational themes of power, achievement, and affiliation are so embedded in the literature on both human psychology and international relations as well as foreign policy, we suspect that opinions concerning foreign policy goals and strategies might be explained in terms of these three basic motives. We believe that we can use insights from the extant, partial approaches to model those factors which are most influential in shaping dispositions with respect to the motive central to each approach. Our framework for the general assessment of the role of motivation in foreign policy opinion formation combines these insights. It associates each of the three motivational themes identified with one general foreign policy goal – security, prosperity, and community, respectively. Systematic differences among individuals are modelled to form one primary dimension of variance for each of these basic goals. We thus posit that resulting opinions are structured in terms of perceptual and preference orientations which can vary along three dimensions. Each of these dimensions can be described in terms of polar differences: (1) in an actor's basic perceptions concerning the relevant characteristics of its environment; (2) in the actor's preferences with respect to strategic goals; and (3) in the actor's preferences with respect to strategic means. The core tenets of our framework model the effects of variation on these dimensions of motive disposition on opinions concerning specific foreign policy issues.

The power motive compels human beings to seek security in the form of protection from and advantage in conflicts with others and ensures immediate physical survival. Actors perceive their security environment to be more or less competitive. We hypothesise that the more competitive

an actor perceives the relationship between its community and those threatening its security, the more salient the power motive. Vice versa, the more co-operative an actor perceives the relationship between its community and those representing potential threats, the less salient the power motive.

The positions foreign policy actors take towards possible security threats depend on whether they perceive the relationships between themselves and the relevant others as essentially competitive or co-operative. Actors' choice of strategic security goals thus reflects preferences analogous to the competitive-co-operative perceptual dimension. We hypothesise that if an actor perceives a potentially threatening situation to be highly competitive, then the actor is more likely to seek superior relative power, domination at the extreme, as its strategic goal. If the actor perceives a potentially threatening situation to be less competitive, then the actor is more likely to accept symmetric power relationships and to seek a mutual understanding or even accommodation as its strategic goal. We thus expect the security goal preferences of individuals to range from domination based on power superiority on the one hand to accommodation based on a symmetry of power on the other hand.

An actor's choice of strategic security goals also affects its preferences for the means used to obtain security. If a foreign policy actor believes that domination of a potential enemy is necessary for its security, that actor will be more prepared to use or threaten force, that is to adopt militarist policies. If an actor seeks accommodation, that actor will prefer non-coercive, non-militarist methods of dealing with security issues. Those who seek a mix of assertion of power and accommodation are likely to pursue more complex strategies, which involve both military and non-military actions.

Whereas the power motive arises from a perception of threats, the achievement motive arises from a perception of, or need for, opportunities. This motive inspires the pursuit of all those resources which, as, for example, money, education, or personal rights, are expected to better human beings' life circumstances. The prosperity goal is thus to be understood not in a narrow, strictly material sense, but, analogous to liberal conceptions of individual preferences, as a broader conception of the national interest.

Those perceptions most relevant to the pursuit of achievement concern an actor's own status and capabilities relative to those of the other relevant actors. We hypothesise that, generally, if an actor perceives itself as superior to those others, then the actor will be prepared to continually interact with them. If an actor perceives itself as inferior in capabilities to those others, then it will be hesitant to enter arrangements which institutionalise interaction. Foreign policy actors' responses to opportunities for achievement depend on their perceptions concerning their relative strength. Such perceptions thus affect the strategic goals actors pursue with respect

to the basic foreign policy goal of prosperity. We hypothesise that if an actor perceives itself to be inferior in capabilities to relevant others, it will be more likely to pursue a foreign policy of non-involvement, isolation at the extreme. Vice versa, if the actor perceives itself to be in a superior position, it will favour a foreign policy of entering interactive arrangements, which increase interdependence.⁸

The socio-economic goals ranging from isolation, on the one hand, to interdependence, on the other, also affect the relevant strategic means preferred by foreign policy actors. An actor who pursues an isolationist policy will be more likely to employ policies protecting the goods, services, money and ideas it already possesses. One example would be protectionist trade policies. More generally, anti-involvement policies avoid exposure to the effects of the foreign policies of other international actors. An actor who favours a policy of interdependence, on the other hand, will strive for active involvement in the 'free trade' of goods, services, money and ideas. It will be more prepared to enter into institutionalised arrangements, such as international organisations or alliances, as well as informal commitments with other international actors.

The affiliation motive inspires actors to attempt integration into a community, which can provide more protection and comfort than any actor would be able to secure for itself. In order to be part of such a community, actors accept and internalise, at least to some extent, that community's norms and rules of behaviour and, in turn, become able to shape the nature and conduct of the collectivity. Those perceptions most relevant to the pursuit of affiliation concern the conditions for communal identification with other relevant actors. Actors perceive their communities to be more or less exclusive. We hypothesise that if an actor emphasises those values which make its own community unique, then that actor will feature an exclusive identity that clearly separates the community from its environment. If, on the other hand, an actor stresses values its community holds in common with others, that actor will exhibit an inclusive identity, which accentuates the similarities between the community and the environment.

