

The Middle East in the International System

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
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The
Iraq War

**Causes and
Consequences**

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Turkey: Recalcitrant Ally

Gareth Winrow

On 1 March 2003 the Turkish parliament failed narrowly to approve a government motion to permit the deployment in Turkey for six months of 62,000 US troops, 255 jet aircraft, and 65 helicopters.¹ This would have allowed the opening of a northern front in an increasingly likely US-led military operation against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The motion also called for an unspecified number of Turkish troops to be deployed in northern Iraq. The failure to pass the motion surprised many even though opposition in Turkey among the public and within the ranks of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) against a war in Iraq was considerable. Following a series of high-level US political and military delegations to Turkey and in line with the approval of the Turkish parliament in a vote on 6 February, US military personnel had been upgrading and modernizing bases and port facilities in Turkey. Ankara and Washington were also negotiating a substantial aid package to offset Turkey's expected losses resulting from the military operation.

After a clearly exasperated Bush administration abandoned the northern front option, on 20 March the Turkish parliament approved a motion granting the United States and Britain overflight rights and permitting more Turkish troops—reportedly 10,000—to enter northern Iraq.² Unlike the Gulf War (1990–1991), though, coalition forces could not use Turkish airbases to launch air sorties against Iraq. Unwilling to further antagonize the United States and upset European Union member states, the AKP government decided against unilaterally intervening militarily in northern Iraq. The Turkish military shelved plans to intervene in early April.³ Nevertheless, relations between Turkey and the United States deteriorated until October 2003, when the parliament in Ankara agreed to send Turkish peacekeeping units to help the embattled US-led international force in Iraq.⁴ Vehement opposition from the northern Iraqi Kurds blocked the deployment of the Turkish force. Turkish policymakers are determined to prevent the

formation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which they believe could destabilize Turkey and the region.

■ Explaining Turkish Policy

External Factors

After the Gulf War, protected by coalition aircraft patrolling from the Incirlik airbase in Turkey, the northern Iraqi Kurds had established governments separate from Baghdad in what became an autonomous Kurdish region. The Turkish authorities were concerned that the administrations formed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) might unite, declare independence, and then act as a model or magnet for the Kurdish population concentrated in southeastern Turkey.

Division and instability in northern Iraq enabled Turkey's Kurdish rebel grouping, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), to operate across the Iraqi-Turkish border. In clashes with the Kurdish rebels in Turkey, approximately 35,000 were killed over a fifteen-year period until the capture and imprisonment in 1999 of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK's leader. Fearful of the possible fragmentation of the Turkish state, officials in Ankara were reluctant to allow the Kurds in Turkey to express their cultural and ethnic identity. An EU-supported reform package finally adopted in 2003, permitting broadcasting in Kurdish and courses to learn Kurdish in Turkey, was eventually implemented in 2004.⁵

Since 1991 Turkish governments have attempted to influence developments in northern Iraq. Ankara allowed the delivery of humanitarian aid, engaged in barter trade to procure illicit diesel fuel from the KDP, periodically militarily intervened to support the KDP in clashes with the PKK, and helped to cement a cease-fire in 1996 between warring KDP and PUK factions.⁶ By March 2003, about 2,000 Turkish troops remained in northern Iraq.

The coalition government led by Bulent Ecevit, in office between May 1999 and November 2002 and which included the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), was more suspicious of the northern Iraqi Kurds and of US sympathy for their cause. Ecevit made it clear that the formation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and the Kurdish occupation of the oil-rich territory of Kirkuk—at the time under Baghdad's jurisdiction—would lead to war with Turkey.⁷ In September 2002 the KDP and PUK agreed to a draft constitution for a post-Saddam Iraq that would include a federal Kurdish region with Kirkuk as its capital. Ecevit fumed that the situation in Iraq had “got out of control” and that “a Kurdish state has been founded in northern Iraq,” and accused the Bush administration of “steering” the Kurdish groups.⁸

