

- 28 For example, Ole Holsti reports that in US public opinion since the end of the Cold War there has been a greater degree of continuity than of change. See Holsti (1997). See also Chapter 7 in this volume, in which Tamar Hermann finds little change in Israeli attitudes towards the use of force since the Oslo Agreement.
- 29 The most detailed study of these questions is Holsti and Rosenau (1984). Unfortunately, the authors were forced to ask their respondents to indicate retrospectively what their opinions were at the beginning of the war.
- 30 It should be recognised that both the US Congress and the public were divided on the issue of the use of force right up until the 15 January 1991 Security Council deadline.
- 31 See Chittick *et al.* (1995).

3 German public opinion and the use of force in the early 1990s

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Introduction

Since 1990 German foreign and security policy has increasingly been emancipated from the inheritance of German history and the Cold War era. The repeated participation of German military forces outside the NATO alliance territory is a clear indicator of these fundamental changes. The most recent step in this almost ten-year-old development of out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr* was the decision of the German parliament to support the KFOR troops in Kosovo with up to 8,500 German soldiers. This decision is particularly noteworthy, since it was agreed upon by a left-wing coalition government, whose members until recently were strongly opposed to German out-of-area missions. Moreover, this change in policy outlook took place in the context of a war against Yugoslavia that was not sanctioned by the United Nations. Finally, in the Kosovo conflict German soldiers were not only deployed in supplying humanitarian aid and to support the military allies, but they also actively participated in actual fighting, that is to say, in about 390 sorties they tried to destroy Serb communication centres. Altogether this means that, ten years after the end of the Cold War, out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr* are endorsed by almost every political party in Germany.

The support for the use of force was, however, not limited to the political elite but also widespread among the population. One reason for the strong acceptance was probably the declared goal of this mission, namely the intention to end a humanitarian disaster. Accordingly, the public approval of the NATO bombing in Yugoslavia remained around 60 per cent almost during the whole period of the war in Kosovo.¹ This high agreement is so much more remarkable when one considers that at the beginning of the air attacks the majority of the population was rather uncertain whether the air strikes would eventually lead to the retreat of Yugoslavia; and even in the later phase of the conflict, public opinion remained divided in this respect. Although there seems to be a basic approval by the German population of out-of-area missions, the degree of support can easily be affected. The damage caused by NATO forces

to the uninvolved and the civilian population, for example, had a detrimental effect on the public's approval. The short-term but noticeable decline in public support after the inadvertent NATO bombings of the Chinese embassy or of civilian targets is a clear indication of this dependence. The support for foreign military engagements is, however, even more likely to be related to the expected and actual own losses in material and human lives. This is suggested by the large majority of Germans who opposed any deployment of ground troops to enforce the war goals in Kosovo. Another hint of the impact of expected human losses on the support is the decline of public approval for the air strikes, as well as for the dispatching of ground troops whenever the involvement of German soldiers was explicitly mentioned.² Therefore, it seems that the high support for German out-of-area missions so far can be explained by the fact that the *Bundeswehr* was involved in foreign missions for the 'right reasons' and because no German military personnel have been killed in action yet. The overall public approval should not obscure the fact, however, that opposition predominated and still prevails in certain segments of the German population. The latest bombardment of Yugoslavia was, for instance, less supported in the eastern states, and among the supporters of the PDS (*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus*) it was overwhelmingly scorned. Also, despite the direct responsibility of their party for the actual military deployments, many members and supporters of the *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* vehemently rejected the German military involvement in Kosovo, since they still felt obligated to their pacifist tradition.

This short overview of recent developments helps to raise the major questions discussed in this chapter. First of all, the impact of the changes in the foreign and defence policy situation since 1990 will be analysed. In the descriptive part, the perceptions of the population towards the new foreign and security policy challenges will be investigated. Then, changes in the support for the compulsory military service and in the general willingness to defend the country will be outlined. Of particular interest will be the public's attitudes towards specific out-of-area missions.

The second major task will be to identify the relevant determinants of public support for the use of force and for out-of-area missions. For this purpose, a hierarchical model of attitude structure will be introduced. An empirical examination of all these questions will be carried out on the basis of data from the early 1990s. Several arguments support this decision. Foremost, the available data for this period are rather extensive. Furthermore, the historical setting in this time period includes several out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr* and probably the most intensive discussion about the use of force publicly and in the media since unification. Finally, this period also seems to be well suited to the investigation of possible differences and processes of convergence in the contents and structure of the foreign and security attitudes among the citizens in the eastern and western parts of Germany. Before the underlying theoretical

arguments of the study and the presentation of the empirical results are discussed, a short overview of the historical setting will be given.

Overview of German out-of-area missions

Due to the particular historical, political and geographical situation of Germany, public attitudes towards the use of force were hardly of any concern until the reunification in 1990. For decades German foreign and security policy was shaped by the East-West conflict and all governments had to adhere to the interests of the Western allies. Nevertheless, the question of German involvement in solving international conflicts by military means was raised earlier. Already in 1982, Germany signed the Wartime-Host-Nation-Agreement with the US, after the Americans demanded a stronger military engagement from their European partners. This agreement granted German civil and military support for American troops in case of US out-of-area operations. Shortly after the signing of the agreement, Chancellor Schmidt asked for a legal study to clarify the permissibility of German participation in out-of-area missions. This report concluded that the constitution (*Grundgesetz*) did not forbid the military involvement of the *Bundeswehr* outside the NATO territory when and if such a mission were carried out within the framework of a system of collective security. Despite this report, the prevailing defence policy consensus ruled out direct German involvement for the time being. During the first Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, the discussion about German out-of-area engagements intensified again, however. Again, the Western allies demanded from Germany active participation in the Persian Gulf. Direct involvement was disapproved, but as a symbolic gesture of solidarity, Germany deployed naval units in the Mediterranean.

With the breakdown of the GDR regime in 1989 and after the reunification of Germany in 1990 the political situation changed fundamentally. Germany regained full sovereignty and its foreign and security policy had to be re-oriented. The need for a rapid redefinition of German foreign and security policy was also fostered by a major challenge within a year. When the UN Security Council condemned the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq and decided on a military intervention, Germany had to decide on its role in this conflict. Direct deployment of German military personnel in the Gulf region was rejected once again because of the still unclear constitutional situation. To make up for insufficient active military involvement Germany promised financial and material help. Furthermore, air force units and missile defence systems were relocated to Turkey, army units provided humanitarian help within the framework of the action 'Kurdish Help' and later the navy participated in the international mine clearing action in the Arabian Gulf. This German reluctance was nevertheless disapproved of as opportunistic by some of the alliance partners.

During the intense public debate about the German role in the Gulf War, an 'Independent Commission for the Future Tasks of the *Bundeswehr*' presented its final report, in 1991. On the one hand, it confirmed the constitutionality of out-of-area missions, but on the other hand it demanded a broad political consensus for such actions. The deployment of medical personnel of the *Bundeswehr* to Cambodia in the framework of the UN mission formed the beginning of the German blue helmet activities. Soon afterwards the involvement of German soldiers began in former Yugoslavia. At first, German airforce planes brought aid to Sarajevo and navy ships helped to control the UN embargo against Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. These measures led to an intense domestic political discussion about the future of German foreign military deployments. Apart from the conflicts in the Balkans, and the request of the UN for a German rapid reaction force, the programmatic discussions within the various political parties contributed to the intense public debate. The then ruling conservative government turned down the UN request, even though in principle it was positively disposed to an active German role. In contrast, the opposition parties remained firmly opposed to any German out-of-area involvement.