With respect to their strategic goals, foreign policy actors who portray more exclusive identities will be more likely to seek recognition through independence. Those actors who hold more inclusive identities will be more likely to pursue integration, unification at the extreme. In terms of strategic means, foreign policy actors who seek independence tend to prefer unilateral initiatives, as they would be hesitant to compromise their independent position by having to consult with others. Foreign policy actors who seek integration into a larger community instead tend to act on a multilateral basis. This is because consultation among all affected parties is likely to lead to more concerted action and to strengthen communal bonds.


Our framework is comparable to the approach developed by Rattinger and Juhász (1998) to examine the impact of 'international postures' on

opinion formation. Rattinger and Juhász argue that 'international postures' are concerned with three basic questions: To what extent should the state get involved internationally? (our pro-involvement-anti-involvement dimension) How should it get involved? (our militarist-non-militarist dimension) Should it act alone or with partners? (our unilateralist-multilateralist dimension). Their finding for the case of Germany, that the 'international postures' captured by the degrees of isolationism, multilateralism and militarism exhibited by the public emerge as the strongest predictor for opinions concerning international security arrangements, supports our belief in the relevance of these types of motive dispositions in opinion formation.⁹

In the following discussion, we will centre on strategic dispositions towards the three basic foreign policy goals, since such dispositions can be most closely identified with actual preferences towards behavioural options. We will explain how our understanding of the structure and impact of motive dispositions can contribute to a better understanding of the structure and development of such preferences. We contend that all three of the above basic motives need to be taken into account in order to explain or predict actors' opinions concerning any foreign policy issue. If we, for example, wish to predict public opinions concerning a possible military action, we must not only consider whether the polled individuals are more or less militarist, but also take into account the other two motivational dimensions. For example, a rabid militarist might still be opposed to military action because he is also a unilateralist and the action is to take place under UN command. Similarly, the public might cease to support a military operation over time, because it is anti-involvement and therefore disinclined towards long-term international commitments.¹⁰

All three dimensions need to be considered to account for and predict public opinion on any foreign policy issue, including issues of using force. If we do so, we can establish a classification system of eight ideal types, each of which captures a different combination of extreme positions on our three dimensions of motive disposition. In order to make this model of explanation more accessible, we might ask the reader to imagine a cube whose sides are defined by the three dimensions (see Figure 2.1).¹¹

Together, these three dimensions represent all possible motivational dispositions towards basic foreign policy goals and strategies. Real individuals' dispositions may fall anywhere on the surface or within this cube. The eight corner points of our cube, however, constitute ideal types A through H. Type A individuals are: militarist, anti-involvement and unilateralist. While they generally support the use of military force to achieve foreign policy goals, they are disinclined towards multilateral ventures. In addition, they tend to oppose lasting international involvement. Type B individuals are: militarist, pro-involvement and unilateralist. They support both international involvement and the use of military force, while preferring unilateral action. Type C individuals are: non-militarist, pro-involvement and unilateralist. They generally do not support the use of force to achieve



where x = Security
y = Prosperity
z = Community

and

Type A = militarism, anti-involvement, unilateralism
Type B = militarism, pro-involvement, unilateralism
Type C = non-militarism, pro-involvement, unilateralism
Type D = non-militarism, anti-involvement, unilateralism
Type E = militarism, anti-involvement, multilateralism
Type F = militarism, pro-involvement, multilateralism
Type G = non-militarism, pro-involvement, multilateralism
Type H = non-militarism, anti-involvement, multilateralism

Figure 2.1 The construction of eight ideal types from three dimensions.

foreign policy goals, but support long-term international involvement, while preferring unilateral initiatives. Type D individuals are: non-militarist, anti-involvement and unilateralist. They generally oppose both the use of military force and international involvement. They prefer foreign policy initiatives to be of a unilateral nature. Type E individuals are: militarist, anti-involvement and multilateralist. They support the use of military force, prefer foreign policy initiatives to be conducted on a multilateral basis, and oppose long-term international involvement. Type F individuals are: militarist, pro-involvement and multilateralist. They support the use of military force, international involvement, and multilateral initiatives. Type G individuals are: non-militarist, pro-involvement, and multilateralist. They do not support the use of force, but do support international involvement and prefer multilateral initiatives. Finally, type H individuals are: non-militarist, anti-involvement, and multilateralist. They generally support neither the use of military force nor long-term international involvement. They also prefer foreign policy initiatives to take a multilateral form.

The construction of the above eight types allows us to group the foreign policy opinions of individuals who share similar outlooks by their relative

proximity to one or the other of these extreme corner positions. In addition, plotting the positions of individuals on all three dimensions could allow us to estimate the likelihood that the individual's opinions will approximate that of any ideal type.

Examining the structure of public opinion

In the previous section we have argued that foreign policy analysts tend to structure their thinking about international relations and foreign policy around three basic approaches, each of which focuses on a different basic foreign policy goal and the accompanying motive. We have further contended that the motivational assumptions made in each approach are more usefully thought of as dimensions (variables), allowing individuals to express different perceptions and preferences with respect to both foreign policy ends and means. We believe that all three of these dimensions must be taken into account in explaining and predicting foreign policy opinions, as all three motivational themes play important roles in foreign policy choice. In this section, we offer some empirical evidence that these same three dimensions structure foreign policy opinion, as expressed in public opinion polls. In the next section, we will show how these dimensions may be employed as independent variables in order to predict specific foreign policy opinions.