Recent Turkish governments have sought to play the Iraqi Turkmen card in their attempts to influence developments in northern Iraq. Ethnically and linguistically related to the Turks, the Iraqi Turkmen had been largely ignored by Turkey until a group of predominantly Sunni Iraqi Turkmen were encouraged to form the then Ankara-based Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) in 1995. The Iraqi Turkmen assumed more prominence when three-quarters of the 400-man Peace Monitoring Force (PMF), established in 1996 to separate KDP and PUK combat units, consisted of Iraqi Turkmen who took orders from Turkish officers.⁹ The PMF became, in effect, a training school in which up to 2,000 Iraqi Turkmen received military instruction.¹⁰ The ITF repeatedly argued that Kirkuk and Mosul were traditionally Iraqi Turkmen and not Kurdish territories. Claims that the Iraqi Turkmen population in Iraq numbered up to 3 million were obvious exaggerations.¹¹ The draft constitution prepared in September 2002 for the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq referred to the Iraqi Turkmen as a “national minority.”¹² The official Turkish line was that the Iraqi Turkmen should be recognized as one of the three main constituents of Iraqi society, along with Arabs and Kurds.¹³

The Baghdad regime appeared to pose a continued security threat to Turkey after the Gulf War. In February 1999, Saddam Hussein had warned Ankara that it would face attack if it continued to allow US and British aircraft to launch air sorties against Iraq from Turkish territory.¹⁴ In July 2002 the Bush administration urged the Turkish authorities to take the Iraqi missile threat seriously and pushed the Turks to deploy surface-to-air missile batteries.¹⁵

Given these concerns over the PKK, northern Iraq, and the Baghdad regime, it seemed inevitable that the parliament in Ankara on 1 March 2003 would approve the motion for Turkish and US joint participation in a war against Iraq. This would have enabled Turkey to work with the United States to shape the political future of a post-Saddam Iraq.

Washington clearly expected parliamentary approval. In December 2002, warmly receiving AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President George W. Bush spoke of Turkey as a “strategic ally and friend of the US.”¹⁶ In the same month, during a second visit to Ankara in that year, US deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz confidently declared that Turkish support was “assured” in any possible military operation against Iraq.¹⁷ After two weeks of extensive discussions between US and Turkish diplomats, a memorandum of understanding was signed on 22 February 2003. The correspondent of the Turkish daily *Milliyet*, Fikret Bila, revealed the details of this memorandum after the war. The Turkish and US militaries had agreed to enter northern Iraq together. Turkish units could engage the PKK, while US forces would seize control of Mosul and Kirkuk. No heavy weaponry would be allocated to the KDP and PUK, and Kurdish *peshmerga*

(fighters) would return all light weapons handed to them by coalition forces after the cessation of hostilities. Air operations over northern Iraq would be under Turkish control, and the United States would meet all the costs of the campaign.¹⁸ With reports that 40,000 Turkish troops would participate in this combined operation, the memorandum has been referred to as the “deal of the decade.”¹⁹

Prior to 1 March, Washington was also in talks with Ankara over the terms of an extensive aid package. The debt-ridden Turkish economy had just recovered from a severe financial crisis, with support from the International Monetary Fund. Turkish officials believed that Turkey had not been properly compensated for its support in the Gulf War and were thus determined to strike a hard bargain. It was reported that up to \$92 billion in aid and loan guarantees was demanded from the United States.²⁰ The Bush administration was only prepared to offer a package of \$4 billion in grants and \$20 billion in loan guarantees.²¹ After the outbreak of war this package was removed. Instead, in April 2003 the US Congress approved a \$1 billion grant or \$8.5 billion loan on the condition that Turkey would cooperate with the United States in Iraq—that is, Turkey should not intervene unilaterally in northern Iraq. An agreement fixing the terms of the loan was signed in Dubai in September 2003.²² In practice, Turkish officials were unhappy at the restrictions placed on the grant/loan. In March 2005, citing recent economic growth, the Turkish treasury announced that it was no longer interested in the package.²³

Some Turkish officials and businessmen had been eager to cultivate expanding commercial ties with the Saddam regime and were thus opposed to war with Iraq. In autumn 2002 a report released by the Turkey-Iraq Business Council noted that Turkey had lost \$100 billion as a consequence of the Gulf War and UN economic sanctions against Baghdad. The report added that with another conflict Turkey could incur losses totaling up to \$150 billion because of the impact on trade, tourism, and oil prices, and because of military costs and other expenses.²⁴ War could also lead to an indefinite closure of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline network connecting Turkey and Iraq, thereby depriving Ankara of oil transit revenues.