Despite the domestic controversies, the Federal government decided to participate with German soldiers flying AWACS planes in control of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. This decision was the first reason for a complaint from the SPD and the FDP at the Constitutional Court (*Verfassungsgericht*) on grounds of unconstitutionality. Notwithstanding this complaint, the government complied with the request of the United Nations in the same month also to send *Bundeswehr* units to Somalia to support the supply of humanitarian aid, and to provide logistic assistance to the Italian troops. At the request of the SPD this decision was also submitted to the Court. Thus, the wars in the Balkans and Somalia gave a new urgency to the question of the constitutionality of the participation of the *Bundeswehr* in out-of-area missions. The Constitutional Court had to decide on three different cases within a short period of time: the deployment of the navy in the enforcement of the trade embargo against Yugoslavia in the Mediterranean; the involvement of German soldiers in AWACS reconnaissance flights in control of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina; and finally, the involvement of *Bundeswehr* units in the UN operations in Somalia (März 1993; Bähr and Biner 1994).

The Court first dealt with the issue of the deployment of German soldiers in AWACS reconnaissance flights in April 1993, although it did not immediately rule on the constitutionality of this mission. The demand for a temporary injunction was turned down as the lives of German soldiers seemed hardly threatened, while a withdrawal of German air force personnel could have led to a considerable loss of trust by the international community. For the Somalia decision of June 1993, the Constitutional Court decided on a requested injunction, as human losses among the German

soldiers could not be ruled out. More important than the temporary injunction was, however, its ruling on the question of its institutional competence. It determined that deployments of German military abroad would only be constitutional after previous agreement of the parliament. The general decision on the constitutionality of out-of-area missions was decreed in July 1994. Most importantly, it decided that out-of-area deployments of German forces by the government are covered by the constitution. Article 24/2 of the constitution permits such engagements, if they take place in the context of a system of collective security. At the same time, the Constitutional Court also required that parliament needs to decide on the issue before any deployment of forces can take place. Almost all political parties welcomed the ruling of the *Verfassungsgericht*. It also closely corresponded to public opinion in the early 1990s, since only a small minority of the population approved of deployment decisions being made by the government alone. The great majority of the citizens even felt that the parliament should require a two-thirds majority to take such decisions.³

All of these developments indicate that since 1990 Germany has quickly taken over a new role with respect to international crises. The wars in the Gulf, in the Balkans and in Somalia also left little time for prolonged considerations and adjustments. Since the 1990s the extent of German involvement has risen gradually. In the beginning, Germany carried out more or less only symbolic actions, then it concentrated on humanitarian aid, and recently it has been involved in actual combat. The decision of the Constitutional Court as well as the changes in the position of the political parties and the public contributed to this rapid development.

While a remarkable readiness to support out-of-area involvements of the *Bundeswehr* developed among the political elite and the general public, there are at least two factors that could in practice impede or prevent future foreign deployments of German military forces. First of all, the equipment of the *Bundeswehr* appears not to be fully suitable to carry out world-wide missions. The UN request in 1994 for the deployment of a German medical unit to Rwanda, for example, had to be turned down by the government due to the lack of ready-to-use equipment. In view of tight budgets, the build-up of a powerful, rapid reaction force is also rather improbable in the near future.

Furthermore, the willingness of the German government to engage in dangerous military missions is surely limited by the expected public reaction. This fear of public disapproval can be illustrated by several events. In 1993 the government decided to temporarily stop the German involvement in the air bridge to Sarajevo after the shooting down of an allied military plane. Also, its clear rejection of sending ground troops into Kosovo to carry out NATO's war aims was motivated by the fear of human losses. This seems to indicate that public opinion on the use of force has a considerable impact on the formulation and execution of out-of-area missions.

The study of foreign policy and security attitudes

Before 1990 relatively little effort was made to examine systematically the content and structure of German security attitudes, in spite of the fact that the German public is among the most often surveyed populations with regard to foreign and security policy attitudes (e.g. Jacobsen 1975; Zoll 1979; Meyer 1983; Rattinger and Heinlein 1986; Szabo 1983; Rattinger 1985, 1991; Schweigler 1985; Eichenberg 1989; Brooks 1990; Rattinger *et al.* 1995).

This is regrettable because, as was pointed out in Chapter 1, recent research has shown both the need for and the relevance of taking public opinion into account in the study of foreign policy and foreign policy making.⁴ As was also pointed out, the earlier widely spread pessimistic assessment of the role of public opinion has been questioned by numerous newer studies. The so-called revisionists also maintain that the public is well prepared to play an important role in the foreign and security policy decision-making process.

In the first paragraphs it was argued that it is now generally accepted that, even if the level of specific knowledge is low, political attitudes are well structured. This was argued and demonstrated, for instance, by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987). The hierarchical model of attitude organisation, which was first applied in the context of foreign policy attitudes by Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, will guide the analytic part of this contribution. These authors criticised the assumptions of the traditionalists particularly for two reasons. First, they argued that it would be necessary to limit the analysis of attitude structures to specific policy domains; otherwise it is hardly possible to detect any underlying mental connections. Moreover, if one does not restrict oneself to a particular domain, one might interpret spurious relationships between attitudes that are in fact mentally unconnected. Second, it is argued that one should differentiate among attitudes according to their level of generality. The reason for this resides in their presumptions about human nature and information processing. Hurwitz and Peffley see most people as cognitive misers in their information processing. That is to say, they constantly try to keep the costs of information gathering as low as possible. Therefore, the average citizen tries to find short cuts in the generation of his attitudes.

On the bases of these two hypotheses Hurwitz and Peffley propose a hierarchical model of attitude structure which differentiates between three levels of generality. On the most general level we find the so-called *core values*, which contain basic human values, such as the morality of warfare or ethnocentrism. It is assumed that almost everybody has rather firm and stable core values that strongly influence the different standpoints of the individual, in particular the so-called *postures*, which are found on the next level of abstraction. Postures, such as militarism and internationalism, depict the general strategies in obtaining the core values. Again, most

people are supposed to have, for instance, a fairly clear idea whether they support international involvement or rather military means to solve conflict on a general level. Finally, on the lowest level of abstraction, we find *opinions on specific policy issues*. On this level, many people might not have the necessary information to form clear and stable attitudes. Therefore, it is presumed that there is a causal link between the different levels. Hurwitz and Peffley assume that the core values directly influence the postures and these in turn affect the assessments of specific issues. Accordingly, a person who has not yet made up his mind on a specific policy issue can use his postures and in an indirect fashion his core values as guidance to form his opinion. If, for example, a person is asked to offer his opinion on the deployment of German ground forces in Kosovo he does not need to obtain detailed information about the goals of the mission, the type of deployment or the chances of success. For the formation of an attitude it might be enough to check one's more fundamental views about the use of military force, or whether one is generally in favour of the involvement of national forces in solving international conflicts. But even among those who are not dependent upon the formation of their opinions from more general convictions, usually a fairly close relationship between values, postures and specific issues exists, due to the general tendency of people to strive for consistency in their attitudes.

Before the underlying hierarchical model for the empirical analysis is described in greater detail, a few critical comments should be made. It is in fact highly plausible to expect close relationships among attitudes from a narrowly defined domain area. But how narrow should a domain be? Do highly correlated attitudes towards a confined issue area (e.g. deployment of forces abroad) constitute convincing evidence for the existence of a well-organised belief system? One could also argue that political sophistication is primarily determined by the very fact that attitudes towards diverse policy areas are organised consistently by taking into account their different trade-offs.

