Chapter 13

The EU and the Mediterranean: Open Regionalism or Peripheral Dependence?

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When the European Union produced its first truly integrated policy for the Mediterranean basin in late 1995, the question arose as to whether the new policy initiative would be an example of 'open' or 'closed' regionalism[1]. At the time, this was a significant issue in international relations as discussions of globalization were beginning to focus on the issue of whether or not its effects would manifested in a truly global economic system or whether a regionalist pattern would emerge in which foci of integrated economic activity might not also acquire other integrated characteristics which would seriously undermine the sovereignty of component states. This, in turn, would affect diplomatic and international relations between such regional agglomerations and might thus construct a new kind of international order. Indeed, the general argument applied outside the confines of economic change, for the end of the bilateral balance-of-power was not seen as necessarily introducing hegemonic stability, focused around the sole remaining 'hyperpower'[2]. Instead regional orders of hegemonic political hierarchy were also conceived as likely outcomes[3]. Behind these issues, the overall discussion subsumed two separate but related issues: firstly, that globalization would inevitably be regionalist in nature and, second, that economic integration would inevitably lead to political integration and, eventually to societal homogenization.

1 Region and state in the contemporary world

Events over the past ten years have largely resolved these issues. Globalization has proceeded apace in economic terms and has powerfully affected the international division of labour, but the economic hierarchy of the old 'triad' – the economic network between the United States, Europe and Japan that predominated during the latter stages of the Cold War – seems largely in place, even if somewhat expanded eastwards[4]. Japan has been replaced by South-East Asia and China, with India, perhaps, knocking at the door, but the triad structures still seems firmly in place – as yet unaffected by the World Trade Organisation and protected by progressive failure in the various GATT negotiation rounds. In political and diplomatic terms, the hyperpower, the United States, after a brief burst of aggressive brilliance, seems now in retreat and regionalism looks as if it may become the dominant theme of

global politics in future. Regionalism, in short, is still a matter of considerable relevance to the contemporary world.

In this respect, the initiative of the European Union in introducing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as its flagship policy in the Mediterranean continues to be important for this was, perhaps, the first genuine attempt at creating an open regionalist system. It was, however, created for a very different world, in which the globalization paradigm had a much more powerful resonance. At least, this reflected the views of the Clinton administration, with its belief that, with the Cold War ended, geopolitics could give way to geo-economics in which a globalized world economy would be dominated by the United States and where neo-realist assumptions about the world community would be subordinated to economic realities and democratic peace – the essence, after all, of Francis Fukuyama's vision of the 'end of history'[5]. At that time, the more pessimistic prognostications of Samuel Huntington[6] seemed largely irrelevant, although the passage of time has altered this so that they have now become part of the spontaneous vocabulary of policy-makers and acquired a new relevance in academic discourse as well.

Fukuyama seems to recognize this, for he has recently admitted that force and coercion, to be applied by states with the necessary status to do so[7], may well be necessary to achieve his ideal outcome, a situation which reflects the rather more accurate analysis of the post-Cold War world – made at the start of the 1990s and still relevant today – by Adam Roberts, when he argued that the developed world was now a 'Grotian one, observing norms of cooperation, and perhaps even has its Kantian element: a civil society of civil societies'. However, outside this normatively ideal focus, '...parts of the world beyond are still Hobbesian, with force still a very active final arbiter within and between countries, and sovereignty loudly proclaimed.'[8]. That is, after all, very much the European Union's self-image and the one that allows it to legitimately regard itself as a politically relevant region in the contemporary world. The question is, however, to what extent are these concerns relevant to the Union's current interactions with neighbouring states and how far can those be said to reflect a regionalist paradigm?

As Stephen Calleya[9] has pointed out, the subject of regionalism has received relatively little analytical attention in recent years, not least because of the dominance of neo-realism in theoretical studies of international relations, in which the state and the international arena have been the primary referents. Nonetheless, the growing effects of multinational organizations and transnational corporations on the international scene, together with the implications of the phenomenon of globalization have begun to alter these assumptions although the obsession with state security since the events of 9/11 seems to run counter to that. At the same time, the experience of the European Union and its relationships with peripheral and semi-peripheral states and regions has thrown the issue into sharp relief within the world of practical politics and diplomacy.

A major problem, however, is to establish precisely what the term means. Neither geographic nor systemic definitions, taken alone, provide a comprehensive mechanism for its conceptualization. Geographic contiguity is clearly an essential component but does not, of itself, provide any insights as to what regionalism actually is, although it does imply that a plurality of states is involved. Indeed, other

meaningless unless defined in social or political terms as well. In short, the concept essentially relates to a process of economic, political, cultural or social interaction between specified entities within the region's geographical bounds. It is that process of interaction that gives the term meaning, for it has greater explicatory power and significance than is the case for any other group of geographically contiguous entities linked to it.