The CCFR data

Ideally, we would employ public opinion data from a wide variety of countries on a range of foreign policy issues and spanning the Cold War as well as the post-Cold War period, in order to test systematically the propositions which can be derived from our model. Unfortunately, the necessary consistently collected general data are available only for the United States, and even these do not include the kinds of policy-relevant responses, which would closely capture our dependent variables. The best Cold War data come from the four elite and four public opinion surveys, conducted mostly by Gallup for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) between 1974 and 1986.¹² Three additional data sets on elites collected by Holsti and Rosenau in 1976, 1980 and 1984, and one elite data set collected by Chittick in 1982 were also used in the following analyses.¹³

In order to establish the existence of a three-dimensional structure to foreign policy opinion, Chittick, Billingsley and Travis have analysed the answers given to all the foreign policy goal questions used in the above-mentioned interviews and surveys between 1974 and 1986 (Chittick *et al.* 1995). If public opinion concerning foreign policy issues were unstructured, no consistent pattern should emerge from factor analyses of responses to these foreign policy questions. If it were true that respondents take either a realist or an idealist stance on foreign policy issues, then a single

Items	Factors*	Target Matrix		
		I	II	III
C1	Improving Communications			
C2	Seeking World Population Control			
C3	Averting Third World Debt Crisis			
C4	Combating World Inflation			
C5	Protecting the Global Environment			
C6	Keeping the Peace			
C7	Fostering International Cooperation			
C8	Promoting Human Rights			
C9	Improving Standards of Living			
C10	Promoting World-wide Arms Control			
C11	Strengthening the United Nations			
C2	Combating World Hunger			
S1	Preventing Soviet Expansion			
S2	Maintaining a Balance of Power			
S3	Strengthening Friendly Nations			
S4	Defending Our Own Security			
S5	Matching Soviet Military Power			
S6	Protecting Weaker Nations			
S7	Bringing Democracy to Others			
S8	Defending our Allies' Security			
S9	Containing Communism			
P1	Keeping US Industry Competitive			
P2	Dealing with Own Domestic Problems			
P3	Setting Good Examples for Others			
P4	Promoting Capitalism			
P5	Keeping Up Value of Dollar			
P6	Protecting American Jobs			
P7	Securing Energy Supplies			
P8	Protecting American Business			

* Factor I is Unilateralism/Multilateralism; Factor II is Non-Militarism/Militarism; and Factor III is Protectionism/Free Trade.

	0
	1, 2
	3, 4
	5, 6
	7, 8
	9, 10
	11, 12

factor should emerge in which some individuals (realists) will answer most questions one way and the others (idealists) will answer them the opposite way. If it were true that respondents consider foreign policies simultaneously from both a realist and a liberal perspective, then a two-factor solution should emerge. In order for our framework to be supported, a factor analysis of the responses should produce three distinct factors, representing the three dimensions we have stipulated. Figure 2.2 illustrates the pattern which would result from a hypothetical situation in which, every time a question was used in one of the twelve surveys and interviews, the answers defined the primary dimension we have associated with each basic foreign policy goal.

In order to construct this hypothetical situation, all questions were first placed into one of the three goal domains of community, security, and prosperity. The three columns representing the target matrix in Figure 2.2 correspond to the three dimensions (I = unilateralism-multilateralism; II = militarism-non-militarism; III = anti-involvement-pro-involvement). A shaded box in a column indicates that the corresponding question defines that dimension, where the degree of shading indicates the number of times this occurred.¹⁴ In this 'perfect' factor matrix, each question defines the expected dimension, and no other. For example, the questions labelled 'C' deal with foreign policy issues we associate with the community goal. We expect differences of opinions on each of these questions to define a unilateral-multilateral dimension. That is, a person who answers one of these questions in a particular way is likely to answer all questions in the 'C' group the same way. Another respondent with dissimilar views should answer these questions in the opposite way. This pattern in the answers given suggests that, even though each question in the community goal domain involves a specific issue, all of these issues are judged according to the respondent's position on one underlying motivational dimension, in this case the dimension of unilateralism-multilateralism.

The analysis

In the actual analysis, the survey responses to each question were analysed in twelve separate principal component factor analyses followed by VARIMAX rotations.¹⁵ The results of all four public surveys and all eight elite surveys are summarised in Figure 2.3. Each time a question defines a factor, this finding is graphically represented by shading the box in the appropriate column. For example, if the empirical results in one of the twelve analyses show that question C10 defines the unilateralism-

Figure 2.2 Number of times each question is expected to define factors in the target matrix.

Items	Factors*	Composite Matrix		
		I	II	III
C1	Improving Communications			
C2	Seeking World Population Control			
C3	Averting Thrd World Debt Crisis			
C4	Combating World Inflation			
C5	Protecting the Global Environment			
C6	Keeping the Peace			
C7	Fostering International Cooperation			
C8	Promoting Human Rights			
C9	Improving Standards of Living			
C10	Promoting World wide Arms Control			
C11	Strengthening the United Nations			
C2	Combating World Hunger			
S1	Preventing Soviet Expansion			
S2	Maintaining a Balance of Power			
S3	Strengthening Friendly Nations			
S4	Defending Our Own Security			
S5	Matching Soviet Military Power			
S6	Protecting Weaker Nations			
S7	Bringing Democracy to Others			
S8	Defending our Allies' Security			
S9	Containing Communism			
P1	Keeping US Industry Competitive			
P2	Dealing with Own Domestic Problems			
P3	Setting Good Examples for Others			
P4	Promoting Capitalism			
P5	Keeping Up Value of Dollar			
P6	Protecting American Jobs			
P7	Securing Energy Supplies			
P8	Protecting American Business			

	0
	1, 2
	3, 4
	5, 6
	7, 8
	9, 10
	11, 12

* Factor I is Unilateralism/Multilateralism; Factor II is Non-Militarism/Militarism; and Factor III is Protectionism/Free Trade.