The second major assumption of the hierarchical model can also be questioned. Apart from the often discussed controversy about top-down and bottom-up causation, it seems also quite plausible that the major determinant of an attitude is not necessarily an attitude from a higher, but one from the same, or even a lower level of specificity. If a person has to evaluate the use of force in a specific case, he might, for instance, also be heavily influenced by historic analogies. Therefore, the general attitude towards the use of military force is probably highly influenced by specific international events. Thus, memories of the appeasement policy of the 1930s might, for example, encourage the use of force in order to prevent greater damage, while the experiences of the Vietnam War might cause one to be cautious in getting involved in a guerrilla war in the Third World.

Finally, the model by Hurwitz and Peffley does not discuss a direct link between core values and specific issues. This implies that values have at

most an indirect effect. This assumption is similarly questionable, since, if this were true, then it would be unnecessary to consider them in the explanation of specific issues at all. Notwithstanding these critical comments, the assumed hierarchical organisation of foreign policy and security attitudes is an interesting and promising model.

According to the hierarchical model, attitudes are grouped together on several levels, in keeping with their level of generality. On the lowest level of abstraction the following attitudes will be included in our model: the attitudes towards the support for the compulsory military service, the readiness to defend one's country and a number of opinions on specific out-of-area missions. These attitudes will be considered as the dependent variables. That is to say, they are dependent upon the attitudes from all higher levels of abstraction. In this respect the underlying model used here is different from the one described above, since variables from all levels are considered as potential determinants of the specific issues. Moreover, the variables with the greatest generality are assumed to have the potentially greatest effect, since they can exert a direct as well as an indirect effect on the attitudes on the lowest level of abstraction.

The independent variables are grouped together according to their generality. The level above the specific issues consists of three postures. These postures include the strategies, which relate to the 'whether', the 'how' and the 'with whom' in the implementation of foreign and security policy. *Internationalism* measures the general willingness to become involved in the solution of international conflicts. Indicators for this dimension are the demand for an active role for Germany in world politics or the disapproval of the opinion that Germany should worry primarily about its own problems. *Militarism*, as the second posture, concerns itself with the basic position towards the preferred means to settle international conflict. It is operationalised by the degree of belief that there is a fundamental need for military forces and on the general support for the use of military force. The third posture, *unilateralism*, finally indicates whether working together with other partners is preferred in foreign and security policy. A unilateralist is identified by his agreement with the argument that Germany should only worry about its own security.

At the highest level of abstraction, two core values, *nationalism* and *morality of warfare*, are grouped together with the perception of threat and ideological orientation. 'Nationalism' primarily indicates the strong identification with one's people and political system. It is operationalised by the conviction that Germany deserves a leading role in the world and by items which gauge the strength of patriotism. The core value 'morality of warfare' describes the degree of conviction whether it is at all possible to justify war. The acceptance of the legitimacy of war under certain circumstances and the view that killing in war is not murder are indicators for this core value. The 'perception of threat' and 'ideological orientation' have no direct relation to foreign policy attitudes. Nevertheless, they were included

on this highest level of abstraction, since they are supposed to stand in close relationship to basic foreign policy beliefs. Threat perception was measured by the evaluation of the past and the future overall security situation and by the expectation of war within the next ten years, while the ideological orientation was ascertained by the self-placement of the respondents on the left-right scale. The only exogenous variables in the model on the third level are three social-structure variables (sex, age and education). They serve as basic control variables for the social-psychological variables of the model.

The hierarchical conceptualisation of foreign policy attitude structure implies a strong relationship between specific issues and postures and core values. Since the direction of causation is assumed to be unidirectional, core values can affect both postures and specific attitudes, while postures can only influence the opinions towards specific issues. Of course, not all core values and postures are equally relevant for the explanation of particular attitudes. 'Morality of warfare' might, for example, be more effective in influencing an attitude towards an actual military action than towards a humanitarian mission of the *Bundeswehr*. Therefore it is one of the major aims of the empirical analysis to determine the relative impact of the different general attitudes on each specific attitude. The estimation of the effects will, however, depart from Hurwitz and Peffley's model, where primarily the effects between attitudes on neighbouring levels of generality were calculated. In the model underlying the following empirical analysis, first the total effects of the attitudes on the most general level will be estimated, before the explanatory power of the attitudes on the next level is determined. Furthermore, the hierarchical model also implies that specific issues will not be considered as potential causes of other specific issues.

Data and method

The database for the empirical analyses consists of a three-wave panel study, which was carried out in the early 1990s at the University of Bamberg within the framework of a DFG-funded research project. The main aim of the study was to broaden the database for the study of foreign and security policy attitudes. The almost 300 items that were put in each of the three waves referred directly to this policy field. Most questions were put repeatedly, but a number of additional items were included in the second and third wave to cover new events. The first interviews took place in the summer of 1992 (June, July), the second wave in early 1993 (February, March), and the last in autumn (October) of the same year. Altogether 2,089 people were questioned on the first occasion, of whom 1,111 could still be reached by the third series of interviews. The proportions of respondents from the eastern and western states were about equal in all three waves, although only about a fifth of the total German

population lives in the eastern part of the country. This over-sampling of the population from the 'new states' was necessary to allow for more detailed comparisons between sub-samples of the population in the east and the west.

The empirical analysis is divided into a descriptive and analytic part. In both sections, all results will be reported separately for the respondents from the east and the west. If one is interested in the results for Germany as a whole, the results for the west are, due to the distribution of the population, a good approximation. Whenever possible, the temporal stability of the attitudes was also considered. A continuous differentiation according to the temporal stability was, however, not possible, as several questions were not repeated. Whenever the temporal dimension of attitude change was not possible or was of no major concern, then all the available data have been utilised in the analysis. That is to say, if information was present from more than one wave of the panel, then the repeated answers of the respondents were used as multiple indicators of their attitude. However, only those respondents were included into the analysis, who repeatedly provided a valid answer to the respective question. This approach has been used for the descriptive as well as the analytic examinations. Consequently, the regression analysis was based on all those cases where individuals offered repeatedly valid information for the dependent variable, while all missing cases for the independent variables were substituted with the respective means.

Whenever possible, the indicators for the different concepts were composed of several items (see Appendix). For this purpose it was necessary to identify first substantially related questions and then test their empirical correlation. Once the substantial and empirical relationship was established, all the constituting variables were re-coded to the same value area and added together. The newly created dimensions were therefore additive compositions of the constituting items. All variables, no matter whether they were representing a single variable or an additive composition, have been further re-coded to a common value area, in order to ease the interpretation of the results. In the descriptive part of the chapter, the computations of the mean approvals were always based on variables with a value area between -1 and +1. Accordingly, a positive mean indicates approval whereas a negative mean implies disapproval. Similarly, all the dependent variables in the regression analysis have also the same value area between +1 and -1. Contrary to the dependent variables, all independent variables were re-coded to a value area between 0 and +1. These two values represent the extreme positions on the respective independent variable. This standardisation of the value areas allows us to ascertain the total effect of each independent variable by the unstandardised regression coefficients, and thereby also allows a cautious comparison of these coefficients. An unstandardised regression coefficient of 1, for example, shows a change between the extreme positions of the independent variable, which

can be compared in terms of its extent to a change between indifference and complete agreement. At each comparison, it is, however, important to keep in mind that the reported unstandardised regression coefficients always refer to the results in the stepwise regressions where the variable was first entered into the equation.