Nor is such an interaction a purely passive process; it also involves purpose and action that prioritize the key elements that animate the concept. It is, in essence, a constructed and shared socio-political reality, often involving a shared economic dimension, within a geographically contiguous international region[10]. This is important, because – as we shall see – although the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was articulated in largely economic terms, the Barcelona Declaration which introduced it in 1995 made it clear that its signatories recognized the underlying social, political and security realities that it was to condition. Now that, ten years later, the Partnership is to be redefined as from 2007 within the context of European Neighbourhood Policy in more bilateral terms, questions arise as to what extent the old assumptions about regionalism and the Mediterranean region still apply.

How, for example, should the linkages between an integrated region, such as the European Union and states to which it relates in a form of open regionalism be conceptualized? Is the relationship an issue of a centre-periphery/hub-spoke relationship or are there more substantive, egalitarian relationships involved, of the kinds implied by the Barcelona Declaration's objective of a 'shared zone of prosperity and stability'? And what of the relationships between the states of the Southern Mediterranean shore in this context? Are these to be static or evolutionary and, if the latter, what is the outcome likely to be? The intervening decade and the very strikingly altered international environment have played their parts, of course, in determining what these will be, but to what extent do the original concepts of open regionalism still have relevance? Indeed was the concept merely a transitional stage towards a more profound regional relationship and, if so, what will happen now, given the events of recent years[11]?

2 Europe's Mediterranean policies

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative was, nonetheless, quite unlike the policy initiatives that Europe had adopted towards its southern periphery previously, for those had in large measure stemmed from the colonial inheritance. It was also designed to respond to quite specific policy objectives for the Union's member states – peripheral security over both regional conflict particularly in the Middle East but also to end the danger of spill-over effects involving violence, smuggling and drugs. Perhaps the most important of these involved the development of a mechanism designed to end the danger of mass-migration into Europe itself. As such, it was a defensive strategy, but the means it adopted were novel since it saw mutual confidence-building and shared strategies as the way forward. This was a complete break with the past but reflect much of the ethos of the Union itself and its policies towards new Accession states in the wake of the end of the Cold War.

Britain and France had been the major colonial powers in the Middle East and North Africa, although Italy had first colonized Libya before being expelled during the Second World War, and Spain had had interests in Northern Morocco and in The Western Sahara. This had left a legacy of economic dependence on Europe as well as ambiguous cultural relationships, which the Union and its predecessor, the European Economic Community, had tried to address in a series of bilateral economic agreements from 1969 onwards, starting with North Africa and then, in 1976 extending to the Middle East Mediterranean littoral. With Israel and Turkey there had been separate but parallel agreements dating from the mid-1960s. The major driver for this was a growing problem of migration into Europe, mainly from Turkey and North Africa but later, too, from Egypt which European states found difficult to digest in social and cultural terms, despite the growing demand for migrant labour and the growing need of host countries for the remittances it generated. Parallel to this were accelerating flows of asylum-seekers, reflecting deficiencies in governance in the South Mediterranean region.

Now the new Partnership, more colloquially known as the Barcelona Process, swept all of these into a single policy. Inevitably, the economic dimension of the policy was the most detailed and comprehensive, not least because this approach had underlain the construction of the Union itself. It was also an extension of the original bilateral agreements that had been negotiated between Europe and the South Mediterranean states. However, whereas these had provided for free access to the European market for industrial goods and restricted access for agricultural produce, the new economic policies converted these trade agreements into free trade agreements, in which European industrial products would also be granted free access to South Mediterranean markets after lengthy transition periods when tariff and non-tariff barriers would be gradually reduced. Given the Union's dominant position within the trade patterns of the South Mediterranean, it was both the essential and inescapable partner for economic change, a position reinforced by European dependence on the region for energy.

Energy dependence is quite striking – in 2005, Europe imported 11,112 million b/d net of oil and refined products. The Middle East and North Africa generated 45.5 per cent of this total – 5.06 million b/d, of which 3.12 million b/d came from the Middle East and the Gulf (28.1 per cent of the total) and 1.94 million b/d from North Africa (17.5 per cent). As far as natural gas was concerned, the dependence was even more acute. In 2005, the Union imported 294.5 billion cubic metres of pipeline gas and 47.6 billion cubic metres of liquefied natural gas; a total of 342.2 billion cubic metres. The Middle East and North Africa supplied 22.5 per cent of this total and North Africa alone supplied 19.3 per cent. In the case of Algeria, the largest sole supplier to the Union from the South Mediterranean, 97 per cent of its gas output went to Europe – 62.3 per cent by pipeline and the rest in the form of liquefied natural gas[12].