** It is possible for an item to define more than one factor at the 0.40 level or higher.

multilateralism dimension, then the box in Column I corresponding to that question will be shaded. If the empirical results show that that question defines another dimension, then the appropriate box in one of the two other columns will be shaded. Once again, the degree of shading indicates the number of times a question defines the dimension in question. The overall results across all twelve separate analyses can quickly be discerned by comparing Figures 2.2 and 2.3.

A comparison of the target and composite matrices reveals a striking similarity, indicating that our suggested three-dimensional structure is indeed plausible. Chittick *et al.* find that the three dimensions identified above do appear as factors, which account for patterns in survey responses. The authors show that questions dealing with 'promoting human rights', 'improving standards of living', 'promoting world-wide arms control', 'strengthening the United Nations', and 'combating world hunger' define a community factor; that questions dealing with 'maintaining military strength', 'strengthening friendly nations', 'defending our own security', 'defending our allies' security', and 'containing communism' define a security factor; and that questions dealing with 'keeping up the value of the dollar', 'protecting American jobs', 'securing energy supplies', and 'protecting American business' define a prosperity factor. Squaring the factor loadings associated with each question under each factor delivers the per cent correspondence between the responses to each question and the hypothesised factor or dimension.

The minor deviations of the composite from the target matrix can be explained by the fact that some questions more closely define one particular dimension than do others. For example, we expect that Question S6, which concerns the protection of weaker nations, will be interpreted as involving a security issue. Figure 2.3 shows that many respondents did indeed interpret the question that way. However, some people considered this question to involve a community issue. Perhaps the difference in interpretation is a consequence of ambiguity in the language – if emphasis is placed on the words 'protecting' and 'aggression', the question may elicit opinions towards the use of military force, which is primarily an issue of security; if emphasis is placed on the words 'weaker nations', the question may elicit opinions towards US relations with less developed countries, which is more of a community issue. It is important to keep in mind that individuals are always generally motivated to pursue all three basic foreign policy goals and thus their positions on all three dimensions of motivational disposition may play a role in shaping their opinions. That is why, in order to predict such opinions, it is advisable to consider all three dimensions of motivational disposition.

Figure 2.3 Number of times each question actually defines factors at the 0.40 level or higher in the composite matrix.

Efforts to replicate the above results using more recent survey data have been frustrated by the fact that the CCFR has changed some of the questions asked in its surveys. Such modifications, which are intended to capture expected changes in opinions after the end of the Cold War, make it difficult to compare the results of analyses based on survey data from different periods. By dropping key questions in 1990 and 1994 the CCFR has made it impossible to determine to what extent differences in findings concerning the structure of responses are caused by actual changes in basic foreign policy dispositions resulting from the new post-Cold War situation and to what extent they depend on the particular mix of questions asked in each year.¹⁶

Chittick and Billingsley have analysed the 1994 public survey data, again using principal component factor analysis followed by a VARIMAX rotation.¹⁷ This analysis is based on the responses to sixteen foreign policy goal questions. The results are shown in Table 2.1.

These results are interesting, because the factor analysis now produces four factors rather than the three expected. The security factor, which had usually been strong, emerges here as weak and divided. Factor I is labelled community; Factor II prosperity; Factor III global security; and Factor IV national security.¹⁸ Since this survey was taken in late 1994, some time after the end of the Cold War, it is interesting not only to examine which questions are associated with each basic motive but also to compare some of the items in this solution with the same items used in the solutions obtained during the Cold War. As many of the questions used here have a history, as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, we can identify some of the specific changes which have occurred in this most recent factor matrix. With respect to the prosperity factor, two of the individual items, 'protecting American jobs' and 'protecting American business' are old items which habitually define this factor. But two new items have been added, which has led to a strengthening of the factor. It is interesting that both 'illegal drugs' and 'immigration' are defined as economic issues.

Most change has occurred with respect to the security dimension. Two questions that have a history of simultaneously defining both the community and the security dimension (Factors I and IV respectively) continue to do so. These are the questions on 'protecting weak nations' and 'bringing democracy to others'. The 'weak nations' question (S6), as mentioned above, is particularly susceptible to varying interpretations. The question on 'democratic government', however, is in some ways the most interesting of all, because of its mixed history. In 1974 (Vietnam) the public viewed it as a security question and in 1978 (Carter) as a community question. In 1982 and 1986 (Reagan) the question defined both security and community with the loading on security slightly higher. These, of course, were the days when democracy was contrasted with communism in the context of the Cold War security stand-off.¹⁹ Now, in the post-Cold War context, the question clearly defines the community dimension (Factor I).