The estimation of the effects of the different determinants on the approval of foreign deployments was carried out by step-wise regression analyses. By using step-wise regressions instead of other statistical procedures, the model receives a few desirable properties. Although the hierarchical structure remains untouched, estimating the effect of the single variable always controls for the impact of other variables on the same level of generality. Also, it need not be assumed that all the explanatory power of a basic variable has to be completely transmitted through variables on less general levels. The step-wise inclusion of groups of independent variables was chosen to model the hierarchical attitude structure on four levels. In the first step, the total effects of social-structure variables were determined. In the second step threat perceptions and three basic attitude dimensions were included in the equation: 'ideological orientation', 'nationalism' and 'morality of warfare'. In the last step, the remaining effects of the three postures, 'militarism', 'involvement', and 'unilateralism', were calculated.

Findings

The future foreign and defence policy tasks

The post-Cold War situation forces all international actors to redefine their policies. As a fully sovereign state, Germany had also to adapt its foreign and security policy to the new circumstances. The *Bundeswehr* has to find a new role and to be restructured after the major enemy disappeared, and even the Atlantic Alliance as a whole has to find new tasks to justify its existence. The population seems to be well aware of these changes. On a general level the adoption of more German responsibility in five new foreign policy fields was supported almost without exception (Table 3.1). The demand for more engagement in world-wide environmental protection was consensual among an overwhelming majority of the population. Many respondents also strongly supported the intensification of the struggle against poverty in the Third World. Assistance to the eastern European countries in the reconstruction of their economies and the intensification of European integration were also considered by sizeable majorities to be an important future task, even though Germany had traditionally already been rather active in these policy fields. Finally, the adoption of more responsibility in securing peace world-wide by UN missions was also favoured by the average German. A clear majority in favour of international peacekeeping missions was, however, only present in the west.

Table 3.1 Adoption of more responsibility by Germany

	Approval ^a		Importance ^b	
	West	East	West	East
Environmental protection	0.63	0.75	47	54
Battle against poverty	0.43	0.50	17	18
Economic assistance for eastern Europe	0.35	0.38	12	14
European integration	0.24	0.17	7	5
UN peacekeeping	0.17	-0.04	17	10
N ^c	883	1079	865	1056

a Mean rating on a scale from -1 (disapproval) to 1 (approval).

b Proportion of respondents in per cent.

c Results are based on data from the second and third wave.

In the new states the respondents were more or less divided on this issue. The other differences between public opinion in the east and west were less pronounced. In the new states dedication to European integration was somewhat less developed than in the old states. In return, the easterners approved more of the improvement of environmental protection, of the battle against poverty and the reconstruction of the economy in eastern Europe.

The level of support for a new foreign policy task does not necessarily say anything about the perceived importance of this task. Nevertheless, there is a relationship between approval and perception of relevance. The more a foreign policy task was favoured, the more it was also considered to be important. Extended activities in environmental protection were not only the most accepted new policy for Germany but were also considered by about every other respondent as important. Compared to this, the weaker support for the intensification of the European integration process was rated relevant by about every twentieth respondent. The only exception to this pattern of relationship consists in the attitudes towards the use of the military in the framework of UN missions to secure peace. Although the adoption of more responsibility in this policy area had overall the least approval, it was considered relatively more important than some other more valued issues. In both parts of the country peacekeeping was considered more relevant than European integration and in the west even more than economic assistance to eastern Europe. This finding underscores the awareness of this truly new task in the post-Cold War world.

The perceived future foreign and defence responsibilities of Germany correspond to a large degree with the views about the expected new tasks of the *Bundeswehr* (Table 3.2). Apart from the real duty of every military force, which is to guarantee the protection of the country from attack, deployment in environmental protection and the provision of help in case of a catastrophe also received widespread approval. The parti-

Table 3.2 Future roles of the *Bundeswehr*

	Approval ^a		Importance ^b	
	West	East	West	East
Environment protection	0.64	0.73	22	21
Catastrophe help at home and abroad	0.61	0.68	28	28
Overseeing of cease-fires	0.32	0.24	10	6
Support of the police forces	0.32	0.36	11	17
Reconstruction of the east	0.20	0.53	9	17
UN missions to repress aggression	0.17	-0.08	9	5
Humanitarian UN missions	0.10	-0.09	5	5
World-wide missions to secure western interests	0.07	-0.25	5	2
N ^c	919	1073	1003	1152

a Mean rating on a scale from -1 (disapproval) to 1 (approval).

b Proportion of respondents in per cent.

c Results are based on data from the second and third wave.

icipation of the *Bundeswehr* in UN missions in the form of monitoring cease-fire agreements and the assistance of the police forces by the *Bundeswehr* were also supported in both parts of the country. The approval of these tasks was, however, noticeably weaker. The reconstruction of the eastern part of Germany received even less support, although the support in the east was remarkably high. With respect to the evaluation of future out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr*, support dropped even further. While the population in the west still approved of the different options, the average respondents from the east opposed them. They rejected the repression of aggression by UN missions as well as humanitarian missions, which could involve armed arguments. The disapproval became even more notable when world-wide deployments of the *Bundeswehr* to secure western interests were mentioned.

Despite a few irregularities, a relationship between approval and perceived importance also exists for the evaluations of the future tasks of the *Bundeswehr*. It is, for example, remarkable that the adoption of police tasks and especially the help in reconstructing the east were considered an important new field of activity for the *Bundeswehr* by an unexpectedly high proportion of citizens from the east. This finding suggests the desire of the respondents from the east to quickly improve economic and social conditions in the new states. Of course, such *Bundeswehr* missions are highly unlikely to take place, since they are not legally permissible.

The rating of the tasks concerning out-of-area missions is of special interest in this chapter. Each single option was considered as rather unimportant in both parts of the country. If all four options are added together, however, the relevance of military missions of the *Bundeswehr* becomes

Table 3.3 Most important tasks of NATO (in %)

	Region	
	West	East
Protection of member-states from attack	45	57
Out-of-area	39	32
Overseeing of arms control agreements	14	18
Overseeing of cease-fires	9	6
Creation of peace in civil war regions	9	6
Securing western interests world-wide	4	1
Securing western supply of resources	3	1
World-wide co-ordination	16	11
Co-ordination of economic policy	6	2
Co-ordination of foreign policy	4	4
Planning of defence expenditure	3	2
Co-ordination of aid for eastern Europe	2	2
Joint development of arms systems	1	1
N ^a	1389	1663

a Results are based on data from all three waves.

much more impressive. In the west about 30 per cent of the respondents decided on these options as most important, and in the east the respective proportion was still around 18 per cent.

Not only Germany and the *Bundeswehr*, but also the Western Alliance faces new challenges. Accordingly, the respondents were also asked about the most important future tasks of NATO (Table 3.3).