Such dependencies, particularly on pipeline gas, had clear security implications for alternative sources of supply would not be easily available. Indeed, given the dependence of oil refineries on an homogenous crude input mix, similar considerations applied to crude oil supply as well. Both concerns had an immediate

at the time, a full-blown civil war was being waged. Concerns about security in the Middle East also reflected global concerns about energy security from the Gulf but also concerns about spill-over effects from the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the future of the Oslo Process appeared to be ever-more gloomy. Europe clearly had an acute interest in trying to stabilise the region and, given the nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy which was then just being given sinews as the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, prescriptions for this derived from the collective European experience seemed the most appropriate.

In terms of external trade, the dependence of the South Mediterranean on Europe is equally as striking. Tables I and II in the Appendix below demonstrate that, although the South Mediterranean is marginal to European interests, representing only 7.5 per cent of its imports – including oil and gas which caused a peak in imports in 2004 and 2005 – and 9.5 per cent of its exports in 2005, the European Union was the regions major trade partner by far, supplying 46 of its imports and taking 47 per cent of its exports in 2005. Table II demonstrates a similar marginalisation in terms of direct foreign investment, for the region only absorbed 3.26 per cent of EU foreign investment in 2004.

The disaggregated figures are even more revealing for they demonstrate that dependence on access to Europe amongst the Maghrib states has been far higher that the average figures would suggest. Furthermore, the overall figures also conceal the importance of Turkey in the South Mediterranean relationship for variations in South Mediterranean trade faithfully replicate similar variations in trade between Turkey and the European Union. In other words, despite the importance of energy trade to Europe, the real determinant of trade patterns is Turkey which is not an energy exporter, although this feature will emerge in the coming years as the country becomes the terminal for oil and gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia. The simple fact is, however, that Europe will shape the economic futures of the South Mediterranean powerfully in the years to come, even if its share of South Mediterranean trade is in slow secular decline. It is worth noting that the South Mediterranean suffers from a trade deficit with Europe, even Europe itself is in deficit in its trade with the rest of the world.

This pattern of dependence stemming both from the colonial period and from Europe's pattern of energy supply meant that South Mediterranean economic development would be intimately connected to the region's access to European markets, both in terms of trade and in terms of driving migration as employment generation failed to keep pace with its demographic growth. Conversely, Europe would react to its perceptions of the security dilemma that migration would cause by seeking to use economic means to improve economic performance and thus remove the driver for migration that had existed since the First World War but that had become a dominant concern after 1945.This was the key dilemma that the Barcelona Process sought to resolve but it was the integrated, holistic nature of the policy that marked in out as an experiment in open regionalism, as portrayed in the Barcelona Declaration.

3 The Barcelona Process

There were two essential components to the new policy. It first sought the organisation of a series of bilateral free trade arrangements between individual South Mediterranean states and the European Union in industrial goods, thus exposing their industrial sectors – seen as the primary potential generators of growth and employment – to unfettered competition with European industry. This, it was anticipated, would force an optimal use of resources in the countries concerned and ensure appropriate economic reforms to meet the European challenge by modernising their economies. It was an approach that recalled the principles behind the Europe Union's own construction, culminating in the Single European Market. Secondly, this was paralleled with a series of multilateral partnership measures based on the confidence-building approach established by the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, held in Helsinki in 1975 to initiate the process of détente, and repeated in the Italian-Spanish non-paper of 1990 which proposed a similar Conference on Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean. This, together with free trade, provided the innovative elements of the new policy and would construct the shared zone of peace and stability whilst the expected integration of Southern markets, to exploit efficiencies arising from economies-of-scale and complementarity within an enlarged market space capable of stimulating endogamous growth would speed access to a shared prosperity.

However, although the new policy was based on the principles of economic integration with the implied assumption of free movement of capital and goods, it remained faithful to its underlying purpose of preventing further migration into Europe and did not include the essential third freedom, that of labour. Borders and divisions, in short, were to be preserved for economic and political reasons. Indeed, to this extent, it faithfully replicated the underlying principles of *détente* which had sought to create confidence-building measures designed to reassure the Soviet Union against its fears of military threat but not to assimilate it, with its alien political system, into Western Europe or the wider Western sphere. That would have to await internal change and the spontaneous disintegration of the Socialist Bloc in 1989 as the Cold War came to an end. In the same way, the Barcelona Process was designed to promote economic, social and political change within established boundaries and indirectly reinforced their effectiveness, thus primarily serving the objective of European security through Europe's preferred diplomatic instruments.