Policymakers in Ankara had also been worried that a war could have negative repercussions for regional security, given that Iran and Syria also had sizable Kurdish populations. Abdullah Gul, the AKP prime minister at the time, visited Syria and Iran, and also Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, in January 2003, and the foreign ministers of these states met in Istanbul on 23 January. The moderate Islamist AKP government was here also attempting to placate its domestic supporters by showing that Turkey was seeking a common front with key Muslim states on the Iraqi issue. However, the Istanbul meeting achieved little apart from a bland declaration that urged Baghdad to comply with UN Security Council resolutions while the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq should be respected.²⁵

Internal Factors

Domestic circumstances help explain why the Turkish parliament failed to approve the motion on 1 March. An inexperienced AKP government had assumed office in November 2002 and was distracted by other pressing issues, such as Cyprus and Turkey’s bid for EU membership. Prime Minister Gul’s hand was weakened because AKP leader Erdogan was waiting in the wings to take over the premiership. Constitutional amendments adopted in December 2002 meant that the previously convicted Erdogan could be elected to parliament and thereby become prime minister. Conveniently, a by-election would be held on 9 March 2003, because of previous election irregularities in the province of Siirt, enabling Erdogan then to be appointed prime minister on 14 March.²⁶ It was striking that Bush invited Erdogan rather than Gul to the White House in December 2002 to discuss Iraq.

Traditionally, Turkish foreign policy has been entrusted to professional diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs working closely with the foreign minister, prime minister, and military chiefs. Gul and Erdogan were also apparently influenced, though, by less experienced personal advisers, who believed that the United States could not launch a military campaign against Iraq without opening a northern front. Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis often played second fiddle to Erdogan on the latter’s trips abroad. Unusual for a foreign minister, Yakis caused consternation within the ministry by issuing off-the-cuff remarks. Yakis was quickly forced to retract a statement made on 3 December 2002 in which he announced that Turkey would allow the United States to use its airbases in the event of a war against Iraq.²⁷ In early January 2003, Yakis alleged that Turkey was examining whether it had any historical and legal claims to Mosul and Kirkuk, both formerly part of the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan swiftly reacted by noting that these remarks only reflected the personal views of the foreign minister.²⁸

Unwilling to alienate its domestic constituents, the AKP experienced serious divisions within its ranks over whether Turkey should participate in a US-led military operation against a predominantly Muslim country. Many newly elected AKP deputies had little knowledge or experience of international politics. However, according to Article 92 of the Turkish constitution, parliamentary approval was required for a declaration of war, the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey, and the dispatch of Turkish forces abroad “in cases where there is international legitimacy.” Bulent Arinc, the Speaker of parliament, and a prominent member of the conservative wing of the AKP, argued that without a second UN Security Council resolution in addition to Resolution 1441, there would be no international legitimacy.²⁹ In a fractious AKP cabinet meeting on 24 February 2003, Construction Minister Zeki Ergezen echoed the views of much of the Turkish public when he voiced that he opposed the bombing of Muslims.³⁰

Gul and Erdogan realized, though, that US-Turkish relations would

come under tremendous strain if a motion permitting the deployment of US troops in Turkey for a military operation in northern Iraq were not quickly brought before parliament. The cabinet agreed to hold a free vote in parliament on the motion. Without the party whip, evidently Gul and Erdogan were resigned to losing thirty to forty votes from their party, but ninety-nine AKP deputies opposed the motion on 1 March. With a vote of 264 to 250 in favor, and with nineteen abstentions, the motion was not adopted, because three more votes were needed to secure the required majority of those present in parliament.³¹ It seems that a number of AKP deputies representing districts in southeastern Turkey were keen not to upset their Kurdish and Arab constituents.

The opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), opposed the motion. Although in favor of more Turkish units in northern Iraq, Deniz Baykal, the CHP leader, argued that the movement of US troops across Turkish territory smacked of aggression.³² Encouraged by disagreements within the AKP and by mounting popular discontent, various nongovernmental organizations in Turkey orchestrated large-scale antiwar protests. In early December 2002 the results of a survey conducted in July and August by the Pew Research Center revealed that 83 percent of the Turkish public even opposed the use of Turkey's airbases by the United States for an operation against Iraq.³³ Clearly, this mounting popular opposition had an impact on the 1 March vote.

President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a former Constitutional Court judge with little background in international diplomacy, also opposed a war because of the absence of "international legitimacy." Sezer played a key role when presiding over a meeting of Turkey's National Security Council (NSC) on 28 February 2003. Gul and Erdogan had been pressing for the NSC to recommend that parliament should approve the motion. However, Sezer personally intervened to cut short the NSC meeting by noting that the NSC had already decided at its previous session on 31 January that the government should seek parliamentary authorization.³⁴ Crucially, therefore, AKP leaders failed to secure support from the powerful NSC immediately before the 1 March vote.

One may have expected the influential military at the NSC meeting to prevail upon Sezer to recommend backing the motion given the terms of the memorandum of understanding that had just been concluded with US officials. But the Turkish armed forces were not keen to be seen to be openly backing the moderately Islamist AKP government. On 8 January, General Hilmi Ozkok, chief of general staff, had for the first time publicly accused the government of promoting Islamic activism in Turkey. This was after Prime Minister Gul in an unprecedented move had objected to the expulsion of officers from the armed forces on the grounds that they were Islamic agitators.³⁵ It appears that the military expected parliament to approve the

motion without a recommendation from the NSC. Apparently, Ozkok was loath to press the government to adopt the motion, as the EU would have then probably complained about the military dominating Turkish politics. The Turkish armed forces also did not want to be seen to be openly backing a highly unpopular war.³⁶ Too little too late, on 5 March Ozkok declared that firm support for any US military deployment would be in Turkey's political and economic interests.³⁷

Given the awareness of Washington's resolve to overthrow Saddam, there were no obvious divisions within the top echelons of the Turkish military concerning opening a northern front. Throughout the 1990s a close working relationship had developed between the Turkish and US militaries. Turkish generals had welcomed the use of Incirlik by coalition aircraft to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, as this had enabled the Turkish military to avoid international censure and operate relatively freely on the ground in northern Iraq.³⁸

Interviewed in May 2003, Wolfowitz could not hide his disappointment at what he perceived to be the failure of the Turkish military to provide a leadership role.³⁹ Relations between the US and Turkish militaries further worsened in July when eleven of Turkey's special forces were apprehended by US units in Suleymaniye and detained for three days on the grounds that they were plotting to murder the Kurdish mayor of Kirkuk.⁴⁰ Ties only improved after the parliament in Ankara, in October, approved of the possible dispatch of Turkish peacekeepers to Iraq.

The impact of the Turkish media on foreign policy making and on public opinion is difficult to gauge. Newspapers and many private television and radio stations in Turkey articulate opinions across the political spectrum. In the print media, well-known and informed commentators have presented differing viewpoints on Iraq. However, by summer 2002 a substantial part of the Turkish public objected to a war with Iraq, and press coverage notwithstanding, this opposition continued in the following months. Significantly, though, more details about the negotiations between Turkish and US diplomats and friction within the AKP ranks in the buildup to the war would only be published by leading press analysts several months after the end of the military campaign.⁴¹

■ Impact of Turkish Foreign Policy

The assumption that decisionmaking in key areas of Turkish foreign policy is largely in the hands of the foreign ministry and the Turkish armed forces, which share certain mind-sets, has been seriously challenged with the failure of the Turkish parliament to approve the 1 March motion. Although equipped with only limited formal powers in foreign policy making,

President Sezer was able to exert his personal influence over a hesitant military. With Turkey continuing to democratize in its bid to secure membership of the EU, the impact of Turkish public opinion on foreign policy issues must also now be taken more into account.