Quite naturally, the protection of member states from attack was mentioned most often. Overall, about every other respondent saw this as the most important task. The relevance of defence was rated, however, about 10 percentage points higher in the east than in the west. This difference probably refers less to a different evaluation of NATO's primary task, but indicates a greater awareness of the diversity of potential future tasks in the west. That is to say, the respondents in the west were more familiar with NATO, and were therefore more willing to opt for the remaining options. Despite this regional difference, the next three most important tasks were all related to deployments of military forces outside the NATO territory in both parts of the country. Overseeing of arms control agreements and cease-fires were considered by many as very important potential future assignments. In fourth position, presumably with foresight of future conflicts, peacekeeping in the civil war regions of eastern Europe and the Balkans was regarded already at that time as an important task. These results again stress the fact, that already at the beginning of the 1990s, many German citizens were well aware of the consequences of the changes in the international system. When the various options are viewed as a

whole, almost 40 per cent in the west and about one-third of the respondents in the east selected those tasks related to out-of-area assignments as the most important. Compared to the number of respondents favouring military options, only a minority, 16 per cent in the west and 11 per cent in the east, considered NATO primarily as an organisation, which helps to co-ordinate the foreign, defence and economic policies of the member states.

For all investigated international actors a number of new foreign policy tasks were all more or less approved and considered important. That is to say, the German public acknowledged Germany's new international responsibility and the need to find a new role for the *Bundeswehr* and NATO. Among the different policy options, approval for involvement in out-of-area military missions was present most of the time. Of course, a clear pattern of east-west differences also appeared. Whenever the use of force in out-of-area missions had to be evaluated, respondents from the east were less supportive than their counterparts in the west. The recent rejection of the German involvement in Kosovo seems to indicate that this regional difference might have persisted over the years.

The willingness to defend the country

Compulsory military service was introduced in Germany in 1956. For a long time the defence of the country was considered more or less the only task of the *Bundeswehr*. Today, this picture might change somewhat, due to the frequent German involvement in out-of-area missions. In this connection it has been questioned whether the traditional structure of the national forces is still adequate to meet the new challenges. Although until now only career and voluntary soldiers were involved in foreign deployments, the idea of a military that relies on the system of compulsory military service is difficult to reconcile with the idea of forces that operate world-wide. Therefore, the traditionally strong approval for the draft system might undergo a change. It is conceivable that approval will decrease as more and more citizens consider the compulsory military service as inappropriate to meet the challenges of global military engagements.

In the early 1990s the view that compulsory military service is an important civil duty was supported by more than half of the Germans (Table 3.4). Between 1992 and 1993 this support increased (slightly) even further. Most of this effect was due, however, to increasing support for compulsory military service in the east. In all three series of interviews, about one-quarter of the respondents in the new states were undecided in this respect, compared to less than 20 per cent in the old states. Despite this difference, compulsory military service was not only not unsettled by the new situation, but it even won somewhat in approval in the early 1990s. In the long run, however, decreasing acceptance cannot be ruled out, since the size of the *Bundeswehr* is likely to reduce further, and the new

Table 3.4 Approval of compulsory military service and willingness to defend the country (in %)^a

Panel	Compulsory military service						Willingness to defend					
	West			East			West			East		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Approval	55	55	57	49	50	53	60	61	69	55	56	60
Indifference	20	18	19	26	26	25	21	22	19	22	25	24
Disapproval	25	27	24	25	24	22	20	18	12	23	18	16
N	1013	681	503	1016	721	583	995	678	495	1005	714	583

a Due to rounding errors, percentages do not always add up to 100.

international tasks might require more specially trained soldiers. Therefore, these tendencies have the potential to undermine the support for the draft system. The repeated public discussions about the need to alter the structure of the *Bundeswehr* are a clear indication of potential changes.

The acceptance of the draft should not be directly equated with the willingness to defend one's country, since this readiness is logically not related to the domestic structure of the military forces. In Germany, the willingness to fight for one's country was widespread. About 60 per cent of the respondents agreed that everybody who is able should fight for his country in the event of war. Less than a fifth of the population disagreed with this statement. Even though the willingness to fight is not directly related to the attitudes towards the draft, the distributions of opinions and development of these two attitudes were rather similar. The willingness to defend the country was less widely dispersed in the east, and the proportion of undecided was likewise higher in the new states. Altogether, the willingness of the German population to defend their country and to support compulsory military service was high and even increasing. At least in the case of the evaluation of compulsory military service, the moderate changes also resulted in an alignment between east and west.

Support for out-of-area missions

With respect to public support for the deployment of military forces outside the territory of the Atlantic Alliance, one can distinguish between the general approval of such out-of-area missions and the support for actual deployments. According to the previous findings, one might expect at least some support for such deployments in the west. If the respondents, however, are confronted with the choice between the option of a world-wide deployment of the *Bundeswehr* to secure western interests and the option of the exclusive task of the *Bundeswehr* to defend Germany against an attack, then

Table 3.5 Support for out-of-area missions (in %)^a

Panel	<i>Bundeswehr</i>						NATO					
	West			East			West			East		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Approval	32	34	28	12	18	17	22	24	19	9	15	9
Indifference	14	16	15	8	12	10	18	22	23	14	18	17
Disapproval	55	50	57	80	69	73	60	54	58	77	67	74
N	992	666	496	1014	713	576	993	653	467	1002	709	583

a Due to rounding errors, percentages do not always add up to 100.

a strong scepticism towards foreign deployments was revealed. In the west, a third at most of the respondents tended towards such deployments, and in the east less than 20 per cent was ready to support such measures (Table 3.5). A clear trend is not recognisable for the early 1990s. Rather, the fluctuations between the interviews suggest the dependence of these attitudes on concrete events. Nevertheless, a slight convergence of the attitudes between east and west is observable, although the differences remain large. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that an unmistakable disapproval of foreign deployments of the *Bundeswehr* prevailed in the eastern states. The low number of undecided respondents in the east also supports this conclusion. The sceptical assessment of out-of-area missions was not limited to the deployment of the *Bundeswehr*. Likewise, a clear majority of the citizens were also convinced that NATO should be kept out of conflicts outside the NATO territory. The same pattern of differences appeared between east and west and over time. The disapproval of NATO engagements outside the territory of the member states was high, especially in the east, and no clear trend or process of alignment took place.

At the beginning of the 1990s in particular, three specific military conflicts stimulated the public debate about the deployment of military units abroad. During the fieldwork of the present study, between early summer 1992 and late autumn 1993, the Gulf War had already ended. However, this conflict affected the reflections of people about out-of-area missions, since Iraq had to be repeatedly asked to observe the no-fly zones. During the fieldwork the second conflict developed in Somalia, and its end could already be expected at the end of 1993, when the last interviews took place. The conflict in the Balkans was already in full swing at the time of the first series of interviews of the summer of 1992. During the next one and a half years the war became hardly less intense.

Looking back, the majority of the German population assessed the war against Iraq as justified (Table 3.6/Iraq 1), even though many people might have been concerned about the huge collateral damage. Military attacks by

Table 3.6 Attitudes towards UN missions (in %)^a

	<i>Iraq</i> 1	<i>Iraq</i> 2	<i>Somalia</i> 1	<i>Somalia</i> 2	<i>Bosnia</i> 1	<i>Bosnia</i> 2	<i>Bosnia</i> 3
	<i>War</i> <i>justified</i>	<i>Military</i> <i>attacks</i>	<i>UN</i> <i>deployment</i>	<i>German</i> <i>deployment</i>	<i>No-fly</i> <i>zone</i>	<i>Deployment</i> <i>of</i> <i>troops</i>	<i>Bombard-</i> <i>ment</i>
<i>Panel</i>	1	2&3	2&3	3	2&3	2&3	2&3
<i>West</i>							
Approval	61	66	70	52	58	51	40
Indifference	20	18	16	18	24	22	22
Disapproval	20	15	14	30	18	27	38
N	989	1133	1153	482	1118	1134	1142
<i>East</i>							
Approval	44	48	70	32	45	33	19
Indifference	24	21	18	28	23	19	19
Disapproval	32	31	13	40	32	49	67
N	959	1236	1281	551	1233	1255	1271

a Due to rounding errors, percentages do not always add up to 100.

the Gulf War allies, which were carried out because of Iraq's disregard of the UN resolutions after the war, found an even higher approval (Iraq 2). Yet, a clear-cut east-west difference surfaced. The approval rate to both questions was up to 20 percentage points less in the new states. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the sceptical views on the general idea of foreign deployments of the *Bundeswehr* and NATO are replaced by approval for actual out-of-area missions. People probably want to avoid such deployments, but once they recognise the legitimacy of a specific military action they are also ready to support it. They probably also approved of operation 'Desert Storm'. This mission could altogether be considered a success, since German soldiers were not fully excluded, and since there were no human losses on the German side. The fact that the general approval of the Gulf War turned out to be somewhat weaker than the support for the latter specific military actions need not surprise us, since the bombings were primarily carried out to enforce the no-fly zone in order to protect the Kurdish population.