Table 2.1 Rotated factor matrix based on 1994 CCFR public data on foreign policy goals

	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV
Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations	0.71937	-0.01038	0.04998	-0.02285
Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	0.66861	-0.12232	0.10449	0.10076
Combating world hunger	0.66710	0.11685	0.10414	-0.06670
Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression	0.58965	-0.04535	-0.02126	0.43109
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	0.58667	0.11290	-0.03736	0.37862
Strengthening the United Nations	0.42234	0.20483	0.38283	0.06555
Protecting the jobs of American workers	0.02005	0.77221	0.11020	-0.00511
Stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the US	0.02898	0.66933	0.09995	-0.09113
Controlling and reducing illegal immigration	-0.11742	0.60851	0.14487	0.23493
Protecting the interests of American business abroad	0.15135	0.58047	-0.05165	0.24891
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons	0.12286	0.03263	0.68389	0.11085
Reducing our trade deficit with foreign countries	-0.05351	0.07167	0.63294	0.16870
Improving the global environment	0.45101	0.03815	0.58523	-0.26345
Securing adequate supplies of energy	0.02211	0.27554	0.48020	0.33588
Maintaining superior military power world-wide	-0.03613	0.17159	0.15266	0.70673
Defending our allies' security	0.27589	0.03527	0.22990	0.61745
Per cent variance explained	21.9	12.8	7.5	7.1

This mixed history suggests that such 'ideologically loaded' questions might be used as 'marker' variables to identify the most salient dimensions or factors at a given time.²⁰

One question, 'United Nations', that has consistently defined the community dimension (Factor I) now defines the new global security dimension (Factor III). We can explain the new interpretation of the 'United Nations' question in terms of international events. In the three years prior to this survey, the United Nations launched more peacekeeping missions than it had in the previous four decades of the Cold War. It is not too surprising then that this issue now defines global security almost as well as community. It is also noteworthy that the 'environmental' and 'energy' questions now contribute to the definition of the new global security dimension (Factor III). The 'environment' question had not been used in public surveys prior to 1990, but in elite surveys it had consistently defined a community dimension (Factor I). The 'energy' question has had a mixed history, defining the prosperity dimension in 1974 and 1982, and the security dimension in 1978 and 1986. This may be because, while the reference to energy suggests a prosperity issue, the term 'securing' suggests a security dimension. The fact that both of these questions now best define a global security dimension (Factor III) may indicate that the concept of security is being redefined in order to encompass new threats which may be considered just as worrisome as the traditional military concerns captured in Factor IV.²¹ Finally, it is not surprising that 'military power' and 'nuclear weapons', new questions, and 'allies' security', an old question, define the security factor. However, it is interesting that the 'trade deficit', a relatively new question, which had previously defined the prosperity dimension, is now also viewed as a security issue.

The above four-factor solution does not produce a simple structure. That is, the factor scores produced by this factor matrix include at least five items that define more than one of the factors at the 0.30 level or higher. Since some respondents are reading all five of these questions differently at least, their inclusion in subsequent analysis would pose difficulties for the interpretation of results. In order to attain a simpler structure, the authors eliminate the five questions that do not discriminate clearly between factors.²² When the eleven remaining questions are analysed, using the same method, they define three factors as expected. The results are shown in Table 2.2.

The resulting factors generally represent our three dimensions: Factor I is pro-involvement-anti-involvement in the prosperity domain; Factor II multilateralism-unilateralism in the community domain; and Factor III militarism-non-militarism in the security domain. The 1994 solutions (Table 2.2) thus generally reconfirm that we can identify three basic dimensions in foreign policy opinion, which we can relate to our three

Table 2.2 Rotated factor matrix, using reduced foreign policy goal questions for CCFR 1994 public data

	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
Protecting the jobs of American workers	0.78304	0.02021	0.07147
Stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the US	0.67018	0.01867	0.02155
Controlling and reducing illegal immigration	0.60476	-0.19084	0.28039
Protecting the interests of American business abroad	0.59493	0.13856	0.10996
Combating world hunger	0.13806	0.75904	0.02221
Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations	0.00541	0.75292	0.04477
Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	-0.09133	0.67848	0.18656
Maintaining superior military power world-wide	0.19251	-0.04462	0.62713
Defending our allies' security	0.05148	0.26678	0.61679
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons	0.04596	0.16047	0.60989
Reducing our trade deficit with foreign countries	0.09009	-0.02623	0.59315
Per cent of variance explained	21.8	15.8	10.0

motivational themes. Second, this analysis demonstrates that the issue contents of the three goal domains change over time as people redefine issues in terms of their changing circumstances. The instability of the initial factor matrix (Table 2.1) illustrates the extent to which key items used during the Cold War, as for example the question on 'containing communism', may lose their meaning as a result of changed circumstances. Others become interpreted in terms of different goals. This underscores the need to include multiple and varied items in order to define our goal domains. It also serves to remind us that individuals' positions with respect to all three basic foreign policy goals should be considered when attempting to predict their reactions to novel situations or events.

Predicting the content of public opinion

The ultimate goal of the framework presented here is, of course, not only to determine the structure of foreign policy opinion in general, but also to use the resulting factor scores to predict specific opinions. Since both the Cold War and the post-Cold War data analyses have produced independent factors, some might argue that we can explain the opinions expressed in the security domain, for example, mainly if not exclusively with reference to the factors measuring militarism–non-militarism. However, that loses sight of the fact that although these factors are independent of one another, they measure different aspects of foreign policy motivation in the same human beings. Recall that foreign policy analysts who assume the operation of only one type of relevant motive are soon compelled to consider other types of motives as well. Thus, we foresee the need to use all three factors in accounting for foreign policy opinions regardless of how we might classify a particular issue.