Not participating in the war, Ankara lost a golden opportunity to have a major say in the political reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq. Since 1991 Turkish governments had pursued a policy that aimed to preserve the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq, forestall the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and crush PKK insurgents holed up in KDP- and PUK-controlled territory. The AKP government and the Turkish armed forces have made it clear that these remain Turkey's main priorities in Iraq. Nevertheless, Ankara will find it more difficult to press its case in Washington, given US sympathies for the Iraqi Kurds and bearing in mind the Pentagon's bitter disappointment at the failure of the Turks to open a northern front. The strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States had suffered a major setback. Some in Washington must have seriously questioned Turkey's geopolitical value after the United States was unable to use Turkish airbases and ports in a major military operation.

However, relations between Turkey and the United States improved when Erdogan met Bush in the White House in January 2004. With Incirlik being used as a staging post for the rotation of US troops to Iraq, Bush again referred to Turkey as "a friend and important ally."⁴² US officials remain aware of Turkey's strategic location on a future east-west energy transportation corridor stretching from the Caspian Sea to western Europe—although throughout 2004 and the first half of 2005 the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline was repeatedly damaged by insurgents. At the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004, Bush referred to Turkey as a key state in the war on terrorism and an important model for a future democratic Middle East.⁴³ Relations between Washington and Ankara deteriorated again, though, when in November 2004 Mehmet Elkatmis, the chairman of the Turkish parliament's Human Rights Commission, condemned the United States for committing "genocide" against the Iraqis in the military operation against Fallujah.⁴⁴

The diplomatic maneuvers immediately prior to the war enabled Turkey to improve ties with Iran and the Arab world. Previous governments in Ankara—with the exception of the 1996–1997 administration, led by the more radically Islamist Necmettin Erbakan—had focused little attention on their Muslim neighbors. Arab states had remained suspicious of their former colonial ruler. Although membership in the EU remains a priority for the Erdogan government, the conservative AKP is also naturally interested in the Muslim world. Significantly, in June 2004 a Turkish academic would be appointed secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Conference.

■ Conclusion

Unilateral Turkish intervention in northern Iraq to prevent the formation of an independent Kurdish state is not impossible given that Ankara regards this as an issue of crucial importance for Turkey's own national security. Such action would have disastrous repercussions for Turkish-US relations. Turkish officials have become resigned to the possibility of a federal Iraq in which the Kurdish autonomous region would be an important component. However, Ankara remains opposed to the division of Iraq. In January 2004, receiving Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the Shiite leader and a member of the then Iraqi Governing Council, Erdogan warned that moves toward the breakup of Iraq could prompt intervention from its neighbors.⁴⁵ Ankara has also lobbied for Kirkuk to be given a special status in which all resident ethnic groups would be involved in the city's administration.⁴⁶ Turkish policymakers are concerned that the possible inclusion of the oil-rich Kirkuk territory in an enlarged Kurdish autonomous region after the holding of a referendum by December 2007—as envisaged in the draft Iraqi constitution announced in August 2005—could encourage the northern Iraqi Kurds to push for independence.

The Turkish authorities have developed better contacts with the northern Iraqi Kurds. In postwar Iraq, Turkish construction companies established a significant presence in PUK-controlled territory. Turkish-Iraqi commercial relations, in general, had quickly recovered, so that by May 2005, Turkish state minister Kursat Tuzmen set a target to attain in the foreseeable future an annual business volume of \$10 billion through cooperation in trade, investment, transportation, and contracting services.⁴⁷ Kurdish appreciation of the messages of condolence sent by Ankara after the two suicide bomb attacks in Erbil on 1 February 2004 helped improve ties between Turkey and the PUK and KDP. But the northern Iraqi Kurds' demands for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from their territory were not seriously considered by Ankara, given the continued presence of the PKK in northern Iraq.⁴⁸ Despite this rapprochement, officials in Ankara are not prepared to countenance the formation of an independent Kurdistan.

The Iraqi Turkmen have proven to be a major disappointment for Ankara. The ITF has failed to become an umbrella organization for all Iraqi Turkmen, and instead has become increasingly regarded as a mouthpiece of the Turkish authorities. This led to a formal split in April 2005 when the pro-Kurdish Erbil branch broke away from the Ankara-controlled ITF with its headquarters in Kirkuk.⁴⁹ Previously, Shiite Iraqi Turkmen, not affiliated with the predominantly Sunni-based ITF, had clashed with the northern Iraqi Kurds in August and December 2003. In January 2005 in the elections to the transitional Iraqi National Assembly, the ITF had only secured three seats.