The overwhelmingly positive assessment of the deployments of UN troops in Somalia was probably due to the mainly humanitarian character of this mission. In fact, this mission was very closely associated in the minds of most people with the saving of starving children. As a consequence, people in both east and west shared very similar views. About 70 per cent of the respondents supported the military protection for the distribution of aid goods (Somalia 1). At the same time, the proportion

of those who also approved the German involvement, was much lower (Somalia 2). In the west it sank by about 25 per cent and in the east by more than 50 per cent. This weakening of approval for a German deployment can be explained by at least two factors. First, the German public might very well recognise the need for military action to end a cruel civil war, but it might not be prepared to shoulder the corresponding responsibility. In addition, the decline in support might also be explained by the fear of human losses. In particular, the news about the killing of Pakistani UN soldiers by Somali rebels, shortly before the question about German participation was asked, might have further reduced the support for German involvement.

In the context of the Bosnian War, three items are available for comparison. They differ mainly with regard to the threat of concrete military violence. The first question measures the approval of the military enforcement of the UN-imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia (Bosnia 1). The next one asks about the support for a massive troop deployment in Yugoslavia to end the war (Bosnia 2). The last one measures the approval for the bombing of Serb troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia 3). The findings suggest that the relatively limited and less dangerous actions receive more approval. Consequently, the support for the supervision of the no-fly zone was the highest of the three. In comparison, fewer people approved a massive deployment of troops in the former Yugoslavia, and the threat of immediate use of force found least support. Again, the citizens living in the eastern part of the country were clearly less inclined to give their approval for these military actions. It is also notable that the difference between east and west further increased with the decreasing approval to the single questions. While the approval in the east reached about 75 per cent of the western level on the question of the no-fly zone, it sank to less than 50 per cent of the westerners on the question about the bombing of Serb troops.

Altogether, the willingness to fight for the country and the support for the draft in Germany have not been weakened by the recent changes in the international climate. Also, the population has recognised the new foreign and security policy challenges and supports the necessary measures most of the time. Although, on a general level, Germans are sceptical about out-of-area missions, they do not refuse their support for specific UN missions. Of course, this support is dependent on a number of factors, such as the success of the mission, the major goals, and probably also upon the expected or real losses of material and especially human lives.

Determinants of the willingness of active defence and support of foreign deployments

To explain the willingness to defend the country and the support of out-of-area missions, three social structure variables and seven attitude

Table 3.7 East-west differences among the independent variables

	<i>West</i>		<i>East</i>	
	<i>Mean</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>N</i>
Threat perception	0.56	1989	0.54 ^a	2131
Ideology	0.50	2204	0.59 ^b	2346
Core values				
Nationalism	0.49	2067	0.38 ^b	2147
Morality of warfare	0.45	2146	0.44	2269
Postures				
Internationalism	0.50	2138	0.47 ^b	2280
Militarism	0.54	2125	0.47 ^b	2272
Unilateralism	0.58	2167	0.60	2311

a $p < 0.01$.b $p < 0.001$.

dimensions will be considered. Before the discussion of the direction and the strength of these variables is presented, it is worthwhile looking at the levels of agreement on these dimensions and at potential differences between east and west. Table 3.7 contains the means for the seven attitude dimensions.

Values around 0.5 indicate a neutral position, while zero and 1 stand for extreme positions. In the early 1990s there was a slight tendency to perceive the international situation as somewhat more threatening in the west compared to the east. Of course, the overall level of fear was not high. Unlike the weak east-west difference in this respect, people had substantially different ideological orientations. While the average person in the west had a preference for the political centre, people in the east leaned ideologically to the left. The citizens in the new states were also notably less nationalistic, which was probably still the result of the only recently completed unification. Yet, the presumably different political socialisation in both parts of the country did not affect the moral evaluation of warfare. People from both parts of the country shared a scepticism about the moral justification of warfare. This agreement did not hinder them, however, from judging the military preparedness quite differently. On average, people in the west had a positive disposition towards the military, while in the east the attitudes were less supportive. Westerners were also more inclined to become involved internationally. In their assessment of the co-operation with other countries on security questions, both population groups were united again. The most notable differences between the east and west therefore existed with regard to the ideological orientations, and to nationalism and militarism. That is to say, citizens from the east were ideologically oriented to the left, they felt less affection for the nation, and they were less supportive of the military than the westerners.

Table 3.8 summarises the effects of the different independent variables on the indicators for the willingness to actively defend the country and the support of foreign deployments. A comparison of the first two columns shows that the effects of the independent variables on the willingness to fight for the country, and the acceptance of compulsory military service are very similar in both parts of the country. Among the three independent variables, age seemed to have the greatest impact. The willingness to defend and the approval of compulsory military service generally increased with age and declined with higher formal education and among females. While the effects of sex and education were comparable in both parts of the country, age played no statistically significant role in the explanation of the willingness to defend among respondents in the new states. This is somewhat surprising, since getting older is usually related to more militaristic orientations. However, the elderly in the east were more likely to have had higher positions in the GDR, thus being on the side of the losers in the unification of Germany. Therefore, their attachment to the country and their willingness to fight for it might not have developed so much.

When the effect of perceptions, ideology and core values is considered, after controlling for the social structure variables, the strong impact of moral persuasions with regard to warfare and nationalism shows up first. In particular, a firm attachment to the nation appears to be a guarantee of a pronounced willingness to fight and to strongly agree with compulsory military service. In contrast to the core values, threat perceptions had no effect in the west, and in the east perceiving the international climate as dangerous merely strengthened the willingness to retain compulsory military service. Political ideology also had a comparably minor impact. In the new states it was not a contributory explanation, while in the west the willingness to defend and the support for compulsory military service declined with left ideological positions. Despite the strong impact of core values, the postures had an additional explanatory power. Especially changes in attitudes towards the military caused a difference in the readiness to fight for the country. This relationship is quite obvious, since one would expect a person who accepts the general need for a national military force also to be ready to fight for his country. Contrary to militarism, the impact of internationalism and unilateralism is less obvious. In fact, internationalism exerted a weaker influence and unilateralism had almost no effect. In the east, a positive attitude towards international involvement was consistently related to both indicators of the readiness to defend, while in the west it was not related to the willingness to fight for one's country. Altogether, it can be presumed that in both parts of the country a strong national feeling, the acceptance of war as a political means, and agreement as to the use of force, are the most important determinants of the willingness to fight and the views on compulsory military service.