Thus, as outlined above, the basket of economic measures designed to set up the bilateral free trade areas with the Union – which were eventually intended to be integrated into a single South Mediterranean market to match the Single European Market – was matched by two other baskets of measures. One basket dealt with common security concerns in the Mediterranean with the objective of constructing a cooperative security regime, an objective that, given the ongoing crisis in relations between Israel and the Palestinians, has remained stillborn. It also advanced the prospect of democratic governance and institutional respect for human rights as an essential part of the modernisation package. The other basket addressed measures directed at creating mutual public appreciation of cultures and societies, alongside others designed to stimulate the development of civil society in

on either objective both because of the timidity of European politicians and because of Southern resentment of European xenophobia at home and interference abroad, not to speak of the wider implications of Western policy after the events of 9/11, in the United States.

What the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, better known as the 'Barcelona Process', did not do was to resolve the inherent contradiction between closer economic cooperation and the persistence of political division. This focused around the issues of migration and visas. Migration had originally been treated by the Union on the basis of a zero-inward migration policy and seen as part of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the Maastricht treaty. By the end of the 1990s, however, Europe had come to recognize that it had become an immigration area and that a policy of managed migration would be necessary – a concern of the Common Foreign and Security Policy because it would involve state-to-state negotiation[14]. Even though this implied that migration and thus labour flows would be permitted, it was still based on the idea that this would take place between states and thus across borders normatively defined as impermeable.

European visa policy maintained this, whether inside the Schengen Area or outside it, so that the difficulties in obtaining a visa began to become a major theme of complaint from the South to the North of the Mediterranean. Similarly, the rapidly increasing flows of illegal migration and asylum-seekers from the South highlighted the reality of the European external border and the growing tensions that it caused – as President Jacques Chirac learned on his famous official visit to Algeria in August 2003, when he was greeted by the mass chanting of 'visas, visas!' by the crowds who welcomed him. Their cries were also a salutary warning to European politicians of the potential failure of the Barcelona Process to achieve its declared objectives, as illegal migration into Europe rose inexorably towards 400,000-to-500,000 a year.[15]

The failure to control migration, however, has not been the only failure that has confronted the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since its inception in 1995. As mentioned above, the security agenda was stymied by the continuing violent confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians. This meant that no consensus could be reached over a Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean, the embodiment of the Barcelona Process and its aspiration for cooperative security in the region, at the Marseilles Summit in November 2000 and the matter has now been postponed indefinitely.

The European Commission has also been unwilling to invoke the sanctions provided in the bilateral Association Agreements it has signed with its South Mediterranean partners over progress towards democratic governance and particularly over the issue of human rights observance, despite blatant abuses committed in Algeria during its civil war between 1992 and 2000, in Tunisia or as a result of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. It has argued that it is more effective to act quietly through diplomatic channels in a process of constructive engagement and that this has been done. There have not, however, been any evident positive outcomes and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the political and security basket of the Barcelona Process has had

More obvious has been the failure of the basket of economic measures contained in the bilateral Association Agreements and the objective of integration of economies in the South Mediterranean. Bilateral free trade areas have been created through the Association Agreements and parallel reforms have taken place in the South Mediterranean states concerned. Primarily, this has involved the gradual phasing-out of tariff barriers to imports and the replacement of lost customs revenue to the state by the imposition of value-added tax. In parallel to this, economic restructuring has taken place. This has been designed to liberalize the economies concerned, in terms of their external trade, monetary policies and exchange control regimes, together with the withdrawal of the state from the economic process and the development of institutions – domestic financial markets and legal systems – designed to encourage foreign private direct and equity investment.

These changes, which mirror precisely the prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank, were intended to improve the climate for foreign investment which was seen as the necessary driver for industrial expansion and job creation. Unfortunately, except for the one-time realisations of privatization receipts, inflows of investment have been disappointingly low. In fact they have been little more than one half of expectations and, once again, because investors sense that, outside the oil-and-gas sectors, returns and security is far better elsewhere – in South East Asia, China or Latin America. This has proved to be the pattern of the region overall which has not only had the second lowest level of foreign investment worldwide on average in recent years – only Africa received less – but has also see its share of investment actually decline in proportion to global investment flows.[16]

The main reason for this has been the region's lack of comparative advantage in a world where low-cost Asian producers are now a dominant force. The implications of this were underlined in January 2005 when the end of the multifibre agreement meant that South Mediterranean textile exports to Europe – one of the mainstays of the expected growth in industrial exports – collapsed precipitously. In the first three months of the year, Moroccan textile exports to Europe, for example, dropped by 30 per cent. The consequences of this in terms of job creation have been compounded by the continuing demographic boom for, even though birth-rates in the last decade have fallen significantly, the massive bulge in population created in the twentieth century is now approaching the age range when it will be potentially economically active but the potential for job creation is simply not there.