Turkish officials would feel less apprehensive about developments in northern Iraq if the PKK were eliminated. In October 2003, Ankara and Washington agreed to a joint action plan to employ economic, political, and legal means to render the PKK redundant.⁵⁰ However, the Bush administration has been reluctant to use force in what would most probably be a costly military operation to eradicate the PKK, even though the Kurdish rebels ended their cease-fire and resumed hostilities in June 2004. Possible unilateral intervention by the Turkish military to attempt to uproot PKK units from their mountain strongholds could lead to a serious deterioration in US-Turkish relations.

Sharing concerns about the future of Iraq, Turkey is likely to continue its rapprochement with Iran and Syria, although not at the expense of US-Turkish ties. In March 2004 there were violent protests by Kurds in Syria demanding more rights. Bashar al-Asad had become the first Syrian president to visit Ankara in January 2004, and this was followed by visits to Damascus by Erdogan and Sezer in December 2004 and April 2005 respectively. Iran recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization when Erdogan was received in Tehran in July 2004.⁵¹ By mid-2005 the Iranian security forces were clashing with supporters of the Kurdistan Independent Life Party (PJAK), an affiliate of the PKK.

Gul suggested at a meeting in Damascus in November 2003 of foreign ministers of states neighboring Iraq—such meetings having become regularized after the January 2003 gathering in Istanbul—that they should form a Contact Group at the UN to discuss the Iraqi issue.⁵² The following month, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established an Iraqi Advisory Group that included the five permanent members of the Security Council as well as Egypt and Iraq's neighbors. In addition to its contacts with Washington, Ankara is seeking to use this group as a mechanism to influence future developments in northern Iraq. However, at the time of writing, there remained a possibility that the failure of Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis to agree to a new Iraqi constitution could lead to the disintegration of Iraq and the eventual formation of an independent Kurdistan with Kirkuk as its capital.

■ Notes

1. *Turkish Probe*, 2 March 2003.
2. *Daily Telegraph*, 22 March 2003.
3. Kemal Kirisci, "The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy," p. 310.
4. *Turkish Daily News*, 8 October 2003.
5. Coinciding with the introduction of Kurdish language broadcasting, and pending the conclusion of their retrial, in June 2004 Leyla Zana and three other for-

mer deputies of the Democracy Party were released. The four pro-Kurdish deputies had been sentenced in December 1994 because of their reported close links with the PKK. By summer 2005 Zana and her colleagues were establishing a new party—the Democratic Society Movement. One should note that after the war in Iraq in 2003 the nonviolent politically active members of Turkey's Kurdish population concentrated on securing political reforms in Turkey and were less interested with developments in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.

6. For background to developments in northern Iraq and Turkey's interests there in the 1990s, see Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey*, pp. 162–167; and Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, pp. 312–342.

7. Soner Cagaptay, "Enhancing the Turkish-American Alliance," p. 2.

8. Bulent Aliriza, "Turkey's Iraq Jitters," p. 1.

9. "War with Iraq—Iraq: Compliance, Sanctions, and US Policy," *Strategypage*, 27 November 2003, <http://www.strategypage.com/iraqwar/americanpolicy/15.asp>.

10. Soner Cagaptay, "Turkmens," p. 2. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the ending of the PMF mission on 2 July 2004. See "Tan Says Mission of Peace Monitoring Force in Iraq Ended," *Anadolu Agency* (Ankara), 2 July 2004.

11. Carol Migdalovitz, "Iraq," pp. 3–4. According to Cagaptay, "Turkmens," p. 1, the Iraqi Turkmen population may total 1–1.5 million. Other commentators believe this figure could be as low as 300,000.

12. See Articles 4 and 49 of the *Draft Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region*, http://www.krg.org/docs/k_const.asp.

13. *Turkish Daily News*, 2 March 2004. For more details on the Iraqi Turkmen, see H. Tarik Oguzlu, "The 'Turkomans.'"

14. Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey and the Muslim Middle East," p. 45.

15. Sebnem Udum, "Missile Proliferation in the Middle East," p. 88.

16. "Remarks by the President in Meeting with the Chairman of Turkey's AK Party," transcript, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 10 December 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/images/20021210-8.html>.