The remaining coefficients in Table 3.8 describe the effects of the independent variables on the different indicators for out-of-area missions. First,

Table 3.8 Determinants of the willingness to actively defend the country and of attitudes towards out-of-area missions^a

	Draft	Defence	Mean	Bundes- wehr	NATO	Iraq		Somalia		Bosnia		Mean	
						1	2	1	2	1	2		3
<i>West</i>													
Sex	-0.09	-0.10	-0.10	-0.04	-0.07	-0.07	-0.13	-0.04	-0.08	-0.17	-0.05	-0.16	-0.09
Age	0.39	0.20	0.30	0.02	-0.09	0.06	0.07	-0.04	-0.09	0.05	-0.04	-0.06	-0.02
Education	-0.20	-0.23	-0.22	-0.03	0.02	-0.23	-0.24	-0.03	-0.05	-0.12	-0.22	-0.27	-0.13
Perception	0.07	-0.08	-0.01	0.44	0.19	0.57	0.22	0.41	0.28	0.18	0.15	0.41	0.32
Ideology	-0.32	-0.21	-0.27	-0.45	-0.12	-0.52	-0.11	-0.07	-0.21	0.03	-0.15	-0.14	-0.16
Morality of war	0.53	0.28	0.53	0.12	0.24	0.05	0.14	0.22	0.27	-0.10	-0.05	-0.17	0.08
Nationalism	0.85	0.79	0.82	0.46	0.18	0.87	0.53	0.04	0.45	0.59	0.82	0.87	0.53
Internationalism	0.27	0.00	0.14	0.64	0.54	-0.13	-0.04	0.45	0.72	0.32	0.12	0.15	0.31
Militarism	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.42	0.03	0.67	0.49	0.39	0.49	0.40	0.33	0.43	0.41
Unilateralism	-0.02	0.15	0.07	-0.06	-0.27	0.31	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.00	-0.03	-0.21	0.04
N	1471	1459		1447	1414	989	1133	1153	482	1118	1134	1142	
<i>East</i>													
Sex	-0.10	-0.15	-0.13	-0.12	-0.12	-0.23	-0.13	0.03	-0.17	-0.13	-0.09	-0.13	-0.12
Age	0.40	-0.02	0.19	-0.20	-0.26	-0.14	-0.21	-0.05	-0.34	-0.25	-0.40	-0.27	-0.24
Education	-0.14	-0.16	-0.15	-0.06	-0.06	-0.44	-0.38	-0.14	-0.17	-0.16	-0.22	-0.15	-0.19

Table 3.8 (continued)

	Draft	Defence	Mean	Bundes- wehr	NATO	Iraq		Somalia		Bosnia			Mean
						1	2	1	2	1	2	3	
Perception	0.22	0.01	0.12	0.26	0.15	0.64	0.27	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.09	0.24	0.36
Ideology	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08	-0.16	-0.19	-0.93	-0.44	-0.06	-0.25	-0.15	-0.40	-0.17	-0.31
Morality of war	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.23	0.28	0.12	0.25	-0.02	0.23	0.05	-0.02	0.02	0.15
Nationalism	0.87	0.73	0.80	0.49	0.34	0.60	0.67	0.15	0.59	0.74	0.98	0.98	0.62
Internationalism	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.60	0.47	0.00	0.24	0.17	0.60	0.28	0.13	0.22	0.30
Militarism	0.77	0.57	0.57	0.38	0.27	0.79	0.60	0.27	0.55	0.37	0.25	0.29	0.41
Unilateralism	-0.05	0.03	-0.01	-0.28	-0.31	0.00	-0.29	-0.02	-0.12	-0.16	-0.03	-0.08	-0.14
N	1717	1705		1703	1703	959	1236	1201	551	1233	1255	1271	
R ² change per variable on each step (entries are multiplied by 100)													
<i>West</i>	Step 1	2.5	1.6	2.1	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.2	0.9	0.6	1.1	0.6
	Step 2	3.6	2.7	3.2	1.8	0.5	4.3	0.1	1.3	1.3	2.0	2.3	1.7
	Step 3	1.1	1.2	1.2	2.2	2.3	2.5	1.5	2.5	1.1	0.4	0.8	1.6
<i>East</i>	Step 1	2.4	0.8	1.6	0.8	1.2	2.8	0.3	1.7	0.9	1.3	1.0	1.3
	Step 2	3.4	2.5	3.0	1.6	1.2	4.7	1.2	2.9	2.5	3.1	3.6	2.6
	Step 3	2.0	1.4	1.7	3.4	2.9	1.4	0.5	2.8	0.9	0.2	0.5	1.6

a Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients.

it is notable that the combined independent variables exerted clearly more often a statistically significant influence in the new states compared to the old ones. From the total of 90 coefficients only half were significant in the west compared with two-thirds in the east. One possible substantive explanation of this difference might be that people in the new states were more dependent on so-called short cuts, due to their presumably lower level of information and their lesser integration into the German society. There are, however, also more noteworthy differences in the explanatory power of the different independent variables between east and west. Among the social structure variables, the effect of age differed the most. In the west no single statistically significant relationship existed among the different indicators for the support of foreign deployments, while in the new states people support foreign deployments less as they are getting older. While also willingness to defend increases with age, support of foreign deployments sinks with age, at least in the east. It appears on the one hand that later in the life cycle attachment to one's own country becomes stronger while people become more isolationist at the same time. The effect of both other social structure variables points in the already described direction. Women and better-educated persons were less willing to support out-of-area missions. However, the disapproving stance of the better educated only increased with respect to specific foreign deployments. On the general question of the involvement of the *Bundeswehr* and NATO in solving international crises, the effect of formal education remained nil.

The perception of the international environment had a remarkable impact on the agreement for out-of-area engagements. The more dangerous the world was perceived to be, the more respondents were ready to become involved internationally. This relationship was particularly clear for the evaluations of specific foreign deployments. Therefore, while the willingness to fight for the country is more or less independent of threat perceptions, agreement to foreign deployments is obviously dependent on such perceptions. Also, the effect of ideological orientations is noteworthy. In the old states ideological standpoints are often linked with pacifist persuasions. Accordingly, the willingness to fight as well as the involvement of military forces in world-wide deployments is usually refused by people with leftist orientations, and supported by citizens with right ideological positions. In the judging of concrete military deployments the connection between ideology and agreement becomes less clear. One reason for this blurring might be the fact that most out-of-area military missions were framed as humanitarian aid, which is presumably supported by everybody. In contrast, the situation in the new states looks somewhat different. In the east, citizens with leftist orientations are generally less biased against the military. Accordingly, ideology does not play a role in the questions of military defence and the overall judgement of the military. It is, however, more often a determinant of the views on foreign deployments.

Among the two core values 'nationalism' was again constantly a strong factor in explaining the different attitudes towards foreign deployment in both parts of the country. Presumably, the call for more power in the world for Germany, which is one important aspect of nationalism, contributes to this strong relationship. In contrast, the second core value had an overall weaker impact. With the acceptance of the 'morality of warfare' agreement of the general judgements of foreign deployments increased, yet for the estimation of concrete deployments these values were only meaningful in the west by exception, and in the east they only helped to explain attitudes towards the Gulf War. One explanation for this might be that among the three international crises, people might associate only the UN mission in Iraq with a real war, since UN ground troops were not involved in extended fighting during the missions in Somalia and Bosnia.