This implies that one of the main, if unexpressed, objectives of the Barcelona process – the creation of economic opportunity and employment to soak up the potential well of emigrants – has simply not been achieved. Of course, had agriculture formed part of the original economic package, this would have provided a further outlet for the economies of the Southern Mediterranean, as had been the case with the agreements drawn up before 1995. Yet, even here it is not clear that this would have been the case, for the highly mechanized, capital intensive agriculture of the European Union with its subsidised production costs could have done untold damage to the protected cereal markets of the southern peripheral states – a problem they now face with the United States.

4 Challenges

The reality of this potential failure has been highlighted by two other developments that further reinforce it, despite their innate contradiction with the normative values of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The first of these has been the European reaction to both this implicit failure of the Barcelona Process and the challenge to it offered by similar American policy proposals such as the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative (USMEPI) or the Broader Middle East-North Africa Initiative (BMENA). The second has been the increasing securitization of Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy in response to the perceived threat of global terrorism in the wake of the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 and the London bombings of July 2005. This tendency had begun long before, after the events of September 2001, but it has accelerated dramatically in recent years and is now conditioning all other external policies.

Its significance lies in the fact that it targets an internalized enemy, Europe's poorly integrated migrant communities, and because it is increasingly being seen at the demotic and instinctive level as a cultural confrontation. Ironically enough, it was to these very problems that the social and cultural basket of the Barcelona Process was addressed and the on-going social crisis within Europe is yet another testament to the wider policy failure described above. Indeed, it could be argued that these tensions go even further back, into the heart of the European project itself with its own normative values of political secularism and intellectual tolerance. In many respects, these are being inverted into statements of cultural intolerance in that, unless they are accepted in their entirety by alien non-European groups within the Union – whether or not they are in the process of being Europeanized through assimilation or integration – such groups are to be excluded from the European project despite their residence in Europe in a deliberate process of migrant cultural and social 'ghettoization'.

The American challenge is more ambiguous, for Europe both wishes to embrace it and yet fears its implications for its own policies in the region. In essence Europe and the United States have a common interest in shaping the Mediterranean environment to enhance their security interests although those interests differ. For Europe, as described above, the dominant concern relates to the Southern European periphery and seeks to ensure border security within an environment of controlled migration. That concern has now been complicated by the growing security threats within Europe itself which are linked, in part to the external political environment and to the European reaction to it. The result has been an increasing tendency to internalize these political concerns and to redefine them in terms of a cultural confrontation within and outside Europe that manifests itself as globalized terrorism.

For the United States, the security concern is quite different in that threats in the Mediterranean remain geographically external to the United States itself and relate to its wider strategic concerns. These reflect the security of strategic lines of communication[17] through the Mediterranean itself, given the fact that these are dominated by a series of choke-points, and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean with respect to Israel and the Persian Gulf. Of course, in the wake of the events of 9/11, the United States has, in effect, adopted Samuel Huntington's concept of the

This means that it is quite prepared to follow the European example of identifying the cultural confrontation that is epitomised by globalized terrorism.

This has not, however, been internalized as is the case with the European Union but it has emphasized a coincident geographic and cultural boundary, particularly with respect to Israel, to which the United States, in addition, to its hard security response in the 'war on terror', has now adopted soft security responses in a similar fashion to the European Union. This, in essence, argues – as does Europe – that the adoption of certain specific cultural and political values and practices could eliminate the security threat, provided that innate and indigenous parallel values are discarded. Despite superficial differences between the two projects – European and American – at root, they are surprisingly similar, even if articulated in different ways.

Thus, on 12 December, 2002, the then secretary-of-state, Colin Powell, in an address to the Heritage Foundation in Washington introduced a new soft security policy for the Mediterranean[19]. This, the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative, was designed to compensate for deficiencies in governance, economic development, educational approaches and the empowerment of women, to which Congress has committed $302.9 million over a four year period for the multilateral initiative, in addition to the $1 billion-worth of bilateral aid that the United States supplies to the region every year[20], quite apart from the special aid programmes for Egypt and Israel. In 2004, the United States opened two regional offices, in Tunis and Bahrain, to manage this initiative and has negotiated bilateral free trade areas with Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco. The initiative is also the vehicle through which the individual programmes of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, proposed by the United States and adopted by the G-8 group of states at the Sea Island meeting in 2004, are put into operation.