Using factor scores derived from an analysis of the CCFR elite and public data sets for 1982, Chittick *et al.* have shown that all three dimensions are useful in predicting individuals' behavioural intentions involving hypothetical situations during the Cold War.²³ Responses to the following questions were used as dependent variables: (1) 'Do you think giving military aid to other countries generally helps our own security?' (2) 'Would you favour or oppose the use of US troops if the Arabs cut off all oil shipments to the United States?' and (3) 'Do you think it will be best for the future of our country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?'²⁴ The response sets were, respectively, 'yes', 'no', and 'don't know'; 'favour', 'oppose', and 'don't know'; and 'active part', 'stay out', and 'not sure'.

The authors employ logit analyses to compare the utility of models based on one-, two-, and three-factor solutions for predicting the opinions of individuals on each of these three foreign policy issues. They are able to show that per cent prediction error is consistently reduced by employing models that include all three dimensions. Thus, statistical analysis indicates that all three dimensions contribute significantly to an explanation of the polled individuals' opinions.²⁵ This confirms our expectation that actors' positions on all three dimensions should be taken into account when trying to explain or predict foreign policy opinions – any other approach which is more limited in scope will produce inferior explanations and predictions. Chittick and Billingsley have updated this kind of analysis by showing that factor scores derived from the factor matrix shown in Table 2.2 can predict responses to policy-relevant questions asked in 1994 (Chittick and Billingsley 1995). Using one-way analysis of variance with positive and negative scores on each of the three factors shown in Table 2.2, they find that all three dimensions are significant in accounting for the differences among individuals' opinions on most issues. We will

F	G	C	B
1.15** (129)***	1.17 (149)	1.38 (128)	1.30 (170)
E	H	D	A
1.16 (299)	1.22 (216)	1.52 (196)	1.38 (217)

* The F ratio is 18.3656 with an F probability of 0.0000.

** Weighted cases with scores of +0.2 to -0.2 on the identity dimension were filtered out.

*** 753 cases were considered missing because they either had no opinion or volunteered that it depends on the circumstances.

Figure 2.4 Mean differences among individuals favouring (+1) or opposing (+2) 'US taking part in UN peacekeeping efforts', using one-way analysis of variance* (number of cases in parentheses).

briefly summarise the main results of the analyses of responses to those two questions, which deal specifically with foreign policy issues involving the use of force.

The first of these questions asked whether or not the US should take part in UN peacekeeping efforts. Respondents could either favour (1) or oppose (2) taking part.²⁶ The results are shown in Figure 2.4. As we should expect, the results show that multilateralists (Types E, F, G and H) are more likely than unilateralists (Types A, B, C and D) to recommend that the US take part in UN peacekeeping operations. Also, militarists (Types A, B, E and F) are more likely than non-militarists (Types C, D, H and G) to favour US participation in UN peacekeeping actions. Finally, not surprisingly, those who are pro-involvement (Types B, C, F and G) are more likely than those who are anti-involvement (Types A, D, E and H) to favour US participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

The second question asked whether or not respondents favoured using US troops if Russia invaded Western Europe. Those who favoured such action received a score of 1; those who opposed, a score of 0.²⁷ The results are shown in Figure 2.5. As expected, militarists (Types A, B, E and F) are more willing than non-militarists (Types C, D, G and H) to favour using troops. Those who are pro-involvement (Types B, C, F and G) are more likely than those who are anti-involvement (Types A, D, E and H) to favour using troops. There is no apparent difference between unilateralists (Types A, B, C and D) and multilateralists (Types E, F, G and H).

These results confirm our suspicion that political opinions concerning the use of force are based on complex dispositions, involving at least two of the three motives stipulated in our framework. In general, those individual relationships between motivational dispositions and foreign policy opinions, which have been statistically observed, are in accord with our theoretical expectations.

F	G	C	B
0.75** (173)***	0.43 (203)	0.41 (185)	0.71 (226)
E	H	D	A
0.63 (449)	0.36 (381)	0.36 (273)	0.61 (324)

* F Ratio is 27.7354 with an F probability of 0.0000.

** Cases with scores between +0.2 and -0.2 were filtered out on the security dimension.

*** 175 weighted respondents were not included because they were 'not sure'.

Figure 2.5 Mean differences among individuals favouring or opposing 'Using US troops if Russia invades Western Europe', using one-way analysis of variance* (number of cases in parentheses).

Conclusion

We believe that individual differences with regard to basic motivational dispositions are the source of a three-dimensional pattern, which can help define the content of public opinion regarding foreign policy. As demonstrated above, it is at least plausible to think of public opinion with respect to foreign policy issues as structured along three dimensions which are explicable in terms of motivational dispositions towards three basic foreign policy goals. We are also able to show that it seems useful to consider all three of these dimensions when predicting both public and elite opinions. We emphasise the importance of a theory-guided and empirically defensible judgement of the structure of public opinion, as it is becoming more commonplace for analysts to use structural factors, rather than the usual demographic variables such as age, gender, and income, in order to explain foreign policy opinions. Information on the structure of public opinion is also considered relevant for predicting opinion change.