The additional effect of the postures on the judgement of foreign deployments is substantial, also after accounting for social structure variables, ideology, threat perceptions and core values. The agreement on the general questions about foreign deployment of the military and NATO increased with those who spoke out against a unilateral direction of German foreign policy, those who had a positive evaluation of the military and especially those who showed a willingness to engage themselves internationally. The great impact of internationalism is in accordance with expectations, since out-of-area missions are always associated foremost with an internationalist orientation. These orientations were, however, less relevant for the judgement of actual foreign deployments. Especially in the case of the wars in the Gulf and in the Balkans, the assessments of the military were dominant. The exception to this pattern showed up in the case of Somalia. The strongest predictor of the attitude towards German involvement in Somalia was internationalism.

Taken together, these results are compatible with the assumption of a hierarchical structure of foreign and security attitudes. The explanation of the willingness to fight for the country, the support for compulsory military service as well as the different indicators for the attitudes towards out-of-area missions improved at each level. In the lower part of Table 3.8 the amount of the average explained variance per independent variable is reported for each level. These figures confirm that the variation in the dependent variables was reduced with the inclusion of each new group of independent variables. The strongest reduction of variance was achieved by the variables on the second level, and among these the core values were probably the most important, as the investigation of the unstandardised coefficients has shown. The impact of postures was always weaker, but of course internationalism, militarism, and unilateralism were entered after all the other independent variables had been taken into account.

There were not only more statistically significant unstandardised regression coefficients for the east but the relative improvement of prediction

was also higher for the new states. The variance in the willingness to defend and the support of compulsory military service was reduced by the three social-structural variables by about 2 per cent on average. The four basic attitudinal variables on the next level improved the relative prediction by at least an additional 3 per cent each. The postures finally added on average 1.2 in the west and 1.7 in the east to the explanation. Overall, the full model reduced the variance in these two variables by 22 per cent in both parts of the country. Contrary to the variables dealing with the readiness to defend the country, the variance in the attitudes towards out-of-area missions could not be reduced as much. Also the impact of the core values, ideology and threat perceptions was less pronounced. While they were important in explaining variance in the attitudes towards specific out-of-area deployments, they were less suited to improving prediction of the general views on foreign deployments. The variance in the latter group of dependent variables was strongly reduced by the postures. On average, each posture improved the relative prediction of the opinion on the role of the *Bundeswehr* and NATO in out-of-area missions by about 3 per cent.

Summary

A great number of important foreign and security policy events and developments and an intense public debate about out-of-area deployments of German forces took place in the early 1990s. The German population was aware of the potential consequences of the changing international environment. In this early phase of foreign and security policy reorientation, the willingness to defend the country and especially the support for the present structure of the *Bundeswehr* did not decline. At the same time the public anticipated new regional conflicts. At least in principle, it supported the demand for international military involvement and considered the preparedness for out-of-area missions as an important task. Nevertheless, the general support for out-of-area engagements of NATO and the *Bundeswehr* was not widespread. However, once the public had to decide on concrete out-of-area deployments, sizeable majorities usually approved of them.

Shortly after unification, it was not surprising to find a number of significant differences in the foreign and security policy attitudes of the citizens from the eastern and western parts of the country. The common assumption that the different dominant political socialisation and life situations in east and west do have a notable effect on the political attitudes of the population was confirmed. A different outlook between easterners and westerners surfaced, for example, in their evaluations of future foreign and security policy tasks. Easterners were overall more sceptical towards out-of-area missions and they were more in favour of a foreign policy orientation towards eastern Europe. The differences referred not only to

levels but also to the relationships between foreign policy attitudes. Especially age, ideological orientation and the perception of threat had different effects in east and west on the attitudes towards out-of-area missions. Future studies will have to show whether a convergence has taken place since the early 1990s. These remarkable differences should of course not distract from the fact that within the domain of foreign and security policy attitudes, the direction and even the relative strength of the effects of the basic foreign and security policy orientations on the attitudes towards specific issues were rather similar in both parts of the country.

The examination of the determinants of the attitudes towards out-of-area missions was guided theoretically by a modified hierarchical model. It could be demonstrated that variables from each level of generality have additional explanatory power. Furthermore, the direction and relative strength of the relationships confirmed common expectations. Therefore, the results generally support the assumptions of the existence of a foreign policy belief system and a hierarchical organisation of the respective beliefs. Of course, the empirical examinations also revealed substantial differences between the explanatory power of the independent variables in east and west. The most striking difference referred to the considerably stronger relationships between the foreign policy and security attitudes in the east. This also seems to suggest that the assumption of a hierarchical organisation of attitudes might not be equally appropriate for all populations. Since the model was more powerful in the east, it might be hypothesised that such hierarchical attitude organisations are particularly widespread among individuals who know relatively little about the respective attitude domain and do not consider it overly important.

Notes

- 1 Survey data issued by the Ministry of Defence and gathered by the EMNID survey institute.
- 2 Survey data collected by the EMNID survey institute in the first few days of April and published by the private TV-network n-tv.
- 3 This information is extracted from the same panel study on which this chapter is based.
- 4 For a summary of the different schools of thought see Holsti (1992).

Appendix**Independent variables*****Threat perception**

- In the last five years the world has become much safer.
- In five years the world will be much safer than today.
- Please tell me, according to this scale, how probable you think it is that Germany will become involved in a war in the next ten years (0: completely improbable; 10 highly probable).

Ideology

- In politics people often speak of 'left' and 'right'. By using this scale from 0 to 10 where would you place yourself, if 0 is left and 10 is right?

Morality of warfare

- War is sometimes necessary to protect a country's interests.
- Each soldier is a potential murderer.

Nationalism

- Germans should have more national pride, because we have all reason to be proud of our country.
- The highest objective of German politics should be to provide Germany with the power and the authority that correspond to its importance in the world.

Internationalism

- Germany should play a more active role in world politics.
- Germany should not concern itself with matters of world politics, but rather concentrate on the problems at home.

Militarism

- Even if there is no other country that poses a large military threat for Germany, it is still reasonable to have a strong *Bundeswehr* for defence.
- Every independent and sovereign nation has to have its own defence forces.

Unilateralism

- Germany should take care of its security on its own.

Dependent variables***Defence**

- Naturally nobody wants war. If war arose, however, each person who is capable should fight for his country.

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- Compulsory military service in the *Bundeswehr* is an important civic duty.

Bundeswehr

- Should the *Bundeswehr*, together with our allies, be involved in operations to protect Western security interests around the globe or should it only exist for the defence of the Federal Republic in case of an attack? (1: world-wide missions; 7: only for defence)

NATO

- NATO should stay out of conflicts outside of the NATO area.

Iraq 1

- The war against Iraq was justified because Kuwait had to be liberated.

Iraq 2

- The military strikes of the Gulf War allies as a reaction to the disregard of the UN resolutions by Iraq were correct.

Somalia 1

- The deployment of troops in Somalia to secure the distribution of aid is correct.

Somalia 2

- The German UN participation in Somalia is correct.

Bosnia 1

- The no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, issued by the UN, should be enforced militarily.

Bosnia 2

- The UN should end the war in former Yugoslavia by a massive deployment of troops.

Bosnia 3

- The UN should order the allied airforces to bomb the positions of the Serb attackers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

* Unless otherwise indicated, all composing variables had the same question format. The respondents were asked to indicate their approval to the statements on a five-point scale: 1: disagree completely; 2: disagree somewhat; 3: undecided; 4: agree somewhat; 5: agree completely.