17. *Turkish Daily News*, 5 December 2002.

18. See the series of four articles by Fikret Bila in *Milliyet*, 22–25 September 2003.

19. Philip Robins, "Confusion at Home," p. 564.

20. *Financial Times*, 19 February 2003.

21. *Financial Times*, 20 February 2003.

22. "United States–Turkey Financial Agreement: Joint Statement Following Signing of the Agreement, 22 September 2003, Dubai UAE," JS-747, Press Room, Office of Public Affairs, 22 September 2003, <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js747.htm>.

23. *Turkish Daily News*, 5 March 2005.

24. *Turkish Times*, 1 October 2002.

25. "Regional Initiative on Iraq—Joint Declaration," Istanbul, 23 January 2003, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/irak.htm>.

26. These distractions prevented the possible swift approval by parliament of a second motion similarly worded to that of 1 March. This was at a time when ships carrying tanks and heavy equipment for the US Fourth Infantry Division, planned to be deployed in northern Iraq, were still waiting off the Turkish Mediterranean coast.

27. *Turkish Daily News*, 5 December 2002.

28. *Milliyet*, 7 January 2003.

29. *Turkish Daily News*, 25 February 2003.

30. Sedat Ergin, "Tezkere AKP'yi Catlatti" [Memorandum Splits the AKP], *Hurriyet*, 24 September 2003.
31. Soner Cagaptay, "An Accident on the Road to US-Turkish Cooperation in Iraq," p. 1.
32. "Baykal: We Should Not Allow US Troops in Our Country," *Kurdistan Observer*, 4 February 2003, <http://home.cogeco.ca/~observer/4-2-03-baykal-not-to-allow-us-troops.html>.
33. "What the World Thinks in 2002," *Pew Research Center for the People and the Press: Survey Reports*, 4 December 2002, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?reportid=165>.
34. Sedat Ergin, "Galiba o Tren Kacti" [I Suppose That Train Has Left] *Hurriyet*, 25 September 2003.
35. *Turkish Daily News*, 10 January 2003.
36. I am grateful to Gareth Jenkins for these observations.
37. *Turkish Daily News*, 6 March 2003.
38. Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, p. 128.
39. *Turkish Daily News*, 7 May 2003.
40. Jeffrey Donovan, "Iraq: US Pressing Governing Council to Accept Turkish Troops," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (Washington, DC), 9 October 2003.
41. Fikret Bila and Sedat Ergin produced a series of articles in the mass-circulation newspapers *Milliyet* and *Hurriyet* respectively in September 2003. In January 2004, Murat Yetkin prepared articles for the center-left newspaper *Radikal*.
42. *Financial Times*, 29 January 2004.
43. *Los Angeles Times*, 29 June 2004. Note that the terrorist attacks against synagogues and British targets in Istanbul in November 2003 were condemned by the Turkish public and government and did not spark a rise in anti-US or anti-British sentiment.
44. *Turkish Daily News*, 27 November 2004.
45. "Prime Minister Erdogan: 'Kurds Have Been Trying to Take Oil Reserve Areas in the North Under Their Influence,'" *Anadolu Agency* (Ankara), 14 January 2004.
46. *The Guardian*, 15 February 2005.
47. "Export to Iraq Increases: Target Is \$2.5 billion," *Zaman*, 22 May 2005, <http://www.zaman.com/?bl=economy&alt=&hn=19822>.
48. *Turkish Daily News*, 10 February 2004; "Iraqi Kurd Tries to Reassure Turkey over Rebels," *Reuters* (Ankara), 10 February 2004.
49. Kathleen Ridolfo, "Iraq: Will the Turkoman Split Break Turkish Interference?" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (Prague), 6 April 2005.
50. "Turkey, US Craft Plan to Defeat Kurdish Rebels Left in Iraq," *Bloomberg*, 2 October 2003.
51. *Turkish Daily News*, 30 July 2004.
52. "Foreign Minister Gul Says Suggestion of Annan About Iraq Shows Importance of Regional Initiative Which Turkey Has Started," *Anadolu Agency* (Naples), 29 November 2003.

Part 3

Context and Consequences