The interesting feature of this new American policy is that, even though its security justification is quite different, it is in direct competition with the Barcelona Process, at least as far as governance and economic development are concerned. At best, such duplication causes confusion and at worst it provides a mechanism by which Southern governments can avoid commitments they do not wish to undertake by playing off the European Union against the United States. It is not clear why cooperation between both major regional powers was not encouraged when the United States decided to adopt a soft security approach and, although Commission officials today claim that there is no conflict, the Commission presidency in 2002 had no doubt at all that the American initiative was designed, in part at least, to challenge Europe[21]. After all, the United States had been sidelined when the Barcelona Process had been introduced in 1995!

It is also clear that the American initiative also emphasizes the existence of a cultural barrier between a realm of assumed secular democratic tolerance and an external arena of cultural otherness characterized by violence and threat. This is to be corrected by the introduction of cultural and political change in a rather more intrusive fashion, particularly with respect to education and the status of women, than that practiced by the European Union, although the underlying assumptions are the same in both cases. Both arise from shared perceptions of a new international order, created by the hegemony of a single hyper-power, in which Europe must find its place, despite the contradictions this may create with its underlying interests,

given the presence of domestic migrant communities and a turbulent periphery in which the turbulence is, in part, a consequence of the attitudes and policies of its dominant partner, the United States.

The policies of both the United States and the European Union towards the Middle East must, however, be seen against the wider context of the contemporary international order. Most analyses of international relations today start with an assumption that a new world order was essentially established upon the ashes of the Cold War. With the destruction of the prolonged stability of the Cold War, a new kind of stability emerged, predicated on the predominance of the United States in security and economic terms – a kind of uni-polar hegemonic stability – and on the universalization of the liberal democratic model and the market economy – the modern version of globalisation[22]. The first airing of this new world occurred in the aftermath of the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait by the Multinational Coalition under the leadership of the first Bush presidency and under the aegis of a revived United Nations, now set, apparently, to operate as its founders had intended. Concepts of open regionalism, which innately respected the sovereignty of participating states fitted well into this background

During the 1990s, however, a series of new ideas began to emerge, building in part on new, postmodernist concepts of sovereignty. These allowed for intervention in the internal affairs of a state, indeed encouraged it, if the state in question in some way abused universal principles of human rights or, because it repressed its own population, could be considered to have forfeited its right to rule, since sovereignty was an expression of general will or collective legitimacy, not solely of the power of the state[23]. By the end of the decade, this had blossomed into a full-blown ideology of intervention, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world, as typified by Tony Blair's Chicago speech on 22 April 1999[24]. These ideas, drafted originally by Sir Laurence Freedman, were given intellectual substance by Robert Cooper, a British diplomat, who first argued that the postmodern state would be a construct of a state within an ordered international community where sovereignty was voluntarily derogated. He subsequently proposed a reification of interventionism under the rubric of 'reluctant imperialism', which turned out to be suspiciously similar to concepts of liberalism imperialism as developed at the height of the Victorian era[25].

Such ideas meshed well with those that were to emerge when the Bush administration came to power in 2001 and the neo-conservative agenda became to dominate the foreign policy process. The new concepts not only involved the long-standing American conservative vision of the projection of national interest at a global level – first proposed and justified by President Reagan in the 1980s, as a kind of inversion of the moral status of American democracy into the international area as a justification of the practice of diplomatic neo-realism – but also added its own unique assumptions. These involved the practice of unilateral force where necessary, on a pre-emptive basis, if need be, to establish an international democratic environment sympathetic of and supportive to the United States and its allies. The neo-conservatives rejected the restraining influence of international organisations or of an international, law-based community[26]. They also distanced themselves from the European Community's endorsement of such an approach and its innate preference for soft security and the preferred European diplomatic technique of constructive engagement.[27]

The neo-conservatives were a product of the frustrations felt by the United States during the 1990s and of the underlying American distaste for any kind of restraint on its diplomatic activities. As such they were well within an American tradition reaching back, ironically enough, to Woodrow Wilson as well as to his Congressional critics at the time who had refused to endorse the international institutions created by the Treaty of Versailles. They also reflected many of the assumptions behind the geo-economics of the Clinton era, much though they decried Clintonian foreign policy. In a sense, they combined the universalism of Francis Fukuyama's vision and the scepticism of Samuel Huntington. Even more surprisingly, they echoed many of the assumptions behind the New Right in Europe even though they rejected the European project.