It was argued in Chapter 1 that much of the recent interest in the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy stems from the notion that both American and European public opinion have been affected by dramatic changes in the international situation, although such an impact could not yet be demonstrated.²⁸ It is at least possible that dramatic events such as the end of the Cold War may be able to cause more significant changes in public opinion on foreign policy than most opinion analysts have found so far. Unfortunately, the true nature and causes of such changes are impossible to determine without the data necessary for cross-period comparison. For example, answers to questions concerning the impact of the Vietnam War on US public opinion have not been entirely satisfactory because of the insufficiency of pre-Vietnam base-line data.²⁹ Another possible problem has been conceptual. Changes in opinion are

usually conceptualised as linear. Where data are available, the most common method for gauging changes in public opinion is to look for marginal variance in the percentage of persons expressing a given opinion on the same question at two different points in time. However, we suspect that dramatic changes can occur, and not become observable this way. We believe that in order to demonstrate that little or no opinion change has occurred one must show that there has been no significant change in the underlying structure of opinions (Chittick and Billingsley 1990).

Motive dispositions are a relatively stable factor in the formation of specific opinions, since they are fundamental in a person's basic orientation towards the international environment. However, such dispositions may still change, not only across generations, but also in response to dramatic events and developments. In such a case, individuals' positions can be thought of as shifting along one or more of our dimensions.

It seems, for example, at least worthwhile pondering the possibility that the initial popularity of the 'new' types of military involvement – peace-enforcing, peacekeeping, and peace-supporting missions – partly reflected a popular simultaneous shift towards multilateralism and pro-involvement. However, we suspect that the actual experience with such missions in Bosnia and elsewhere may have led some individuals to reconsider the effectiveness of such measures, and to prefer prolonged negotiations before any use of force. Thus, all three of our dimensions may affect individuals' views and changes in public opinion concerning the collective use of force outside NATO.

We expect that if the salience of policy goals changes in political discourse, be it through the manipulations of political decision makers trying to garner support for their policies or otherwise motivated strategies involving the dissemination of information to the public, so may public opinion fluctuate. Thus, for example, if a sector of the population which supports a military intervention for humanitarian reasons (community goal) becomes convinced that in truth the war is being fought for military influence (security goal), those within that sector who are non-militarists will become more likely to withdraw their support. Research on the 'casualty hypothesis' might profit from this somewhat more complex view of public opinion, as it might help explain why public support can be withdrawn during the course of military involvement.

Finally, our perspective has some implications for the controversy between the 'realist' and 'liberal' approaches to the judgement of the proper role for public opinion in the foreign policy decision-making process. 'Realists' or 'traditionalists' are concerned about mood swings in public opinion that could prevent decision makers from pursuing the best foreign policy in a given situation. Ironically, one of the best examples for such a mood swing occurred in the late 1970s in the US, when the Committee on Present Danger and the Coalition for Peace Through Strength convinced many Americans that the Soviet Union was spending more on

defence than the United States, and would soon overtake them in the arms race (Skidmore 1993). By 1983, however, public resistance to a strongly unilateralist, militarist, and pro-involvement foreign policy led the Reagan administration back towards moderation. In the Gulf War, the Bush administration led the American public to focus on the acceptability of using force against Iraq (community issue) rather than its ultimate military effectiveness and likelihood of success (security issue). Although this strategy proved effective in marshalling public support in the short term, it did not help build long-term public support.³⁰

Both of these examples involving the manipulation of public opinion illustrate how a multidimensional structure provides public opinion with a greater degree of underlying stability than a one- or even two-dimensional structure. While it is certainly possible to distort public opinion in the short term, such efforts are not likely to change underlying perceptions of the international environment or orientations towards basic foreign policy goals or strategies, and may even be counterproductive in the long term.

Since the structure of elite and public opinion is similar,³¹ there is at least some hope that the relationship between the opinions of the general public and the choices of foreign policy decision makers in mature democracies can be characterised by a degree of mutual understanding and predictability. However, we cannot expect the consideration of public opinion in foreign policy making to have a beneficial effect if we fail to understand its nature. Nor can we govern in accordance with democratic expectations if we fail to understand the general sources of public opinion and the rules by which opinions change. Our study of the role of basic motivation in the formation of foreign policy opinion attempts to make a small contribution to the development of such an understanding.

Notes

- 1 Chittick, Billingsley and Travis have alluded to the fact that each of our three dimensions is explicable in terms of a basic human motive. See Chittick *et al.* (1995). This chapter develops the idea more fully.
- 2 We conceive 'public opinion' to consist of views on specific foreign policy issues, as they can be measured through public opinion polling. Specific opinions are determined by more general psychological dispositions. Such dispositions take many forms, which we might refer to, for example, as 'attitudes', 'beliefs', or 'motivations'. They cannot be measured directly but have to be inferred from expressed opinions or from observations of behaviour.
- 3 See, for example, McClelland and Steele (1973). On the motive of power see especially Winter (1973) and McClelland (1975). On the motive of achievement see especially McClelland *et al.* (1953) and Atkinson (1966).
- 4 See, most prominently, Morgenthau (1993).
- 5 Some prefer to think of constructivism as a methodology rather than a substantive theory. It can be both, insofar as it includes both epistemological and ontological tenets. We are here more interested in the latter.
- 6 See, for example, Kennedy (1998).