Indeed, in many respects, their arrival to power, as articulated through the Bush administration and, subsequently, in the new national security doctrine enunciated by the new administration,[28] marks the end of a long period of transition from the Cold War to a genuinely new world order. This has little to do with a rule-based international society and much more to do with the revival of a neo-realist approach to the international arena, albeit now against a globalized economic background. And, of course, it is this conundrum that Europe is now struggling either to digest or reject because of the contradiction between innate, if rarely-voiced, European sympathy for such a project and overt European preference for international law as the leaven for international relations. It is a crucial contradiction for it provides the intellectual counterpart to the internalized cultural boundary that has emerged in recent years as a result of terrorist violence. The irony is that, despite the reverses that the neo-conservative vision has suffered in recent years, both in Iraq and in the wider Middle East, the essential principles of the ideology itself have been increasingly integrated into the contemporary general European weltanshauung.

It is against this intellectual environment that the implications of the events of 9/11 should be seen. Ironically enough, they acted as a catalyst for the application of the neo-conservative agenda to the Middle East and for the development of the associated 'war on terror' which now applies to the whole region, together with South East Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have resulted in profound changes in regional politics and geopolitics, as well as in the underlying assumptions behind American and, to a lesser extent European regional diplomacy. They have also generated a competition over soft security, as opposed to hard security responses in the Mediterranean region and in the Gulf. Most strikingly of all, they have nourished the development of a major, dispersed and fragmented terrorist threat exploiting modern means of communication and benefiting from access to a coherent intellectual background that has profoundly affected the internal politics and security assumptions of states throughout Europe, as well as in the United States. And, most importantly, both sides in this conflict are increasingly interlinked through a dialectic of antiphonal, mutually reinforcing violence – a reification, as it were, of the 'clash of civilisations'. It is this that forms the background to both the failure of the Barcelona Process and the emergence of a parallel American policy which is unlikely to be more successful.

5 The European response

In the past four years, Europe has had to respond to these new challenges, as well as to some old ones. It has had to face the fact that the Barcelona Process has failed to realize its early promise; it must confront the challenge of American soft security policies in the Mediterranean; and it has had to confront the issue of terrorism within its external frontiers. It has also had to face the implications of Enlargement, especially in the East where new states now share its common external frontier, many of them also seeking membership of the Union itself.

The issue began to be faced in 2002, at the Copenhagen summit of the Council of the European Union. A fully developed policy was produced by the European Commission in May 2004[29] – the month of Eastwards Enlargement – directed towards the new frontier states of the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova – Russia was excluded at its own request – as well as the ten remaining, partner-states in the Barcelona Process – Turkey was excluded because of its imminent accession negotiations but Libya was included because of its expressed desire to join the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Finally, in June 2004, the states of the Caucasus also joined the new frontier policy[30] as a result of a decision taken by the European Union's Council on 17 June, 2004.

The policy is designed to create a 'ring of friends' around the European Union and to respond to the problem that Enlargement cannot be indefinitely extended, although European security depends on political and economic change in neighbouring states, something which, therefore – as in the Barcelona Process – the Union would wish to encourage. As such, although much of the policy is copied from the Enlargement experience,[31] its roots lie in the European Security Strategy, developed in 2003.[32] In other words, in security terms, the new policy is primarily concerned with trafficking of drugs and people, organized crime, terrorism and similar trans-border issues including the environment. This is, of course, inevitable, once the decision was taken in Brussels to limit future Enlargement, although the fact that boundaries between the neighbour states concerned and the European Union are to be maintained is to be mitigated by encouraging cross-border cooperation.

The logic behind the policy is, however, unchanged from that behind the Barcelona Process or, indeed, behind the parallel American initiatives; namely that neighbourhood states must accept European values in terms of governance and economic policy to enable them to become 'friends' and 'neighbours' but that doing so only provides proximity to the European Union, not access. Thus the policy proposes that a series of individual bilateral relations be established between the Union and each state in which the non-European partner is encouraged to adapt its political and economic policies towards the norms of the European Union and, as this occurs, greater and greater access is provided to the instruments of the Union itself, except that participation in the actual governance of the Union will not be part of the agreement. In other words, through a process of positive conditionality, neighbourhood states are to encouraged to apply the European acquis communautaire,[33] on the assumption that this will reduce potential security threats as, in effect, such states adopt the Copenhagen criteria which lie at the root of the Enlargement process.[34]

The policy itself is articulated through a series of Action Plans. These consist of bilateral agreements between the Union and individual states in which a programme of action, over three-to-five years, is laid out to achieve the overall objective. The state concerned, in negotiation with the Commission, determines the content of the Action Plan, thus establishing what it would consider a reasonable programme, whilst the Union monitors progress through a process of benchmarking and provides political, administrative and financial support. From 2007, the old Barcelona MEDA (Mésures d'Ajustement) financing programme which provided funding for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, together with the old programmes for funding political and economic change in the East, such as the TACIS programme, will have been absorbed into a new financial instrument designed specifically for the European Neighbourhood Policy.[35] It seems impossible to consider such a policy, based specifically on bilateral relations across the Mediterranean, as being in any sense 'open regionalism', even if it does apply to a series of geographically contiguous states.