- 7 Vasquez critiques the balance-of-power research programme of Waltzian neo-realism.
- 8 It is important to keep in mind that the goal of isolation is pursued with reference to prosperity interests. This is of course not to say that weak nations will not often conclude alliances with friendly stronger ones in pursuit of increased security.
- 9 See also Chapter 3 by Zoltán Juhász in this volume.
- 10 As suggested, for example, by Karin Gilland's study of Irish neutrality in Chapter 6 of this volume, a lack of clear distinction between analytical categories such as unilateralism and nationalism, or multilateralism and internationalism, serves to 'muddle' such concepts, rendering them useless as tools for explanation or prediction.
- 11 The authors acknowledge Lee Ann Pingel's valued contribution to the image of the cube in Figure 2.1.
- 12 See Chapter 1.
- 13 See Holsti and Rosenau (1984) for a description of the Holsti-Rosenau data and Chittick and Billingsley (1989) for a description of the Chittick data.
- 14 The same questions were not asked in every survey.
- 15 The foreign policy goal questions used in each individual survey and the results of each separate analysis are shown in Appendix A in Chittick *et al.* (1995).
- 16 The question on 'combating world hunger' was dropped in 1990, and the questions on 'containing Communism' and 'worldwide arms control' were dropped in 1994, weakening the militarism-non-militarism factor. As a consequence, it has been impossible to compare the factor structures derived at these two points in time with those derived earlier, since comparison requires that identical items be used and because the number of identical items was already at the minimum threshold. See Chittick and Billingsley (1990).
- 17 Chittick and Billingsley (1995).
- 18 Richman *et al.* (1997) obtain similar results, but they label their factors quite differently.
- 19 The factor matrices for each of the four public surveys may be found in Chittick *et al.* (1995).
- 20 At this time we know of no other ways of identifying the relative importance of factors irrespective of the number and kind of survey questions asked.
- 21 It is at least possible that after a period of redefinition, factors III and IV might once again merge to represent a new overall conception of security.
- 22 These are the questions on weak nations, the environment, securing energy, United Nations, and democratic government.
- 23 Chittick *et al.* (1995). The best simple factor structures were achieved using the 1982 data.
- 24 No data from elite interviews were available on this question in 1982.
- 25 See also Chittick and Billingsley (1996). The authors conducted a survey among participants in the APSA Convention in Chicago in 1995, just after NATO employed air strikes against Serbian forces near Sarajevo. In this case the factor scores used to measure the three dimensions are based on only a few questions, limiting the analysis to the two dimensions of community and security. Using multiple regression analysis, Chittick and Billingsley find that both of these factors are significant in accounting for opinions on NATO air strikes.
- 26 A total of 753 responses were considered missing because respondents either professed no opinion or answered that the acceptability of US participation in UN peacekeeping efforts depends on the circumstances.
- 27 A total of 175 respondents were excluded because they were 'not sure'.

- 28 For example, Ole Holsti reports that in US public opinion since the end of the Cold War there has been a greater degree of continuity than of change. See Holsti (1997). See also Chapter 7 in this volume, in which Tamar Hermann finds little change in Israeli attitudes towards the use of force since the Oslo Agreement.
- 29 The most detailed study of these questions is Holsti and Rosenau (1984). Unfortunately, the authors were forced to ask their respondents to indicate retrospectively what their opinions were at the beginning of the war.
- 30 It should be recognised that both the US Congress and the public were divided on the issue of the use of force right up until the 15 January 1991 Security Council deadline.
- 31 See Chittick *et al.* (1995).

3 German public opinion and the use of force in the early 1990s

Zoltán Fehér

Introduction

Since 1990 German foreign and security policy has increasingly been emancipated from the inheritance of German history and the Cold War era. The repeated participation of German military forces outside the NATO alliance territory is a clear indicator of these fundamental changes. The most recent step in this almost ten-year-old development of out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr* was the decision of the German parliament to support the KFOR troops in Kosovo with up to 8,500 German soldiers. This decision is particularly noteworthy, since it was agreed upon by a left-wing coalition government, whose members until recently were strongly opposed to German out-of-area missions. Moreover, this change in policy outlook took place in the context of a war against Yugoslavia that was not sanctioned by the United Nations. Finally, in the Kosovo conflict German soldiers were not only deployed in supplying humanitarian aid and to support the military allies, but they also actively participated in actual fighting, that is to say, in about 390 sorties they tried to destroy Serb communication centres. Altogether this means that, ten years after the end of the Cold War, out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr* are endorsed by almost every political party in Germany.

The support for the use of force was, however, not limited to the political elite but also widespread among the population. One reason for the strong acceptance was probably the declared goal of this mission, namely the intention to end a humanitarian disaster. Accordingly, the public approval of the NATO bombing in Yugoslavia remained around 60 per cent almost during the whole period of the war in Kosovo.¹ This high agreement is so much more remarkable when one considers that at the beginning of the air attacks the majority of the population was rather uncertain whether the air strikes would eventually lead to the retreat of Yugoslavia; and even in the later phase of the conflict, public opinion remained divided in this respect. Although there seems to be a basic approval by the German population of out-of-area missions, the degree of support can easily be affected. The damage caused by NATO forces