What, then, happens to the Barcelona Process? It seems clear that the new European Neighbourhood Policy runs directly counter to the underlying principles of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for it promotes bilateral relations between neighbour-states and the European Union, rather than the horizontal integration which was the ultimate purpose of the Barcelona Process. The Commission is determined to reject such a conclusion and, in the regulations laying down the final policy,[36] published in October 2006, it states that (paragraph 13) 'For Mediterranean partners, assistance and cooperation should take place within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership…' It argues that, in effect, the European Neighbourhood Policy will enable states to enter the European Economic Area (paragraph 18) and thus, supposedly, will enjoy all the benefits offered under the Barcelona Declaration's 'zone of shared peace, prosperity and stability' proposed in 1995.

The problem is twofold; firstly all the measures to be adopted under the new European Neighbour and Partnership Instrument in reality emphasize the bilateral relationship between neighbour-states and the Union and undermine the South-South relationships which were the key to the Barcelona Process, and secondly, neighbourhood states have no compulsion for reform. Instead they set the reform agenda by negotiation with the Commission and suffer no inconvenience if they do not achieve the objectives they have set for themselves. It is true, of course, that there are rewards for states that do achieve their targets but no price is paid if they do not. Thus, clearly, if a foreign government feels that its priorities require that the priority accorded to the Neighbourhood Policy should be downgraded, it suffers no disadvantage in consequence.

In essence, therefore, unlike the Barcelona Process, the old principle of horizontal integration has disappeared and the new policy is resolutely bilateral in its conception, rejecting the multilateralism inherent in the Barcelona Process as a complicating factor which led in part to the failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It thus entrenches the 'hub-and-spoke' concept which the Barcelona Process considered to be a temporary stage, to be overcome by horizontal integration in the political, security and social spheres, once economic integration had been achieved in the South. In security terms, it seeks to build what Attina regards as

an amalgamated security community, as defined by Karl Deutsch[37]. As William Wallace has said, 'Western Europe faces the uncomfortable choice of importing insecurity from its neighbours, or of exporting to them security – which necessarily involves prosperity and stability'.[38]

The policy is thus overtly Eurocentric, avoiding any of the linguistic moderation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, even if its underlying purpose is little different. In effect, its spirit and outcomes seem likely to be far closer to the 'closed regionalism' concept, in that it wishes to bind neighbouring states into permanent relationships governed by an agreed body of law, as in the European Union itself, but without any executive counterpart. Indeed, it is also imperial, for the satellite 'neighbours' will be, in effect, satrapies of the European core in which, in the end governance, security mechanisms, economic relationships and cultural paradigms will be imposable if the full benefits of partnership are to be realised. Once states have accepted the European embrace – the *acquis communautaire* – there will be no going back!

6 Conclusion

In a sense, the policy wheel has come full circle, although the European Commission insists that the global and holistic features of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will not be over-ridden by European Neighbourhood Policy when the two are amalgamated after 2007. Whether this is true or not will depend on the degree to which the political-security and cultural-social baskets of the Barcelona Process are sustained under the new, combined policy. In economic terms, however, the hub-and-spoke arrangement of independent bilateral agreements with the European Union will dissipate hopes of integration of the economies in the South Mediterranean into a single market to partner the European Single Market, through initiatives such as the Agadir Agreement and the moribund Maghrib Arab Union (UMA). Yet that, of course, was one of the major justifications for the Barcelona Process; that it would generate economic integration in the South that would provide a sustainable economic region that could ensure endogamous economic growth.

Yet, if the pessimistic conclusions voiced above are not to be realized, the real question is whether or not the new initiatives can achieve the aspirations of the Barcelona Declaration, of creating a zone of shared peace, stability and prosperity, and thus of providing Europe with the security it needs from uncontrollable immigration from the South Mediterranean and from the spill-over effects of regional violence as a result of economic and political failure there. In part, of course, this depends on the ability of Western policy to defuse, not exacerbate, regional problems and tensions. In part it depends, too, on the development of stable, participatory government there as well. Both, in turn, depend on resolving the two great crises in the region – the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq and the continuing crisis in the Palestinian territories – and that, too, is a European and American responsibility. And, increasingly, both are becoming tributary to the securitised obsessions inherent in the 'war on terror'.